Williams v. State

• Citation: 37 N.E.2d 61,219 Ind. 107
• Decision Date: 03 November 1941
• Docket Number: 27553.
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

37 N.E.2d 61

219 Ind. 107

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 27553.

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 3, 1941

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wabash County; Byron C. Kennedy judge.

Kenneth A. King, of Wabash, for appellant.

George N. Beamer, Atty. Gen., and John R. Walsh Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SWAIM Judge.

The appellant was arrested, charged by affidavit with the crime of rape upon a girl under sixteen years of age. The next morning, April 1st, 1941, the appellant was taken before the Wabash Circuit Court for arraignment and on his request the court appointed an attorney to defend him. He did not talk to this attorney, but a short time later, on the same day appellant was again brought into court, withdrew his request for an attorney and pleaded guilty. Thereupon the court entered judgment and sentenced him to the Indiana State Penal Farm for a period of twelve months, pursuant to the provisions of § 9-1815, Burns' 1933, § 2298, Baldwin's 1934.

On April 3rd, 1941, the appellant appeared by counsel and filed his written motion to vacate the judgment and to be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. In said motion it was alleged that he had withdrawn his request for an attorney and pleaded guilty, relying upon the advice of the deputy sheriff that he should not have an attorney, and on the statement of the deputy sheriff to the effect that if the appellant did secure an attorney in the case his sentence would be much heavier than if he did not have one. In said motion the appellant further alleged that at the time he pleaded guilty he did not know what constituted the crime of rape; and that after being advised by counsel he did not believe he was guilty.

After hearing evidence consisting of the testimony of the appellant, of the appellant's mother, and of the deputy sheriff the court overruled the motion.

The action of the court in overruling this motion by the appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty is the only assigned error on which this appeal is based.

Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The action of the court will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Conover v. State, 1882, 86 Ind. 99.

In Pattee v. State, 1886, 109 Ind. 545, 10 N.E. 421, this court said concerning a similar motion: 'We cannot say that the court erred in refusing to permit the appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty. The presumption is in favor of the ruling of the court, and, in the absence of a clear and strong showing that there was an abuse of discretion, the ruling must be sustained.' To the same effect see Crooks v. State, 1938, 214 Ind. 505, 15 N.E.2d 359, and Chaplin v. State, Ind.Sup.1941, 36 N.E.2d 277.

In the instant case the allegations of the motion to the effect that the appellant did not understand what constituted the crime of rape; that he was induced to plead guilty by the advice of the deputy sheriff and the statement of the deputy that if the appellant had an attorney the sentence would be heavier were supported by the testimony of the appellant. The appellant's testimony on the question of the statements made by the deputy was contradicted by the deputy sheriff who testified that he did not advise the appellant what to do; that he did tell the appellant that he (the deputy sheriff) did not know, but that he did not think an attorney would do appellant any good; that the appellant then asked if there would have to be a trial and the deputy answered that appellant would have to have a trial 'if you fight it'; that the appellant then said, 'I don't want to go through a trial. I might as well go over and plead guilty'; that the deputy then said to appellant, 'I don't know if...