Williams v. Smalls
Decision Date | 30 November 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 4755.,4755. |
Citation | 390 S.C. 375,701 S.E.2d 772 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Pearl C. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Dean SMALLS, Respondent. |
Michael T. Miller, of Florence, for Appellant.
R. Hawthorne Barrett, of Columbia, and R. Heath Atkinson, of Florence, for Respondent.
Pearl C. Williams appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment which held section 47-7-130 of the South Carolina Code (1987) did not impose strict liability on the owner of livestock for personal injuries suffered when Williams's automobile collided with escaped cows. We affirm as modified.
In January 2006, Pearl Williams was traveling along U.S. Highway 76 in Marion County, when her automobile collided with cows owned by Dean Smalls, causing Williams personal injury.
Williams sued Smalls alleging both negligence and, pursuant to section 47-7-130, strict liability. Smalls moved for summary judgment, and Williams conceded summary judgment on the negligence claim. The trial court subsequently heard the motion on the strict liability claim and granted summary judgment, finding section 47-7-130 extended only to realproperty damage and not personal injury. This appeal follows.
A trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP. However, "[d]etermining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo." Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008); see also Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State, 372 S.C. 519, 524, 642 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2007).
The trial court held there was no support for the position that the damages recoverable under section 47-7-130 extended to personal injury. Accordingly, the trial court held that recovery for personal injury resulting under these facts required a showing of negligence and therefore granted summary judgment. We agree, in part.
This case involves two novel questions of law: first, whether section 47-7-130 imposes a strict liability standard on the owners of livestock for personal injury, and second, if such a standard is imposed, whether it extends to personal injury occasioned when livestock is found at large upon a public roadway.
Section 47-7-130 of the South Carolina Code provides:
Whenever any domestic animals shall be found upon the lands of any other person than the owner or manager of such animals, the owner of such trespassing stock shall be liable for all damages sustained and for the expenses of seizure and maintenance. Such damages and expenses shall be recovered, when necessary, by action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And the trespassing stock shall be held liable for such damages and expenses, in preference to all other liens, claims or encumbrances upon it.
When this court is confronted with construing a statute:
[If] the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a definite meaning, the rules of statutory construction are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature.
Hardee v. McDowell, 381 S.C. 445, 453, 673 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Initially, the plain language of section 47-7-130 imposes strict liability for " all damages." S.C.Code Ann. § 47-7-130 (emphasis added). We find the plain meaning of the language "all damages" contemplates not only injury to real property, but also personal property. See Kirby v. Mathis, 89 S.C. 252, 71 S.E. 862 (1911) ( ); Restatement (Third) Torts: Liab. Physical Harm § 21 (2005) ( ); Vangilder v. Faulk, 244 Ark. 688, 426 S.W.2d 821 (1968) ( ); Hart v. Meredith, 196 Ill.App.3d 367, 143 Ill.Dec. 75, 553 N.E.2d 782 (1990) ( ); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 560 (5th ed.1984) (discussing the liability of the owner of trespassing stock for infecting plaintiff's animals with disease). Additionally, this plain reading contemplates strict liability for personal injury. See Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 355 P.2d 117 (1960) ( ); Nixon v. Harris, 15 Ohio St.2d 105, 238 N.E.2d 785 (1968) ( ); Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Development Corp., 41 Cal.App.3d 496, 116 Cal.Rptr. 200 (1974) ( ).
However, just as the plain language of section 47-7-130 imposes strict liability for "all damages," the title of the statute directly and specifically addresses the "liability of owners of trespassing stock." See S.C.Code Ann. § 47-7-130 (emphasis added). In the general sense, a trespass is an intentional tort in which a trespasser invades a plaintiff's interest in the exclusive possession of his real property. See, e.g., Cedar Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 264, 628 S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ct.App.2006) (Anderson, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the language of section 47-7-130 is not as explicit in regards to when strict liability is appropriate as it is about what damages an owner shall be strictly liable for. Consequently, we must look beyond the language of the statute to determine if strict liability applies only when the damage is a result of a trespass.
Traditionally, the common law did not, and in the absence of a statute to the contrary does not, impose a strict duty to keep one's stock from entering public highways or roadways unless the animal has reasonably known dangerous propensities. See Gibbs v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex.1999) ( ). In the absence of this strict duty, the preferred standard is negligence. See Restatement (Third) Torts: Liab. Physical Harm § 21 ( ).
The very essence of trespass, as a cause of action, is to ensure protection of an individual's rights and interests in real property, not the least of which is the right of exclusion. In the simplest sense, these rights which support the impositionof strict liability are not implicated in situations in which stock enter upon public highways orroadways, and consequently, it seems universally accepted that liability in these circumstances shall be found only upon a showing of negligence. See Toole v. Dupuis, 735 So.2d 582 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) ( ); Hand v. Starr, 250 Neb. 377, 550 N.W.2d 646 (1996) ( ); Byram v. Main, 523 A.2d 1387 (Me.1987) ( ); Davert v. Larson, 163 Cal.App.3d 407, 209 Cal.Rptr. 445 (1985) ( ); Vaclavicek v. Olejarz, 61 N.J. 581, 297 A.2d 3 (1972) ( ); Scanlan v. Smith, 66 Wash.2d 601, 404 P.2d 776 (1965) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
44 Trespass
...447, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993); Johnson v. Phillips, 315 S.C. 407, 433 S.E.2d 895, 900 (Ct. App. 1993). See also Williams v. Smalls, 390 S.C. 375, 701 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 2010) (very essence of trespass as cause of action is to ensure protection of rights and interests in real propert......
-
3 Animal Injury Liability
...(veterinarian kicked by horse had to show owner knew or should have known horse had dangerous or vicious nature).[3] Williams v. Smalls, 390 S.C. 375, 701 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 2010). The court cited S.C. Code § 47-7-130, but held that negligence, not strict liability under the statute, is t......
-
B. "dangerous" Activities
...(2018); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 514; PROSSER § 76; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 22 (wild animals).[191] See, e.g., Williams v. Smalls, 390 S.C. 375, 701 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 2010); 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals §§ 68-73; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 518; PROSSER § 76, at 541-42; but see, e.g., RESTATEME......
-
A. Definition
...447, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993); Johnson v. Phillips, 315 S.C. 407, 433 S.E.2d 895, 900 (Ct. App. 1993). See also Williams v. Smalls, 390 S.C. 375, 701 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 2010) (very essence of trespass as cause of action is to ensure protection of rights and interests in real propert......