Williams v. Smith

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CARLEY; BANKE
• Citation: Williams v. Smith, 348 S.E.2d 50, 179 Ga.App. 712 (Ga. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 17 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 71916,71916
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. SMITH.

Page 50

348 S.E.2d 50

179 Ga.App. 712

WILLIAMS v. SMITH.

No. 71916.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 17, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 9, 1986.

Certiorari Denied Sept. 2, 1986.

Adele P. Grubbs, Marietta, for appellant.

Terrance C. Sullivan, William H. Duckworth, Jr., Timothy N. Toler, Jonesboro, for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellant is the plaintiff in a multi-count tort action. Counts One and Two of appellant's complaint alleged claims for false imprisonment. Count Three was for medical malpractice. Summit Psychiatric Centers, P.C. (Summit) and appellee Dr. Randy Smith were named as the defendants in appellant's suit. Appellee is a psychiatrist and an employee of Summit. Discovery established the following: During her work lunch break, appellant went to Summit seeking psychological counseling. She was eventually seen by appellee. Appellee determined that appellant's mental condition was such as to require treatment. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellant, she was told by appellee that she was not free to return to work and that she would be hospitalized. It is undisputed, however, that appellant did in fact leave freely and that she did return to work. However, pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-41, appellee executed a certificate as to appellant's apparent need for involuntary treatment. Acting on that certificate, peace officers took appellant into custody later that evening and delivered her to an "emergency receiving facility" for purposes of examination. See OCGA § 37-3-41. The examining physician determined that appellant did not require involuntary treatment and she was released. See OCGA § 37-3-43(a).

On this evidence, appellee moved for summary judgment as to all three counts of appellant's complaint. The trial court conducted a hearing and granted appellee's motion, leaving Summit as the only defendant in the action. Appellant appeals from this grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee.

1. Count One of appellant's complaint alleged that she had been falsely imprisoned when, during her original interview with appellee, he told her that she could not leave the Summit premises because she was in need of hospitalization. Appellant contends that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding this false imprisonment claim.

"False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty." OCGA § 51-7-20. " 'The restraint constituting a false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures, or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if plaintiff does not submit, and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries.' " (Emphasis supplied.) Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga.App. 850, 851(3), 10 S.E.2d 76) (1940). However, "the evidence in this case demands a finding that [appellee] did nothing to induce a reasonable fear in [appellant] that there would be a personal difficulty or personal injury if [she] had refused the command or request made." West v. Baumgartner, 124 Ga.App. 318, 331(6), 184 S.E.2d 213 (1971), rev'd on other grounds 228 Ga. 671, 187 S.E.2d 665 (1972). The evidence is undisputed that, notwithstanding anything that appellee may have said to her, appellant was at all times allowed to move freely about the Summit premises and that, when she left, she did so without incident. It thus appears that appellant was at no time physically restrained by virtue of any "threat" of immediate detention at the hands of appellee. "Threats to imprison are not imprisonments. To constitute false imprisonment, there must be actual physical restraint whether by force or fear." Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga.App. supra at 854(3), 10 S.E.2d 76. The trial court did not err in granting appellee summary judgment as to Count One. See generally Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, supra; West v. Baumgartner, supra. Compare Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga.App. 812, 828(10), 101 S.E.2d 786 (1957); Garner v. Mears, 97 Ga.App. 506, 507(1), 103 S.E.2d 610 (1958).

2. Count Two of the complaint was a claim of false imprisonment based upon appellee's execution of the certificate pursuant to which appellant was taken into custody for an examination. Appellant contends that jury issues remain as to whether appellee "exercised reasonable medical care in diagnosing [her] mental condition and acted properly based upon that diagnosis." Carter v. Landy, 163 Ga.App. 509, 510, 295 S.E.2d 177 (1982). Resolution of this issue requires consideration of the general principles applicable to the tort of false imprisonment and the correlation between those principles and the specific statutory provisions of OCGA § 37-3-40 et seq.

False imprisonment is an intentional tort, not a tort of negligence. See Stewart v. Williams, 243 Ga. 580, 255 S.E.2d 699 (1979). "In an action to recover damages for illegal arrest or false imprisonment the only essential elements are the arrest or detention and the unlawfulness thereof. [Cit.]" Scott Housing Systems v. Hickox, 174 Ga.App. 23, 24(1), 329 S.E.2d 154 (1985). With regard to the element of "unlawfulness" in the tort of false imprisonment, the law has always made a fundamental distinction between a detention effectuated pursuant to process and detention which is not predicated on process. "[A]n action for false imprisonment will lie where a person is unlawfully detained under a void process, or under no process at all, and can not be maintained where the process is valid, no matter how corrupt may be the motives of the person suing out the process or how unfounded the imprisonment may be." Grist v. White, 14 Ga.App. 147, 151(2), 80 S.E. 519 (1913). Thus, when the detention is predicated on no process, false imprisonment is an available remedy and liability depends upon whether a detention without supporting process was legally authorized under the circumstances. See generally Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga.App. 317, 306 S.E.2d 390 (1983). When the detention is predicated upon procedurally valid process, false imprisonment is not an available remedy, regardless of the motives upon which the process was secured, because detention effectuated pursuant to procedurally valid process, such as an arrest warrant, is not "unlawful." " 'Where the arrest is by valid process regularly sued out, action for malicious prosecution is the only remedy....' " Where detention is maliciously procured by civil process, rather than criminal, the appropriate cause of action would be for malicious use of process. See Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587(1)(a), 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939); Page v. Citizens Banking Co., 111 Ga. 73, 86(7), 36 S.E. 418 (1900). In the event that procedurally void or defective process is secured, there is a cause of action for false imprisonment, but only if the process was itself secured in bad faith. See Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359, 366-367(12) (1881); Page v. Citizens Banking Co., supra; Butler v. Tattnall Bank, 140 Ga. 579, 584, 79 S.E. 456 (1913); Massachusetts Cotton Mills v. Hawkins, 164 Ga. 594, 599, 139 S.E. 52 (1927); OCGA § 51-7-21.

OCGA § 37-3-40 et seq. provides for the involuntary examination, hospitalization, and treatment of individuals for mental illness. Although there is no provision for issuance of an arrest "warrant," the law does provide for an analogous procedure whereby such "process" may be issued as will authorize the lawful taking of an individual into custody for purposes of receiving an examination. Under OCGA § 37-3-41(a), one may be taken into such custody by peace officers pursuant to a physician's certificate and, under subsection (b) of that statute, a court order can serve as an alternative form of process. In Kendrick v. Metro. Psychiatric Center, 158 Ga.App. 839, 282 S.E.2d 361 (1981), we first dealt with the tort of false imprisonment in the context of these statutory provisions for involuntary mental examination and treatment. In Kendrick, the issue of the "unlawfulness" of the detention was addressed and determined as in any other false imprisonment case by deciding whether the detention was predicated upon procedurally valid process. "It is because the subject matter of this case involves the extremely sensitive area of deprivation of liberty that we have required such strict compliance with the procedures mandated by [the applicable statutory provisions]. The procedural safeguards contained in [those provisions] are obviously there for the purpose of ensuring that individual rights are not eroded in the name of medical expediency. We consider rigid adherence to the designated procedures especially important in light of the relative ease with which one may be taken from a first interview with a physician to involuntary confinement and treatment." (Emphasis supplied.) Kendrick v. Metro. Psychiatric Center, supra at 842, 282 S.E.2d 361. Thus, the Kendrick decision is implicit authority for the proposition that a claim of false imprisonment based upon involuntary mental examination and treatment is analytically identical to any other claim for false imprisonment. The validity of this analysis expressed in Kendrick is supported by further authority. OCGA § 37-3-4 provides that a physician "who acts in good faith in compliance with the admission and discharge provisions of this chapter shall be immune from civil or criminal liability for his actions in connection with the admission of a patient to a facility or the discharge of a patient from a facility." Thus, one who is admitted as a patient pursuant to a physician's "good faith" compliance with the applicable procedures of OCGA § 37-3-40 et seq. has no right of recovery. This is unquestionably analogous to the general tort provision of OCGA § 51-7-21, whereby those who in "good faith" secure what proves to be a defective or void warrant are provided a defense to a false...