Williams v. Sch. Town of Munster
| Decision Date | 06 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2:12-cv-225-APR |
| Parties | LOUIS WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL TOWN OF MUNSTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 17] filed by the defendants on January 31, 2014. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The plaintiff, Louis Williams, an African American, went to the Munster High School football game on October 1, 2010 to watch his son play. When he arrived, there were no seats available, so he stood near the fence in front of the bleachers with his wife and daughter. While watching the game, Williams received a telephone call. He walked away from the fence to a grassy area near the outside fence.
Williams testified that while he was on the phone, one of the defendants, Donald Stopper, grabbed and yanked his arm and yelled at him to get off the grass. Williams asked Stopper what was going on, and Stopper replied that he told Williams to get off the grass. Williams responded by explaining that he had been on the phone and had not heard anyone tell him to get off the grass. Stopper then stated that he had been yelling at Williams for five minutes to get off thegrass and that Williams stated "no problem." Williams continued to talk on his phone and Stopper attempted to pull him off the grass.
Williams turned around and saw the defendant, Lyon Alb, standing on the sidewalk yelling that he had been told to get off the grass. By this time, Williams was off the grass and stated to Alb that there were no signs telling him not to go on the grass. Williams pointed out non-minorities walking on the grass to Alb. Williams continued to talk on his phone, and Alb moved on the grass behind him, pushing Williams' back with his forearm and getting into his "private space."
Alb and Stopper testified that once Williams was asked to leave the grassy area he became aggressive and invaded Alb's personal space. Williams completed his call and asked Alb what was going on. Williams then asked Alb to move and started to walk away. Alb and Stopper jumped in front of him. Williams asked them both to move, but they continued to block his path. Williams suggested that they call the police, and Stopper and Alb agreed. They asked Williams to go with them, but when he refused, they advised him that he was being removed from the game. Alb and Stopper began hitting and shoving Williams with their closed fists and flashlights in his back, stomach, and side. This lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. Williams testfied that while the defendants were assaulting him, they also verbally taunted him saying, "What wrong, what are you going to do now boy". Once Williams stopped trying to leave, the defendants stopped pushing him.
Stopper went to get the police. When Williams attempted to leave again, Alb stopped him with his forearm. Stopper returned with the police, who then escorted Williams off the premises. After the incident, Williams experienced pain in his side. He was seen for a fracturedrib, abdominal bruising, shallow breathing, and lower back pain the next day at Community Hospital.
At the time of the incident, Alb was employed by the School Town of Munster as a teacher, and Stopper was an employee in student services. Both were responsible for supervising the spectators on the night of the incident. As part of their duties, they were responsible for ensuring that the spectators did not go on the newly planted grass and that no one went under the bleachers. Neither received any training prior to being a supervisor for the Munster home football games.
Williams filed a Tort Claim Notice on February 15, 2011. Because he did not receive the relief he desired, he filed a complaint on June 6, 2012. Williams alleges that he has been denied the right to liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §1 of the Indiana Constitution, that the defendants used excessive force to remove him from the grassy area in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the State of Indiana Constitution, and that his removal constituted assault under Indiana law. The defendants now move for summary judgment on all of Williams' claims.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of agenuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1610, 26 L. Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786. A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. There must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). However, summary judgment may be entered against the non-moving party if it is unable to "establish the existence of an essential element to [the party's] case, and on which [that party] will bear the burden of proof at trial . . .". Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 964 (citing Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Summary judgment is inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith, and other subjective feelings play dominant roles. Ashman v. Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006). Upon review, the court does not evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter; rather, the court will determine whether there exists a genuine issue of triable fact. Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986)).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial.
See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L. Ed.2d 105, 120-22 (2000) (); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2553; Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008)( that a genuine issue is one on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party); Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)( that a genuine issue exists and summary judgment is inappropriate if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a "federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . ." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2082, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights, but "it acts as an instrument for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere." Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1997). When analyzing a § 1983 claim, it is necessary to identify the specific constitutional right that was violated. Spiegel, 121 F.3d at 254. Then, the validity of the claim must be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard that governs the right. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
Williams alleges that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right by applying excessive force and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against him based on his race. Once a violation is identified, the plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian—St. Luke's Medical Center, 184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.1999). West, 487 U.S. at 49-50, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To continue reading
Request your trial