Williams v. State

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CARTER, J.
• Citation: Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184 (Fla. 1899)
• Decision Date: 10 May 1899
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.

26 So. 184

41 Fla. 295

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

May 10, 1899

Error to circuit court, Walton county; Evelyn C. Maxwell, Judge.

Will Williams was convicted of assault with intent to commit manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. One who assaults another with intent to kill him, under such circumstances as that, had the assault resulted in the death of such other, the homicide would have been manslaughter may, under section 2403, Rev. St., be convicted and punished for assault with intent to commit a felony.

2. An indictment charging an assault with intent to commit the felony of murder in the highest degree charges likewise an assault with intent to commit every grade or degree of unlawful homicide that can be committed in pursuance of a homicidal intent, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction for assault with intent to commit the felony of manslaughter.

3. One who assaults another with a deadly weapon, not having a premeditated design to effect the latter's death, may be convicted of an aggravated assault, under section 2402, Rev St.; but if the assault is made with homicidal intent and under such circumstances that, had it resulted in the death of the person assaulted, the person committing such assault would have been guilty of manslaughter, he may be convicted of an assault with intent to commit a felony, under section 2403, Id.

COUNSEL

Daniel Campbell, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

CARTER J.

At the spring term, 1898, of the circuit court of Walton county, an indictment was presented against plaintiff in error, charging him with an assault with intent to murder one Gus Drummond. The indictment alleged that the assault was committed by the accused without authority of law, of his malice aforethought, and from a premeditated design to effect Drummond's death, with a deadly weapon, to wit, a pistol loaded with gunpowder and leaden bullets, by the discharge of which he was alleged to have inflicted upon the person of Drummond two painful and dangerous wounds, with intent willfully, without authority of law, of his malice aforethought, and from a premeditated design to effect Drummond's death, him, the said Drummond, then and there to kill and murder. At the ensuing fall term of the court the defendant was tried, and the jury rendered their verdict, as follows: 'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter.' The defendant moved in arrest of judgment upon the ground that the verdict found the defendant guilty of a crime unknown to the law. This motion was overruled, and the defendant sentenced to two years' confinement at hard labor in the state prison, from which he sued out this writ of error.

The only assignment of error argued relates to the ruling upon the motion in arrest of judgment. There being no bill of exceptions in the record, we must presume that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict, if the jury could, under the law, find the defendant guilty of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter. Chapter 1637, Act Aug. 6, 1868, recognized and prescribed penalties for assaults with intent to murder and assaults with intent to commit manslaughter. Sections 34, 36, 46, subc. 3. This legislation repealed the act of 1832 prescribing punishments for assaults with intent to kill. Sherman v. State, 17 Fla. 888.

On February 11, 1881, chapter 3275 was enacted, by which it was provided as follows (section 1): 'That whoever assaults another with a deadly weapon, with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person assaulted, shall be deemed guilty of an assault with intent to murder,' and the offense was made a felony.

Section 2: 'That whoever assaults another with a deadly weapon, not having a premeditated design to effect the death of the person assaulted, shall be deemed guilty of an aggravated assault,' and the offense was made a misdemeanor.

Section 3: 'That all laws and parts of laws now in force for the punishment of assault with intent to murder, and assault with intent to kill, and assault with intent to commit manslaughter, be and the same are hereby repealed.'

The first and third sections of this act were omitted from the Revised Statutes of 1892, and thereby repealed; but the second section was incorporated therein, and continued in force as section 2402, and an entirely new provision was added, and numbered section 2403, reading as follows 'What Assaults Felonies. Whoever commits an assault on another, with intent to commit any felony punishable with death or imprisonment for life, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding twenty years. An assault with intent to commit any other felony shall be punished to an extent not exceeding one-half the punishment which could have been inflicted had the crime been committed.' This section designs to punish assaults committed with intent to commit any felony. The intent is the gist of the offense, and no one can be punished under this statute for an assault unless it be accompanied with the requisite intent. All unlawful homicides in this state are either murder in the first, second, or third degrees or manslaughter; but they are all felonies. If, therefore, one assaults another with intent to kill him, and the killing would be unlawful, he has committed an assault with intent to commit a felony, whether the homicide would, if it had been accomplished, have been murder in either degree, or merely man slaughter. The statute under consideration is clearly broad enough to include any felony and manslaughter is a felony. But upon in dictments for assault with intent to commit any of the grades or degrees of unlawful homicide, it will not be sufficient to show that the killing, had it occurred, would have been unlawful, and a felony; but it must be found that the accused committed the assault with intent to take life, for, although an unintentional or involuntary killing may in some cases be unlawful, and a felony, no man can intentionally do an unintentional act; and without the intent the assault cannot be punished under this statute, even though the killing, had it been committed, would have amounted to a felony. Walls v. State, 90 Ala. 618, 8 So. 680; Carter v. State, 28 Tex.App. 355, 13 S.W. 147; State v. Evans, 39 La. Ann. 912, 3 So. 63; People v. Mize, 80 Cal. 41, 22 P. 80; Hall v. State, 9 Fla. 203; Davis v. State, 25 Fla. 272, 5 So. 803; Davis v. State, 35 Fla. 614, 17 So. 565. This leads us to inquire whether an intentional homicide committed with a deadly weapon can, under any circumstances, constitute manslaughter; for, if so, we must assume that there was evidence before the jury authorizing them to find that defendant unlawfully assaulted Drummond with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill him, under such circumstances as that, if Drummond had been killed, the homicide would have been manslaughter. Aside from special cases which are declared to be manslaughter by the Revised Statutes, general definitions of the offense are found in sections 2384-2388, which declare that 'the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, in cases where such killing shall not be justifiable or excusable homicide nor murder, according to the provisions of this article shall be deemed manslaughter,' and 'whoever shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an attempt by such other person to commit any felony or to do any other unlawful act, or after such attempt shall have failed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.' By section 2380, murder in the first degree is defined as 'the unlawful killing of a human being when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or any human being, or when committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary'; in the second degree, as 'when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual'; in the third degree, as 'when perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony other than arson, rape, robbery, or burglary.' It will readily be perceived by an analysis of the language of these statutes that there is nothing in the definition of manslaughter to exclude from its provisions all intentional homicides, or to include within the definition of murder all intentional killings, unless the intention is so deliberate as to amount to a premeditated design. The ordinary case of a sudden combat, where the...