Williams v. Spitzer, 02 CIV.0025 (SCH).

Decision Date28 February 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02 CIV.0025 (SCH).,02 CIV.0025 (SCH).
Citation246 F.Supp.2d 368
PartiesTrumont WILLIAMS, Petition, v. Elliot SPITZER, Attorney General, State of New York, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Robert S. Dean, New York City (David J. Klem, of counsel), for petitioner.

Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty., Bronx, NY (Elizabeth F. Bernhardt, Peter A. Sell, of counsel), for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge.

Petitioner Trumont Williams, serving a sentence imposed by a New York state court, seeks by this federal habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to enforce the state's alleged oral promise that if Williams cooperated with federal and state prosecutors following his guilty plea to murder charges in the state court, the state prosecutors would allow Williams to withdraw that guilty plea and plead instead to the lesser charge of manslaughter, thereby significantly reducing his sentence. After Williams rendered valuable assistance in a federal prosecution of others, the state took the position that, assuming without conceding that such a promise was given, it is unenforceable because not recorded. The state trial court agreed and sentenced Williams on his plea to murder charges. That ruling was upheld on appeal. Having exhausted his right to direct appeal in the state courts, Williams brings this federal habeas petition.

Respondent Elliot L. Spitzer, the Attorney General of the State of New York, opposing Williams' petition, contends that federal habeas relief is not available to Williams as a matter of law because (1) federal habeas review is foreclosed when a state court expressly relies on a state procedural default as an adequate and independent ground for denying petitioner relief, circumstances respondent avers exist in the case at bar; and (2) in any event, Williams' petition is barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") since Williams cannot show, as the statute requires, that the state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Respondent's second contention, based on the AEDPA, poses the question whether the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), which considered the constitutional due process implications of a prosecutor's promise given to induce an individual to plead guilty, should be extended to the breach of a prosecutor's promise given to induce an individual to cooperate with law enforcement after having pleaded guilty. On that point this appears to be a case of first impression.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1993 petitioner Trumont Williams belonged to the C & C criminal organization, a violent group that operated in the Williamsburg area of the Bronx. C & C assigned street locations to drug dealers and charged the dealers for "rent" and protection services, which included the murder of rival dealers who did not deal with C & C. A summary of the C & C organization's activities may be found in United States v. Padilla, 203 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2000). Petitioner was a member of C & C's "security" forces and participated in several organization-related murders.

Initially the C & C organization and its members were investigated and charged by the Bronx District Attorney. Petitioner was indicted in the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, for a number of murders and attempted murders. Plea negotiations ensued. Eventually petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the state prosecutors. Petitioner promised to provide information and testimony with respect to C & C. In return, the state prosecutors agreed to accept petitioner's plea of guilty to two separate murder charges, to recommend to the state trial court an agreed-upon sentencing range with respect to those two murders, and to forego prosecution of three other murders and two attempted murders for which petitioner had been indicted. Resp. Aff. at 3; Pet. Mem. at 5, A. 1-22.1

Consistent with that agreement, petitioner appeared before the state trial court (Martin Marcus, J.) on September 29, 1993 and pleaded guilty to two counts of murder in the second degree. The plea agreement is set forth in the sentencing minutes:

This promised sentence is in exchange for Mr. Williams' full cooperation in the prosecution of any and all matters under investigation now or in the future. Mr. Williams will hold himself available to testify at any stage, in any forum where the prosecution deems it necessary to call him as a witness. Mr. Williams will testify in a truthful, forthright and candid manner whenever he is called to testify.

Pet. Mem. at A. 6. In return for that cooperation, the state prosecutors agreed to recommend two concurrent sentences with minimum terms between 15 and 25 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.2 The prosecutors further agreed to make known to the sentencing court the extent of petitioner's cooperation pursuant to the agreement. A. 7, 17-19. Petitioner was retained in state custody.

Eventually the depredations of the C & C organization became the subject of a joint federal-state law enforcement task force investigation. A federal indictment charging petitioner and numerous other C & C members under, inter alia, the criminal RICO statute was filed in this Court bearing docket number 94 Cr. 313 and assigned to me for trial and related proceedings. In January 1994 petitioner was transferred from state custody to the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center. Federal prosecutors, who were working with state prosecutors designated as special federal assistants in preparing the case for trial, advised petitioner of their desire to obtain his cooperation as well. In support of the present petition, Williams asserts that in the spring of 1994 he learned that he was HIV positive. The shortened life expectancy resulting from this diagnosis caused petitioner to become concerned that he would derive no benefit from his plea agreement with the state, which subjected him to a minimum sentence of 15 years. Petitioner says in an affidavit that "I understood that my life expectancy was reduced substantially," and that "I knew that if I was sentenced to a period of time of somewhere between 15 years and life that I would probably die in prison," A. 33, 34-35, a fate that would come to pass if petitioner pleaded to a federal charge (as the federal prosecutors were insisting that he do) and then had to serve the 15 years to life state sentence to which he had agreed as part of the 1993 state plea bargain. It had also become clear to petitioner by this time that his state case would not be transferred to federal court and folded into a new federal indictment.

In these circumstances, petitioner avers, further discussions took place between petitioner, his federal attorney, federal prosecutors, state prosecutors, and city detectives. Petitioner says in his affidavit:

Before pleading guilty in federal court to racketeering charges, including murder, I talked with the detectives and prosecutors what would happen me [sic ] and to my state case. In front of federal and state prosecutors and my attorney, I was told by New York City detectives that I should not worry about my Bronx case because it would be taken care of. It was obvious to me that all these people at these discussions were aware that I was being told that I would not get a greater penalty in the Bronx case should I continue my cooperation with the joint federal and state prosecution....

The detectives, the two names that I know of are Bobby Addorato and Ricky always told me that I would be taking [sic ] care of and that I would not get "fucked." Mr. Barocas [petitioner's federal attorney] told me that everything should work out and Mr. Cataracchi [a state prosecutor whose name is Shahab Katirachi] regularly assured me that "everything will workout" [sic ]. When the detectives told me that I would be taken care of and that I would not get "fucked," none of the attorneys, my defense attorney nor the prosecutors, said anything different.

I was told that the way for me to receive less than 15 years to life in the Bronx County would be for my pleas to murder in the second degree to be vacated and for me to be allowed to plea [sic ] to manslaughter in the first degree. I was explained to this by Mr. Barocas and some of the prosecutors. Since this was the only way not to get a 15 to life sentence, I assumed that the promises made that I would be taken care of and not "fucked" meant that I would be allowed to withdraw my plea to the murder charges and be sentenced after pleading guilty to manslaughter in the first degree.

A. 33-35. These assurances and reassurances were oral. They were neither memorialized nor mentioned in any writing. Petitioner does not contend otherwise.3

Petitioner continued his cooperation with the federal prosecutors and the state prosecutors assisting them. On November 23, 1994, petitioner pleaded guilty to a superseding criminal information in this Court, S6 94 Cr. 313. While petitioner did not testify at the trials generated by the federal C & C indictment, he gave valuable cooperation to the prosecutors. Assistant United States Attorney Margery Feinzig submitted a 5K1.1 letter to me before I sentenced petitioner on his federal plea.4 She stated that with his inside knowledge of how the organization operated, petitioner had "played an essential role in the Government's investigation and prosecution of the members of C & C"; she credited petitioner's cooperation with leading to the conviction of twenty defendants in all. AUSA Feinzig added that petitioner had provided "valuable information that led to the prosecution of numerous extremely dangerous individuals," and that by doing so, had placed himself "at grave risk." Having come to know members of the C & C...

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4 cases
  • Besser v. Walsh, 02 Civ. 6775 (LAK) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. 11/26/2003)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • November 26, 2003
    ...was "not an independent and adequate state ground precluding federal review of his claims." Id. at 847. See also Williams v. Spitzer, 246 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he state procedural rule and the federal issue are not separate and distinct from each other; they are joine......
  • Andujar v. Kickbush
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • June 10, 2019
    ...and refute any contention of an off-the- record promise."); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 (1974), with Williams v. Spitzer, 246 F. Supp. 2d 368, 382, n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the Second Circuit's decision in Siegel and concluding that the New York "policy of refusing to enforce o......
  • Smith v. Anderson, 09–3284.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • February 11, 2011
    ...Supreme Court of the United States” is sufficient to overturn the considered decisions of the state court. See Williams v. Spitzer, 246 F.Supp.2d 368, 382 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“Since Congress provided in the [statute] that habeas courts may now look only to Supreme Court decisions as decla......
  • United States v. Brown
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 26, 2013
    ...that Santobello applies to post-plea agreements intended to induce cooperation with the Government. See, e.g., Williams v. Spitzer, 246 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending Santobello to require enforcement of prosecutors' promises made to induce cooperation with the Government and or......

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