Williams v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-02050-TLP-egb,2:17-cv-02050-TLP-egb |
| Parties | SONYA P. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
JURY DEMAND
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (ECF No. 42.) Plaintiff has responded (ECF No. 46, 76), thus the Motion is ripe. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff began working for Memphis City Schools ("MCS") as a family and consumer sciences teacher in 2002. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 299.) She became a tenured teacher in 2006.1 (Id.) Later, Plaintiff applied for a position as a family and consumer sciences advisor, but did not received the job. (Id. at PageID 300.) She then filed a claim in 2013 with the EEOC alleging age and race discrimination. (Id.) The EEOC negotiated a settlement of the claim in August 2015, resulting in Plaintiff receiving a position as an Adult Education Advisor in the Adult Education Program ("AEP") of the Shelby County Schools System("SCS"). (Id.) Chantay Branch, Director of Employee Relations, contacted Dr. Joris Ray, Assistant Superintendent for Academic Operations and School Support, to secure the position for Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID 300-01.) Ray did not know that Plaintiff was receiving the position as part of the EEOC settlement agreement. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 301.)
At the beginning of the school year in 2015, Plaintiff began her role as an advisor at the Messick Adult Center. (Id.) An Adult Education Grant provided by the State of Tennessee funded both the AEP and Plaintiff's position. (Id. at PageID 303, 313.) When Plaintiff learned that her position was grant-funded, she allegedly sent an email voicing concern about the funding but otherwise she did not dispute her placement. (Id. at PageID 303.)
Plaintiff alleges that it did not take long for SCS employees to begin harassing her. She alleges that on her first day, Carol Miller, Director of Career and Technical Education, told Plaintiff that she "was glad the District [was] righting [its] wrong" and asked Plaintiff if she was being "compensated fairly" for her position. (Id. at PageID 304.) This interaction occurred in front of Rochelle Griffin, Interim Principal of Messick Adult Center. (Id.) Plaintiff was then allegedly harassed on September 9, 2015, when Griffin and Tawn King, Assistant Principal of Messick Adult Center, met with Plaintiff to discuss her tone, communication style, and global perspectives. (Id. at PageID 305.) At this meeting, Plaintiff acknowledges she got "loud," although she alleges that she was not excessively loud. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 306.) Plaintiff believes that those at the meeting intended to intimidate her and question her credentials. (Id. at PageID 307.) Plaintiff emailed Griffin the next day alleging harassment. (Id.) After receiving the email from Plaintiff, Griffin prepared a memorandum in which she summarized the meeting and informed Plaintiff that "I assuredyou that the circumstances by which you took on the AE Advisor position would never be publicized by me." (ECF No. 42-5 at PageID 198.)
The harassment allegedly continued. Plaintiff contends that Griffin sought to derail her career and subvert her authority on at least two occasions. (Id. at PageID 308.) This led Plaintiff to email Ramone Lloyd, Employee and Labor Relations Advisor, to report the harassment and that she believed Griffin and Miller were retaliating against her for filing an EEOC claim. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 308-09.) About one month later, Griffin referred Plaintiff to Labor Relations for ongoing issues of insubordination. (Id.)
Around this time, Plaintiff also began reporting alleged testing fraud occurring at the AEP, among other misconduct, to visiting state officials. (Id.) The very next day, Plaintiff was made to meet with Branch and Lloyd to discuss the ongoing issues. (Id. at PageID 310.) Branch and Lloyd decided that Plaintiff should meet with Griffin to discuss their concerns. (Id.) The meeting was ultimately unsuccessful. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 311.)
Plaintiff then filed many complaints. First, she filed a whistleblower complaint with SCS alleging that SCS had provided false data to the state and was engaging in testing fraud. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 311.) Second, she filed an EEOC claim alleging retaliation. (Id.) The whistleblower complaint prompted a visit from state officials to interview Plaintiff about her allegations of fraud and other misconduct. (ECF No. 46 at PageID 273.) Plaintiff took this opportunity to inform state officials that Griffin "had a problem with change" and was an "interference" and "impediment" to progress. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 312.)
Unsurprisingly, Griffin did not appreciate these comments and issued Plaintiff a written reprimand; this time for "unethical conduct" related to her behavior during the meeting with state officials investigating her complaint. (Id. at PageID 312.) The reprimandstated that "[Plaintiff's] behavior throughout both meetings seemed as though [Plaintiff] was attempting to sabotage the adult education program within Shelby County Schools." (Id.) Griffin then took a step further and referred Plaintiff to Labor Relations—her second referral in less than five months. (Id.) The referral stated that Plaintiff was "an ill-fit for the Adult Education Advisor position and [her] continued employment at Messick Adult Center [was] adverse to the entire Adult Education Program . . . ." (Id. at PageID 313.)
About one month later, the State of Tennessee terminated the Adult Education Grant that funded the AEP without cause. (ECF No. 46-1 at PageID 313.) This precipitated the closing of the entire AEP program, including the Messick Adult Center, and the termination of employees of the AEP program whose salaries depended on grant funding. (Id.) As a result, at least five full-time and forty part-time employees lost their positions in the SCS. (Id. at PageID 314.) Defendant later terminated Plaintiff without cause, but only after she received a negative evaluation from Griffin. Defendant also required Plaintiff to attend another disciplinary session with Labor Relations. (ECF No. 70-1 at PageID 2362.) It was Dorsey Hopson, Superintendent of SCS, who notified Plaintiff of her termination and who allegedly made the final decision to terminate her. (See ECF No. 60 at PageID 1780.) To date, Plaintiff has not acquired another position with the SCS.
Plaintiff has now filed a five count complaint alleging: (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment;2 (2) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; (4) retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (5) violation of Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(b). (ECF No. 1.)
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a] court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). As for the burden of proof, "[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A moving party can support its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.)
What is a genuine issue of material fact? "A fact is 'material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense." Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012). "A genuine issue for trial exists where reasonable minds could differ on a material fact." Henschel v. Clare Cty. Rd. Comm'n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). There must be more than Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87).
The burden of proof can shift to the nonmoving party. "Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact." Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448-49; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party [whowill bear the burden of proof at trial] to go beyond the pleadings" to show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific evidence, cannot establish a genuine factual dispute sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 902 (1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Similarly, statements in an affidavit that are "nothing more than rumors, conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs" are insufficient. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1992). Additionally, "a mere 'scintilla' of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the non-moving party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor." Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986))....
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