Williams v. Sec'y

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: JAMES D. WHITTEMORE United States District Judge
• Decision Date: 24 June 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:12-CV-973-T-27TGW
• Citation: Williams v. Sec'y, Case No. 8:12-CV-973-T-27TGW (M.D. Fla. Jun 24, 2015)
• Parties: NICHOLAS WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

NICHOLAS WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Case No. 8:12-CV-973-T-27TGW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

June 24, 2015

ORDER

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging convictions for armed burglary, attempted murder, first-degree murder, and shooting within an occupied building entered in 2004 by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, Polk County, Florida (Dkt. 1). Respondent filed a response to the petition (Dkt. 9) with exhibits (Dkt. 10), and Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Dkt. 15). Upon consideration, the petition will be denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 20, 2004, a jury convicted Petitioner of armed burglary, attempted murder, first-degree murder, attempted home invasion robbery, and shooting within an occupied building (Resp. Ex. 23, Vol. I at record pp. 226-30). Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on both the first-degree murder count and the armed burglary count, a term of 25-years' imprisonment on the attempted home invasion robbery count, a term of 20-years imprisonment on the attempted murder count, and a term of 15-years imprisonment on the shooting within an occupied building count (Id. at record pp. 263-73). On July 26, 2006, the state appellate court affirmed without written opinion (Resp. Ex. 4); Williams v. State, 935 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [table].

On March 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.850 ("Rule 3.850 motion"), alleging six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Resp. Ex. 8 at "Exhibit A").¹ On February 11, 2008, Petitioner filed his Motion to Submit Revised Ground to Motion for Post Conviction Relief ("motion to revise") in which he requested to "revise" Ground 1B of his Rule 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. 6). On March 20, 2008, the state post-conviction court dismissed, without prejudice, the motion to revise, stating that the Court's files did not contain Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. 7). On April 14, 2008, Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration to which he attached a copy of the Rule 3.850 motion he claimed he previously filed (Resp. Ex. 8). On May 27, 2008, the state post-conviction court filed its Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Motion to Submit Revised Ground to Motion for Post Conviction Relief in which the court denied several claims, and directed the State to respond to the three remaining claims (Resp. Ex. 9). On June 4, 2008, Petitioner filed his Addendum to Pending 3.850 Motion in which he alleged three additional ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims (Resp. Ex. 10). On August 29, 2008, the State filed its Response to the Court's Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Motion to Submit Revised Ground to Motion for Post Conviction Relief (Resp. Ex. 11). On September 15, 2008, the state post-conviction court filed its Order on Defendant's Addendum to Pending 3.850 Motion and Order to Show Cause in which the court denied one claim, dismissed a second claim as facially insufficient, and directed the State to respond to the third claim (Resp. Ex. 12). On November 14, 2008, the State filed its Response to the court's Order on Defendant's Addendum to Pending 3.850 Motion and Second Order to Show Cause (Resp. Ex. 13). On November 17, 2008, Petitioner filed his Amendment to Issue I (Claim 9) of Addendum to Pending 3.850 Motion (see Resp. Ex. 14). On November 21, 2008, the state post-conviction court filed its Order on Defendant's Motions for Postconviction Relief and Amendment to Issue I (Claim 9); Order Granting Evidentiary Hearing and Order Setting Status Conference (Id.). An evidentiary hearing on Claims 1, 6(b), and 9 of Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion was held on December 4, 2009 (Resp. Ex. 15). On February 1, 2010, the state post-conviction court filed its Final Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Post Conviction Relief in which the court 1) denied Claims 1 and 6b of Petitioner Rule 3.850 motion,² and 2) granted Claim 3, striking Petitioner's conviction for attempted home invasion robbery (Resp. Ex. 16). Because the attempted home invasion robbery conviction was stricken, the state trial court entered an amended judgment on February 3, 2010, indicating that the conviction was "stricken per court order of 1/29/10." (Id. at record p. 333).

Petitioner filed a petition for belated appeal of the February 1, 2010 Final Order, which the appellate court granted on October 27, 2010 (Resp. Ex. 17). On February 17, 2012, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the state post-conviction court's Final Order (Resp. Ex. 20); Williams v. State, 104 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) [table]. The appellate court mandate issued on March 14, 2012 (Resp. Ex. 22).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this Court on April 27, 2012, raising six grounds for relief (Dkt. 1):

1. The state trial court erred in finding that probable cause was demonstrated in the affidavit for a warrant to be issued to search the Petitioner's home and that the items seized therein were admissible (Ground One);

2. The state trial court erred in not granting defense counsel's motion for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor published a misleading verdict form to the jury during closing argument (Ground One (a));

3. Trial counsel was ineffective

a. in failing to have Petitioner evaluated for competency (Ground Two);

b. in failing to move to dismiss the charges on the ground that Petitioner was denied a timely first appearance hearing (Ground Two (a));

c. in failing to call Petitioner's father, Warren Williams, and step-mother, Rose Williams, to testify at the hearing on Petitioner's motion to suppress (Ground Two (b)); and

d. in failing to call Warren and Rose Williams to testify at trial (Ground Two (c)).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Standard of Review Under the AEDPA

The petition is subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") effective April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Under AEDPA, habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court's findings of law and fact. It provides that habeas relief may not be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless such determination:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

The Supreme Court has explained the deferential review of a state court's findings:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court's factual findings must also be given deference. Specifically, a state court's determinations of fact "shall be presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2003).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

To have a facially valid claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.

"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). "Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). As the Richter Court explained:

The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.

Id. (citations omitted).

Exhaustion of State Remedies and Procedural Default

Before a district court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner under § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. See § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) ("[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his...