Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 30 January 1888
• Citation: 3 So. 616,83 Ala. 16
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

3 So. 616

83 Ala. 16

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 30, 1888

Appeal from circuit court, Pike county; JOHN P. HUBBARD, Judge.

Indictment for murder. The defendant in this case, Guy Williams, was indicted for the murder of Frank Berry, "by striking him with a stick," was tried on issue joined on the plea of not guilty, convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of five years. On the trial, as appears from the bill of exceptions, it was proved that the killing occurred at a "dance and public supper in the neighborhood," which was attended by the defendant and the deceased; that while the deceased was dancing, the defendant pinned a white handkerchief on the back of his coat, and this caused an altercation between them; that the deceased, who had a pistol in his pocket, was taken out of the room by other persons, on account of his violent language, and was not allowed to come back until after the lapse of a half hour or more, he promised to "drop the matter, and say nothing more about it;" that when he returned to the room, "he again commenced cursing the defendant, who again told him that he did it only in fun;" that the deceased said that they must go out of the house and settle it; that the defendant then started to the door, keeping his eye on the deceased, and stepped down outside of the door, in the dark, and outside of the light shining from the house; that the deceased followed him, and by the time he put his foot on the door-step, was struck by the defendant across the nose, about where it unites with the forehead; that the stick was about the size of an ordinary walking-stick; and that the deceased died from the effects of the blow, about ten days afterwards. Some of the witnesses testified that the deceased, when he came back into the house, had an open knife in his hand, but others said they did not see it; and there were some other discrepancies in the testimony of the several witnesses. The bill of exceptions purports to set out all the evidence; but a fuller statement of it is not necessary. The defendant requested that the following charges in writing be given to the jury and excepted to the refusal of each: "(1) If the defendant, in repelling an unprovoked and aggressive attack struck with a weapon not calculated to produce death, or the natural, probable, and reasonable use of which would not cause death, and death ensued by accident, and he was justified in thus striking, then the jury must find him not guilty. (2) When the state has proved that there was a killing, the burden of proof is then on the defendant to show circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation; else it is murder. (3) It would be murder in the first degree if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, at the time of the act, thought of his purpose to kill the deceased, and then put such purpose into execution. (4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant killed the deceased on a fully formed and conscious design to kill, and with a weapon prepared for the purpose, it would be murder in the first degree. (5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was not at fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and that he was being pursued by the deceased with a knife in his hand, and struck the deceased with a weapon not reasonably calculated to produce death, and did so to resist such assault, and death ensued by misadventure, then this would be self-defense. (6) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was not at fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and struck to repel an assault, and that death ensued by misadventure, this would be self-defense. (7) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was free from fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and struck the blow under the reasonable belief of impending danger to his life, or of grievous bodily harm, as shown by the circumstances then surrounding him, this would be self-defense, although the danger to life or limb was not real; that it is sufficient if the circumstances surrounding him were such as to impress him with the reasonable belief that such danger existed. (8) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was free from fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and was being followed by the deceased in a...