Williams v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11-cv-638-J-32TEM
• Parties: CARL EUGENE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SEC'Y, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

CARL EUGENE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SEC'Y, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:11-cv-638-J-32TEM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

Dated: November 19, 2013

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition (Doc. #1) for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2006 state court (Clay County) conviction for one count of sale or delivery of cocaine and one count of sale or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of church on eight grounds. Respondents have responded. See Response to Habeas Petition (Doc. #11) (hereinafter Response).¹ Petitioner has replied. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Answer to Petitioner's Habeas Petition (Doc. #15). Thus, this case is ripe for review.²

II. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations,which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

III. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (hereinafter AEDPA), this Court's review "is 'greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts.' Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002)." Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).

[Section] 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was: "(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable[³] application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Marquard,[⁴] 429 F.3d at 1303. The phrase "clearly established Federal law," as used in § 2254(d)(1), encompasses only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of therelevant state court decision. SeeCarey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)); Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006).

Id. at 1208-09.

For a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's determination will be entitled to deference for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that explains the state court's rationale for such a ruling. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (holding that section 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been adjudicated on the merits); Wright v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002).

IV. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Grounds One, Two, Four and Five

In ground one, Petitioner contends that counts one and two of the Second Amended Information charging him in state court were defective because they failed to charge a crime under Florida law, in violation of his rights under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. Petition at 7-12. In ground two, Petitioner alleges that counts one and two were defective because they omitted essential elements of the charged crimes. Id. at 13-16. Respondents contend, and this Court agrees, that these two grounds are procedurally barred.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, reh'gdenied, 490 U.S. 1076 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). A procedural default arises "when 'the petitioner fails to raise the [federal] claim in state court and it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile.'" Owen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)).

In the process of exhausting a claim, a habeas petitioner must comply with all independent and adequate state procedures.

As a rule, a state prisoner's habeas claims may not be entertained by a federal court "when (1) 'a state court [has] declined to address [those] claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,' and (2) "'the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.'" Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. —, —, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011) (quoting Coleman,[⁵] 501 U.S., at 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2546).

Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922 (2012) (alteration in original). The Eleventh Circuit has set forth a three-part test to determine whether a state court's procedural ruling constitutes an independent and adequate state rule:

(1) the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must clearly and expressly state that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits of that claim; (2) the state court's decision must rest solidly on state law grounds, and may not be "intertwined with an interpretation of federal law"; and (3) the state procedural rule must not be applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

Petitioner raised these two claims in state court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the First District Court of Appeal in January of 2008. Ex. J. On February 5, 2008, that court dismissed the petition, citing Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004) (finding that habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants which seek the kind of collateral post-conviction relief available through a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 motion filed in the sentencing court will be dismissed as unauthorized, if such petitions: (1) would be untimely if considered as a 3.850 motion; (2) raise claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence; or (3) would be considered second or successive motions under the applicable rule of criminal procedure that either fail to allege new or different grounds for relief, or allege new or different grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first motion was filed). Ex. K. The First District Court of Appeal rejected these two claims on procedural grounds. This procedural rule is regularly enforced. See Rozelle v. State, 119 So.3d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (per curiam) (dismissing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the petitioner challenged his judgment and sentence and citing Baker for the proposition that habeas corpus cannot be used to litigate issues that could have been or were raised on direct appeal or in postconviction motions).

Petitioner also raised ground two in state court in a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 3.850. Ex. BB at 18-31. The state circuit found this claim to be untimely "in that it was filed more than two years after the Defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 175 (citing Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1990), Delap v. State, 513 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1987), and Gust v. State, 535 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). The court furtherfound that this "argument could or should have been raised on direct appeal or in his prior Motion, and is thus procedurally barred." Id. (citing Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1995), and Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1995)).⁶ Upon Petitioner's appeal, the First District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed the circuit court's order. Ex. EE.

It would be futile to dismiss this case to give Petitioner the opportunity to exhaust his claims in grounds one and two because they should have been raised on direct appeal. Accordingly, these two grounds have been procedurally defaulted.

"The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law." Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).

For purposes of the "cause and prejudice" method of overcoming a procedural bar, a petitioner shows sufficient cause if he can demonstrate "that some 'objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.'" Siebert,[⁷] 455 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). External impediments sufficient to constitute cause "include evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered in time to comply with the rule; interference by state officials that made compliance impossible; and ineffective assistance of counsel at a stage where the petitioner had a right to counsel." Mize,[⁸] 532 F.3d at 1190.

Owen, 568 F.3d at 908.

Once cause has been established, a petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice. "As to the prejudice requirement, the petitioner must show 'that there is at least a reasonable...