Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 1901
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.

30 So. 484

130 Ala. 107

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 14, 1901

Appeal from circuit court, Bibb county; John Moore, Judge.

Joseph Williams was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

It was shown by the evidence that the killing occurred in September 1898. There was also evidence introduced that the deceased Thomas Nicholson, several months before the killing had had illicit intercourse with the defendant's wife, and that this was accomplished by force and threats on the part of said Nicholson; that the defendant's wife told him of this fact about July 15th; and the evidence for the state tended to show that it was on account of said Nicholson having debauched his wife that the defendant killed him. The other facts of the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion. One J. W. Green, a witness for the state, testified that the next day after Nicholson was shot he went to see Nicholson, and there took down a statement as made by Nicholson, which statement said Nicholson swore to before him (the witness) as a justice of the peace. This witness testified that at the time of taking down the statement Nicholson said nothing about dying, but that he (the witness) said to Nicholson that the statements made must be voluntary. Upon the defendant offering to introduce this statement in evidence, the state objected, the court sustained the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The substance of the statement is shown in the opinion. The defendant offered to prove certain statements made by the defendant to Nicholson after Nicholson was shot, and while he was lying on the ground, and also certain statements made by Nicholson in talking to the defendant at that time. The state objected to the introduction of each of said statements, the court sustained the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The defendant duly excepted to the portion of the court's oral charge to the jury which is copied in the opinion. There were several charges requested by the defendants which the court refused to give, but the bill of exceptions contains no recital that the defendant excepted to the court's refusal to give these several charges, nor are there any assignments of error made by the defendant.

S. D Logan and C. D. Glover, for appellant.

Chas G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN C.J.

The appellant, Williams, was indicted for the murder of one Nicholson. He was convicted of murder in the first degree the jury assessing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, and he was sentenced accordingly. That he was guilty of murder, all the evidence in the case, including his own testimony, concurred in demonstrating. Not only so, but no part of the evidence afforded any basis for an inference to the contrary. A motive to kill was shown. That the defendant acted on this motive was shown. That he determined on the killing beforehand was shown. That he made preparation to kill was shown. That he did kill, without justification or excuse, by shooting the deceased in the back. was shown. And all and each of these facts were shown directly by the express testimony of the defendant himself. Nor was there any other evidence adduced in conflict with this. On this state of case the trial court did not err in charging the jury at the request in writing of the solicitor "that, if you believe all the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must convict the defendant." But the evidence went even further than has been indicated above. It tended to show that the defendant and his wife conspired together to kill Nicholson; that the wife's part in this conspiracy was to lure him to their house; that, to this end, she wrote him one (probably two) notes requesting him to come there; that in response to these notes he went there; that defendant loaded his gun and remained at home for the purpose of killing the deceased when he should come; that when he saw Nicholson approaching he said to his wife, "There is your man now;" that the wife then said to defendant, "Will you let me speak to him before you kill him?" that he told her she could; that Nicholson came on up to where defendant and his wife were sitting in the door of their house, spoke to them, asked what Mrs. Williams wanted to see him about, and, after talking with her a few minutes on that matter, left them and started to leave the premises; that as he walked away the woman said to defendant, "If you are not going to kill the s_____n of a b_____h, give me the gun, and I will;" that he replied: "Never you mind. You need not be uneasy. He will not turn over the hill;" that he then reached up and got his gun, took deliberate aim first at Nicholson's head, but then, bethinking him not to kill him instantly, but to inflict a mortal wound on his victim, so that he would linger for a time and suffer, he lowered his aim and shot him, when 50 or 60 feet away, in the back, the ball fracturing the inner portion of the spinal column, and producing death several days afterwards. On these tendencies of the evidence, if they presented the real facts, as the jury could not well escape from finding they did, this homicide was "perpetrated by lying in wait," and was murder in the first degree, by the express provision of the statute,-an assassination, pure and simple. Nor was the degree of criminality at all lessened or lowered by the fact that Nicholson had had sexual intercourse with the defendant's wife, nor by the fact, if it be one, that he had accomplished this intercourse by force; these alleged facts having come to the knowledge of defendant a month before the homicide. McNeill v. State, 102 Ala. 125, 15 So. 352, 48 Am. St. Rep. 17; Rogers v. State, 117 Ala. 9, 22 So. 666; Robinson v. State, 108 Ala. 14, 18 So. 732; State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 33, 35, 15 So. 722. And, on the foregoing tendencies of the evidence, the circuit court committed no error in charging the jury at the request in writing of the solicitor that: "If the jury believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased, several months prior to the killing, did have sexual intercourse with the defendant's wife, with or without force, and that the defendant, in Bibb county, Alabama, and before the finding of this indictment, killed the deceased by decoying him to his (defendant's) house, and by lying in wait for him, on account of such illicit intercourse between deceased and defendant's wife, then defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, and it is the sworn duty of the jury to so find their verdict." It does not appear from the bill of exceptions that the court did not instruct the jury in definition of murder in the second degree, and it is therefore to be assumed that such instructions were given. Nor is it at all made to appear by this record that the court in any way impinged upon the statutory right and duty of the jury to find, upon conviction, and set forth in their verdict, the degree of murder of which they find the defendant guilty, unless the...