Williams v. Simmons Co.

• Decision Date: 22 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-2964-P.,CIV.A. 3:99-CV-2964-P.
• Parties: Albert WILLIAMS and Calvin Williams, Plaintiffs, v. SIMMONS COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

Page 665

185 F.Supp.2d 665

Albert WILLIAMS and Calvin Williams, Plaintiffs, v. SIMMONS COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-2964-P.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

May 22, 2001.

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George D. Thomas, Attorney at Law, Law Office of George D. Thomas, Dallas, TX, for plaintiffs.

William E. Hartsfield, Attorney at Law, Hamilton & Hartsfield, Dallas, TX, Timothy R. Newton, Attorney at Law, Frank B. Shuster, Attorney at Law, Constangy Brooks & Smith, Atlanta, GA, Bruce A. Fickman, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Bruce A. Fickman, Houston, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SOLIS, District Judge.

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to For Leave to Amend, filed December 12, 2000; and Defendants' Response, filed January 2, 2001 (Plaintiff filed no Reply); Defendant Simmons Company's ("Simmons") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 20, 2001; Defendants USWA, District 12, and Local 422's ("the Union") Motion for Summary Judgment, also filed February 20, 2001; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, filed March 19, 2001; Defendant Simmons' Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 3, 2001; and Defendant Union's Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, also filed April 3, 2001. Upon due consideration, the Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED and the Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Albert Williams was a 61 year old African American who had worked for Simmons for over 34 years; Calvin Williams was a 43 year old African American who worked at Simmons for over 22 years. Pl's App. p. 15, 90. Both were members of the United Steelworkers of America union. Id. Both worked as "hogringers," whose job was to place borders around the outside of mattresses. Simmons' App. p. 21-23, 259.

In November 1998, Simmons instituted the Pay Plus Bonus Program ("the Program") as a new method of payment of its employees, which was incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). Simmons' App. p. 30-32, 89, 203-04, 260. The collective bargaining agreement to which Plaintiffs were subject has a grievance/arbitration procedure that calls for the remedy of arbitration; the parties do not dispute that the arbitration is final and binding. Simmons' App. p. 275-78. After the implementation of the Program, the efficiency of Plaintiffs dropped. Plaintiffs contend the drop in efficiency was an artifact of Simmons' new measuring system and higher expectations; Defendants fault Plaintiffs for reducing their productivity.

Simmons instituted progressive discipline against Plaintiffs and several other hogringers consisting of verbal and written warnings and suspensions, and indicated that failure to meet production levels would result in termination. Simmons' App. p. 37-39, 47-48, 90-91, 93, 96-97, 122, 124, 190, 185, 262, 332-44. While most of the other hogringers subsequently improved their performance to meet production levels under the new standards, Plaintiffs failed to do so and were fired on April 9, 1999. Simmons' App. p. 48-49, 99-100, 125, 192-93, 263.

Plaintiffs complained that the production standards were too harsh to be met. After Plaintiffs were terminated and while their grievances were pending, the Union requested a time study, which revealed that the standards were appropriate and consistent with other Simmons plants. Simmons' App. p. 346-62. According to union representative Thomas, the conductor of the study informed him that Plaintiffs' grievances were thus without merit, but that "Last Chance Agreements" might be negotiated for Plaintiffs. Simmons' App. p. 347. Believing that the Union could not prevail at arbitration, Thomas decided not to arbitrate the case, but rather to negotiate a Last Chance Agreement with Simmons, which reinstated Plaintiffs in their former positions, without back pay, on a probationary period requiring satisfactory production levels for 15 out of 20 days. Simmons' App. p. 347-48. Failure to meet these production levels would result in Plaintiffs' termination without recourse to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures. Simmons' App. p. 348. Plaintiffs failed to adequately meet those production levels. Simmons' App. p. 131-40, 264, 365-74. Simmons fired Plaintiffs again on June 4, 1999. Simmons subsequently rejected the grievances filed by the Union on the basis that the right to file grievances was waived by the Last Chance Agreement. Simmons' App. p. 349.

Rudy Garza replaced Thomas as union representative. Simmons' App. p. 348. Garza allegedly treated Plaintiffs rudely and failed to return their telephone calls. Pl's App. p. 151-52.

Plaintiffs sue under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by Defendants United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC ("the International Union"), District 12, and Local 422 of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC ("Local 422") (together, "the Union"), and alleging a breach of the CBA by Defendant Simmons Company ("Simmons"). Plaintiffs also sue Simmons for race and age discrimination, presumably under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) et seq., as amended, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1999) et seq., the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code § 21.001 (1996) et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).

II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

The Complaint in this matter was filed November 19, 1999. The deadline for the parties to file motions for leave to amend pleadings was June 29, 2000. The Court's Revised Scheduling Order set a deadline for discovery of October 2, 2000. The Court subsequently agreed to extend the discovery period through November 2, 2000 and also reset the dispositive motions deadline to January 2, 2001. On November 2, 2000, the last day of discovery, Plaintiffs served the Defendants with their supplemental discovery responses, identifying additional witnesses and providing affidavits from three of those witnesses. Plaintiffs' counsel was not made aware of the identity of two of the affiants, and was unable to locate one of the affiants until after June 29, 2000. Discovery was extended until December 21, 2000 to allow Defendants to depose the new affiants.

Plaintiffs now seek to amend the Complaint. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a pleading "shall freely be granted when justice so requires." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The decision to grant leave to amend lies within the discretion of the trial court. However, the policy behind the Rules to grant liberal amendment to pleadings limits the court's discretion. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1981). Thus, unless there exists a substantial reason for denying leave to amend, the district court should permit the filing of a proposed amendment. Id. Nevertheless, the parties' ability to amend their pleadings is by no means unlimited. See In re Southmark, 88 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1996); In re Circuit Breaker Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 547 (C.D.Cal.1997). In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider several factors, including undue delay or prejudice to the non-movant, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and futility of amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. "In exercising its discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint, a trial court may properly consider (1) an `unexplained delay' following an original complaint, and (2) whether the facts underlying the amended complaint were known to the party when the original complaint was filed." Southmark, 88 F.3d at 316.

Plaintiffs claim that their claims for relief have not changed, and that the Original Complaint and the proposed First Amended Complaint are virtually identical except for the Factual Background section. Setting aside any possible deletions, the Court notes additional material contained in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Amended Complaint. Defendants object to the assertion in paragraph 15 that Defendant Simmons "misled" them prior to the implementation of the Pay Plus Bonus Program ("Program") by promising employees that no employee would be fired for failing to meet productions levels. Defendants interpret this allegation as a new claim that Plaintiffs were thus deceived into voting for the implementation of the Program.

It is evident to the Court, and not disputed by Plaintiffs, that Plaintiffs knew of this alleged deception and any failure by the Union to respond to it as of January of 1999, when they were given warnings for failing to meet production levels, and informed that such failure could result in their termination. See proposed First Amended Complaint ¶ 16 ("After the implementation of the Pay Plus Bonus Program, employees received warnings and were subjected to the disciplinary procedure if they failed to meet production levels .... The Union and Simmons did not follow the labor agreement with regards to these grievances."); Employee Warning Notice, Defs' App. p. 9 (written warning to Calvin Williams). Defendants also represent that the deposition of local union president Jack Wiles provides that Calvin Williams was one of the union officials involved in negotiating the program, and thus C. Williams allegedly heard the representation that employees would not be fired for not achieving production levels. Plaintiffs were later terminated for insufficient production levels on April 9, 1999 (proposed First Amended Complaint ¶ 17). Plaintiffs filed the motion for leave to amend approximately 20 months after they were told they were fired for failing to meet production levels, more than a year after filing...