Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C9-94-2257,C9-94-2257 |
| Citation | 551 N.W.2d 483 |
| Parties | 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,229, 132 Lab.Cas. P 58,163 Sarah E. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. ST. PAUL RAMSEY MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where the employee relies upon the same facts and seeks redress for the same allegedly discriminatory practices to support both a reprisal and a separate retaliation claim, the exclusive remedy provision of the Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1994) operates as a bar to the assertion of a cause of action under Minn.Stat. § 181.932 (1994), the so-called Whistleblower Act.
Douglas A. Hedin, Elizabeth A. Gidden, Daniel S. Goldberg, Minneapolis, for Amicus Curiae Minnesota Chapter-National Employment Lawyers Association.
Patricia J. Skoglund, Thomas M. Countryman, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, St. Paul, for Appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Lucinda E. Jesson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for Amicus Curiae State of Minnesota.
Robert J. Hennessey, Ansis V. Viksnins, Theresa M. Herzog, Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for Respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
We entertain review on petition of St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center to consider the question of whether, where the plaintiff has asserted a reprisal claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the exclusivity of remedies provision of that Act, Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1994), operates as a bar to a retaliation claim asserted pursuant to Minn.Stat § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1994), the Whistleblower Act. In reversing the summary judgment entered in favor of the employer, the court of appeals held that the retaliation claim was not preempted by the exclusivity provision, that Williams was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the elements of that cause of action after her reprisal claim failed and that she was entitled to a jury trial on that claim. Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Center, 530 N.W.2d 852 (Minn.App.1995). We reverse and reinstate summary judgment.
Williams was employed as a pharmacy technician during the period from July 27, 1987 to October 17, 1991. She claims that in September 1989, David Heerwald, a pharmacist, became romantically interested in her and repeatedly asked her for dates during the ensuing 6-month period. She alleges that when she continually refused, he began making sexual comments to her at work and became openly hostile. On November 28, 1990, Williams met with her supervisor to report Heerwald's allegedly hostile and offensive behavior. In response, the employer's sexual harassment coordinator conducted an investigation and ultimately concluded on January 18, 1991 that the allegations were meritless.
At about this same time, Heerwald apparently reported to the employer that Williams' conduct had been inappropriate and insubordinate and his reports were supplemented by those of other co-workers complaining of the plaintiff's attitude, behavior and the quality of her work. Williams received a negative performance evaluation on March 6, 1991. She filed a sexual harassment charge with the Department of Human Rights on March 26, 1991.
Seven months later, Williams' employment was terminated on October 17, 1991 for the stated reasons of inadequate performance, a failure to improve the quality of her work in accordance with a designated improvement plan and for disruptive behavior. She commenced this action on October 14, 1992, alleging that her employment was terminated because she filed a sexual harassment claim, specifically asserting sexual harassment and reprisal claims in violation of the Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 363 and retaliation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 181.932, the Whistleblower Act. The employer moved for summary judgment on all claims. Concluding that the retaliation claim was identical to the reprisal claim asserted under the Human Rights Act and that the retaliation claim was therefore preempted by the exclusivity provision contained in the Human Rights Act, the trial court entered summary judgment of dismissal of the whistleblower claim. The sexual harassment and reprisal claims were then tried to the court, which held that Williams had not sustained the burden of establishing either that her co-worker's conduct constituted sexual harassment or a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. Williams did not appeal from the judgment dismissing her human rights claims and instead only appealed the summary judgment of dismissal of the whistleblower claim.
In reversing and remanding, a majority of the court of appeals' panel held, first, that the exclusivity provision of the Human Rights Act did not operate as a bar to the assertion of both the reprisal claim under the Act and a retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Act 1 and, then, that because Williams is entitled to a jury trial on the whistleblower claim, she is not collaterally estopped from relitigating the essential elements of the claim. One member of the court of appeals' panel dissented.
The Human Rights Act prohibition against reprisal is contained at Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1994) which provides in part as follows:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any employer, labor organization, employment agency, public accommodation, public service, educational institution, or owner, lessor, lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of any real property, or any real estate broker, real estate salesperson, or employee or agent thereof to intentionally engage in any reprisal against any person because that person:
(1) Opposed a practice forbidden under this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
The language is specific in its prohibition of intentional reprisal by "any employer" against "any person" who engages in enumerated activities--activities directly related to the initiation of or participation in any proceeding, at whatever stage, commenced under the Human Rights Act. Section 363.11, the exclusive remedy provision of that Act, provides as follows:
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