Williams v. Saul
Decision Date | 09 September 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 5:18-cv-158-MJF |
Parties | GLORIA J. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff Gloria J. Williams brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and seeks review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The Commissioner denied her applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies. After careful consideration of the entire record, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.2
On July 17, 2015, Plaintiff protectively filed: (1) a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits; and (2) an application for supplemental security income. (Tr. 10). In her applications, Plaintiff alleged that her disability began March 14, 2014. (Id.). Her claims were initially denied on August 27, 2015, and upon reconsideration on October 29, 2015. Thereafter Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id.). On May 12, 2017, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared before the assigned ALJ at a video hearing. (Id.). On August 16, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision in which she found Plaintiff was not under a disability. (Tr. 10-22). Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, and, on May 9, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 1-6). Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to review in this court. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). This appeal followed.
In denying Plaintiff's claims, the ALJ made the following findings relevant to the issues raised in this appeal:
Review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence from the record and was a result of the application of proper legal standards. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (); see also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). "A determination that is supported by substantial evidence may be meaningless . . . if it is coupled with or derived from faulty legal principles." Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).As long as proper legal standards were applied, the Commissioner's decision will not be disturbed if, in light of the record as a whole, the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but not a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439. The reviewing court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986). A court "'must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.'" Schink v.Comm'r of Soc. Sec., ___ F.3d ___, 2019 WL 4023639, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019) (citing MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The Act defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability the physical or mental impairment must be so severe that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work, "but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g),3 the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:
The claimant bears the burden of establishing that she suffers from a severe impairment that keeps her from performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. If the claimant establishes such an impairment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant's impairments, the claimant can perform. MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1052. If the Commissioner carries this burden, the claimant must then prove she cannot perform the work suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
Results from a July 2006 Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI") scan showed "mild disc degeneration at C5-6 with a small posterior disc protrusion extendingbeyond smaller spurs that was very close to cord with no displacement or complication." (Tr. 17, 550). It also showed a smaller posterior disc bulge or minor protrusion at C6-7, causing mild deformity of the thecal sac, but not contacting the cord. (Id.). There were also subtle disc bulges at C4-5 and C7-T1. (Id.). The scan also indicated that there was a minimal bulge at C3-4. (Id.). Plaintiff has not received medical treatment for this impairment. (Id., Tr. 48).
In February 2014, Plaintiff presented to the Bay County Health Department for blood pressure medication refills. Plaintiff reported a history that included a back and a left knee injury, but she denied any numbness, tingling, depression, or difficulty with sleeping. (Tr. 618). She also did not report any neck pain. Plaintiff was not prescribed anything for pain. (Tr. 618-23). In May 2014, Plaintiff denied any muscle or joint problems, pain, swelling, tingling, or numbness. (Tr. 614-15). These records reflect that she had no joint abnormalities or swelling. She had full range of motion and full strength. (Tr. 616). In July 2014, she reported swelling in her fingers and feet; however, she denied muscle or joint problems, muscle pain, numbness, or tingling. (Tr. 611). She also had no gross motor dysfunction and a normal mental status. (Tr. 612). These records also indicate that she had no joint abnormalities or swelling and that she had full range of motion and full strength. (Id.). In November 2014, she similarly denied any musculoskeletal or psychiatricproblems. (Tr. 608). Plaintiff's additional exam results remained...
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