Williams v. Sec'y
Decision Date | 24 October 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-204-J-39JBT |
Parties | DALE L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Dale L. Williams initiated this case by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1).2 He challenges several 2010 Duval County convictions through four grounds.3 Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause(Response) (Doc. 15).4 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 18). See Order (Doc. 5).
Four grounds for habeas relief are raised in the Petition: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) an illegal stop and search; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) insufficiency of the evidence. Petition at 5, 7, 8, 10.
No evidentiary hearing will be conducted as this Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the record refutes the asserted factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Petitioner has not met the burden to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012). In this case, the pertinent facts are fully developed in the record or the record otherwise precludes habeas relief; therefore, the Court is able to "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "AEDPA limits the scope of federal habeas review of state court judgments[.]" Pittman v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 871 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-9015, 2018 WL 2322632 (Oct. 1, 2018). This narrow scope of review under AEDPA provides for habeas relief only if there are extreme malfunctions, certainly not to be used as a means to correct state court errors. Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). "Under AEDPA, error is not enough; even clear error is not enough." Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 900 F.3d 1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Indeed, federal courts may grant habeas relief:
Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 898 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
This Court will not "flyspeck the state court order or grade it." Id. at 1345. Instead, the Court is charged with reviewing the conclusions of the state court, deferring to the state court decisions, and granting habeas relief only if the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1147 (11th Cir. 2018). Additionally, "[t]his presumption of correctness applies equally to factual determinations made by the state trial and appellate courts." Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1233 (2013).
In this regard:
"Deciding whether a state court's decision 'involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or 'was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to 'train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims.'" Wilson v. Sellers, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1191-92, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) ( ). The Supreme Court recently held that, when the relevant state court decision is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion explaining why relief was denied, "the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale" and "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Id. at 1192. "[T]he State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision." Id.
Johnson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 737 F. App'x 438, 441 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Bearing in mind this guidance from the Supreme Court, this Court undertakes its review of Petitioner's four claims. If the last state court to decide a federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-based decision in a reasoned opinion, this Court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons, if they are reasonable. On the other hand, if the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion, simply stating affirmed or denied, this Court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that provides relevant rationale. This Court presumes the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning as the lower court; however, the presumption is not irrebutable, as strong evidence may refute the presumption. See Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S.Ct. 1603, 1606 (2016) (per curiam). Thus, the state may rebut the presumption by showing the higher state court relied or most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court, "such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Although the § 2254(d) standard is difficult to meet, the standard is meant to be difficult. Rimmer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 876 F.3d 1039, 1053 (11th Cir. 2017) (, )cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 2624 (2018). When applying the stringent AEDPA standard, state court decisions must be given the benefit of the doubt. Trepal v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1107 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citations omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1237 (2013).
In order to prevail on his Sixth Amendment claims, Petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). A counsel's performance is deficient only if counsel's "identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690.
In making its determination as to whether counsel gave adequate assistance, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. When analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "[t]he question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). And importantly, with regard to theestablishment of prejudice requirement, the reasonable probability of a different result must be "a probability...
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