Williams v. Shapiro

• Decision Date: 27 April 1967
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 449,234 A.2d 376
• Court: Connecticut Circuit Court
• Parties: Pauline WILLIAMS v. Bernard SHAPIRO, Welfare Commissioner. 6-6611-27628.

Page 376

234 A.2d 376

4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 449

Pauline WILLIAMS v. Bernard SHAPIRO, Welfare Commissioner.

No. CV 6-6611-27628.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Sixth Circuit.

April 27, 1967.

John Rose, Jr., New Haven, for plaintiff.

Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Rapuano, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

WISE, Judge.

The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff was the supervising relative for Willie Edward Williams, her husband, and Jimmie Williams, her son, recipients of assistance under the aid to dependent children program. Willie E. Williams had two life insurance policies with the cash surrender value of $183.33 and $206. Jimmie Williams also had two life insurance policies with a cash surrender value of $59.10 and $104.91. The combined cash surrender value of the four policies amounted to $553.34. Plaintiff received assistance under the aid to dependent children program from January 1, 1960, to June 31, 1966, when the award was discontinued because the assistance plan members had insurance policies with a cash surrender value in excess of $250 and refused to adjust the insurance policies so that the cash surrender value would not exceed $250. The award was discontinued by virtue of the rules and regulations of the state welfare commissioner ¹ and the application of the commissioner's policy. ²

The plaintiff requested a fair hearing as provided for in § 17-2a of the General Statutes. Thereafter, a fair hearing was held and the discontinuance of the award by the commissioner was upheld. That decision gave rise to the present appeal under § 17-2b, which provides in part: 'The court, upon such appeal, shall determine whether the commissioner has acted illegally or so arbitrarily and unreasonably as to abuse his discretion * * *.'

The plaintiff contends that the commissioner was in error in terminating plaintiff's award because the limit set by § 17-2-3(c) of the regulations on the total cash surrender value of life insurance policies held by beneficiaries of the aid to dependent children program is substantially lower than that for recipients in other categories of the welfare program and, therefore, that limitation operates as a denial of equal protection in contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; that the arbitrary discrimination between the aid to dependent children program and other categories of assistance has no substantial relation to the objectives of the welfare program, and therefore the practice acts as a denial of property of the beneficiaries without due process as required by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution; and that the limit set by § 17-2-3(c) of the regulations on the total cash surrender value of insurance policies held by beneficiaries of the program is unreasonably low and accordingly acts to deprive the beneficiaries of property without due process of law in contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. The court is not in accord with these contentions and holds that there is no merit to them.

It is fundamental that when a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must approach it with great caution, examine it with infinite care, and sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 390, 161 A.2d 770; Edwards v. City of Hartford, 145 Conn. 141, 145, 139 A.2d 599. Even with more hesitation, this court does not feel justified in passing upon a question of constitutionality and declaring legislation void. This determination should be left to and passed upon by a court of higher jurisdiction.

The plaintiff concedes, as indeed she must, that there is no constitutional or common-law duty on the part of the state or any governmental unit to support poor and destitute persons. The whole matter of relief for the needy is purely statutory. Division of Aid for the Aged v. Hogan, 143 Ohio St. 186, 54 N.E.2d 781. But where a statute makes it a duty of the state or local authorities to provide for indigent persons, that duty is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Although Connecticut has recognized the necessity for a program relating to aid to dependent children by enacting chapter 302, part 2, of the General Statutes, it nevertheless provided in § 17-100, a part of that chapter, as follows: '(N)o beneficiary or other person shall have any vested right to any such aid.' The import of this is that the plaintiff has no 'property' in welfare assistance that is subject to the protection of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and of the Connecticut constitution. Payment of relief funds are grants and gratuities rather than legal obligations. Smith v. Board of Commissioners, 259 F.Supp. 423; see McCarthy v. Hinman, 35 Conn. 538, 540.

The plaintiff concedes that the state can set limits as to the value of assets held by recipients of its welfare programs but contends that those limits can be so arbitrarily low as to deprive a recipient of his property, resulting in a denial of due process. This again presupposes that the recipient of aid has a vested property right in such aid. The court is not in accord, as hereinbefore stated.

Further, the fact that the limit set by § 17-2-3(c) of the regulations on the total cash surrender value of life insurance policies held by recipients of aid to dependent children is lower than that for recipients in other categories of the welfare program is immaterial. The fourteenth amendment does not purport to prevent a state from adjusting its legislation to differences in situations and to that end to make a justifiable classification. It merely requires that the classification shall be based on a real and substantial difference having a rational relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The classification need not, however, be accurate, scientific, logical or harmonious, so long as it is not arbitrary and will accomplish the legislative design. The judiciary will not interfere with the classification when made unless it is clearly unreasonable. Since there is no legal obligation upon the state, or any governmental unit, in the absence of legislative action, to support its poor, it follows necessarily that a large degree of discretion rests upon the state when it elects to furnish relief. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46, 132 A.L.R. 511. Whatever the reasons may be for the legislature to provide for differences in classifications,...