Williams v. State

Decision Date19 May 1941
Docket Number13572.
Citation15 S.E.2d 219,192 Ga. 247
PartiesWILLIAMS v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

The defendant was convicted of murder, and after affirmance of a judgment overruling an ordinary motion for new trial and after still other proceedings, he filed an extraordinary motion for a new trial, presenting, among others, the contention that appointed counsel who represented him during the trial had so failed in their duty to hime as attorneys that he had been deprived of the benefit of counsel and denied due process of law. The judge, after hearing evidence both for and against the motion, found the issues of fact against the movant and denied the motion on all grounds. Held, that the evidence did not demand a finding that the accused had been denied the benefit of counsel or due process of law, as contended; nor does it otherwise appear that the judge abused his discretion in denying the motion.

The exception is to a judgment denying an extraordinary motion for a new trial. The following facts appeared:

At the September term 1937, of the superior court of Elbert County, Norman Williams was indicted for the offense of murder in the alleged killing of Lon Fortson by shooting him with a pistol, the date of the alleged offense being July 19, 1937. On the morning of September 13, 1937, two attorneys of the Elberton bar were appointed to represent the accused he being unable to employ counsel. His trial began on Thursday afternoon, September 16, and continued until Saturday afternoon following, when the case was finally submitted to the jury. The following Monday morning the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder as charged. The verdict contained no recommendation, and sentence of death was imposed. Appointed counsel filed a motion for new trial, but later withdrew from the case after another attorney was employed. The employed attorney prepared an amendment to the motion and prosecuted it to final determination; and a judgment overruling the motion was affirmed by this court. Williams v. State, 186 Ga 251, 197 S.E. 838. After the defendant was sentenced, the same employed attorney filed a motion to set aside the new sentence, because of alleged disqualification of the then presiding judge, and for other reasons not relating to the verdict. This motion was overruled and again the judgment was affirmed. Williams v. State, 187 Ga. 415, 1 S.E.2d 27. Later, the present attorney was employed. He instituted in behalf of the defendant and against the sheriff of Fulton County, where the defendant was then incarcerated, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the conviction was void for the reason that the accused had been denied the benefit of counsel and due process. The trial judge overruled a demurrer, and the respondent sheriff excepted; and this judgment was reversed. Aldredge v. Williams, 188 Ga 607, 4 S.E.2d 469.

On March 11, 1940, during the March term of the superior court of Elbert County, Williams, through the same attorney who had represented him in the habeascorpus case, presented to the judge an extraordinary motion for new trial, in which he gave a history of his case and referred to all the foregoing decisions. It appears that the first motion for new trial, as filed during the term of his conviction, was overruled on December 6, 1937. In the present extraordinary motion the movant presented, among others, the same contentions as were made in the habeas-corpus case, to wit: that by reason of certain alleged facts he had been denied (1) due process of law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution (Code, § 1-815), and (2) the benefit of counsel, as provided in the constitution of the State (article 1, § 1, par. 5; § 2-105). After hearing evidence both from movant and respondent, the judge overruled the motion, and the movant excepted. In such extraordinary motion for a new trial, as amended, substantially the following allegations were made:

Movant was indicted for the killing of Lon Fortson. Movant being at the time about twenty-three years of age, and being unable to read or write or to employ counsel, and without friends or family who were able to secure counsel for him, the trial judge appointed two named attorneys to represent him upon his trial. Said counsel made no preparation for the trial of his case, made no motion for a continuance in order to have time to prepare the case, and allowed movant to be placed on trial for his life after only one conference with him. Movant was not guilty of the offense charged against him, and had six or seven witnesses whose testimony, if believed by the jury, would have resulted in movant's acquittal. Said appointed counsel, although furnished with the names of said witnesses, called none of them to the witness stand and offered only the unsworn statement of movant in his defense. Had said witnesses been offered by said counsel, they would have given substantially the same testimony as embodied in their affidavits attached hereto, to wit, that said witnesses would have sworn before the trial court, in substance, that movant shot said Fortson in self-defense; that said Fortson and his son were both armed and advancing upon movant; that movant did his best to escape, but the deceased approached from one direction while the son of the deceased approached from the opposite direction, thus entrapping movant, who was endeavoring to escape by running back and forth through a small tenant-house. That the evidence of said witnesses would have been invaluable to his defense, in view of the fact that the State was contending that neither the deceased nor his son was armed, and offered evidence to this effect, when as a matter of fact both deceased and his son were armed and advancing upon movant in a threatening and menacing manner. That during the trial two named witnesses for the State were allowed to make certain statements (quoted in the motion) of a highly inflammatory and prejudicial nature against movant, to which his counsel interposed no objection, though had such testimony been objected to the court would have excluded same, and had said counsel made a motion based on the illegal and prejudicial evidence the court would under the law have been compelled to declare a mistrial. Appointed counsel thus allowed movant's rights to be totally and completely ignored, and permitted the jury to become prejudiced and influenced against him because of such illegal testimony. Said appointed counsel made no effort whatever to obtain a new trial after movant's conviction, although they did file a skeleton motion for a new trial based only upon the general grounds; that said appointed counsel refused to amend the motion for new trial, and advised the trial judge that they would not argue the motion for a new trial or urge it upon the judge, and that in so far as they were concerned the court could dismiss the motion for a new trial. Said counsel also informed the court that if it did not dismiss the motion for a new trial, the court should strike the names of said counsel from the skeleton motion. That said appointed counsel, after abandoning the motion for new trial, and while other counsel were considering entering the case, directed a joint letter to such other counsel in an effort to discourage them from entering the case, and informed them that there was no merit in the motion for a new trial; that 'We do not contemplate filing an amended motion, and we will be content to let the law take its course,' and further, 'We consider that we have done all that is required of us,' and that 'We will depend upon Williams to be in charge of his own case from now on so far as we are concerned.'

Movant shows that when the jury in this case retired to consider their verdict, they were not properly sequestered, and were permitted to consider their verdict in a room in the court-house that was not private, for the reason that the door to said room was nearly one-half glass, and from the upper part of said door there was a large triangular hole in said glass, because of which the deliberations of the jury were not private, as by law required; and that said appointed attorneys, although fully informed as to said proper [improper] sequestration of the jury, failed and neglected to call the matter to the attention of the court, or to make any motion of any kind, and thus permitted the jury to continue their deliberations under said circumstances. Movant shows that immediately after the jury had retired to said jury room to begin their deliberations, a spontaneous burst of applause arose from the spectators in the court-room, and that the spectators, some fifty or more in number, began celebrating by hilarity, loud talking, and by generally milling and moving about the court-room, and movant shows that the noise and confusion resulting from said demonstration was very loud and profuse, so much so until said jury were disturbed in their deliberations, and that some member of said jury, whose name to movant it unknown, opened the door to said jury-room so that said jury could discover the purpose of said demonstration on the part of the spectators, and that said demonstration continued in the presence of said jury until and after the door of said jury room had again been closed. That the hostility and feeling against him was very pronounced, and was obviously and clearly a demonstration against movant, which was highly prejudicial and inflammatory, having occurred as alleged in the presence of said jury, which movant alleges was calculated to and did as a matter of fact cause bias and prejudice in the minds of the jury against movant. 'Movant shows that although the foregoing circumstances occurred before and during...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Loomis v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 12 Octubre 1949
  • Amin v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 19 Mayo 1989
    ...he had been denied due process of law." Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1941) (quoting Williams v. State, 192 Ga. 247, 257, 15 S.E.2d 219, 225 (1941)). In quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), that court "The purpose of th......
  • Loomis v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 12 Octubre 1949
    ... ... The ... material portion of the indictment involved here is: '* * ... * for that said accused, in the County of Fulton and State of ... Georgia, on the 28th day of October, 1946, with force and ... arms, did jointly with J. R. Childers and other persons whose ... names are ... that the same could not have been discovered by the exercise ... of ordinary diligence. In Williams v. State, 192 Ga ... 247, 254, 15 S.E.2d 219, 223, the court said: ... 'Extraordinary motions for new trial can not be based ... upon matters ... ...
  • Wilcoxon v. Aldredge
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 9 Julio 1941
    ... ... 670, 144 S.E. 206; ... Brown v. Harden, 150 Ga. 99, 102 S.E. 864; ... Kinman v. Clark, 185 Ga. 328, 195 S.E. 166; ... Aldredge v. Williams, 188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469 ... There was no demurrer or motion to quash here, but there is ... no suggestion that the judge would not have the er in such ... proceeding to test the sufficiency of the petition, ex mero ... motu. See Moody v. Davis, 10 Ga. 403; Goodrum v ... State, 60 Ga. 509; Shore v. Brown, 19 Ga.App ... 476, 91 S.E. 909; Kelly v. Strouse & Bros., 116 Ga. 872, ... 893, 43 S.E. 280. If the judge's ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT