Williams v. State

• Citation: 90 Miss. 319,43 So. 467
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 22 April 1907
• Parties: PLEAS WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

43 So. 467

90 Miss. 319

PLEAS WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 22, 1907

March 1907

FROM the circuit court of Leake county, HON. JAMES R. BYRD, Judge.

Williams appellant, was indicted and tried for the murder of one Henson, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to the penitentiary for five years. From such conviction and sentence he appealed to the supreme court.

The opinion of the court states the facts.

Case reversed and remanded.

May Flowers & Whitfield, and C. S. Dobbs, for the appellant.

The evidence shows that the character of the deceased was, to quote the language of different witnesses for the state "very dangerous." He lived in another county than the one in which he was killed, and so far as the record discloses, had never been before seen in Leake county. Both Henson and his son were armed and were both very boisterous disturbing those who were on the grounds and in the vicinity of the church by the promiscuous shooting of pistols and by noisy and blasphemous conduct. Bad feeling had for some time existed between Henson and the appellant growing out of the active part taken by appellant in the prosecution of Henson for a homicide committed some time before. Different persons were selected to arrest Henson, but inasmuch as he waved his knife and swore that all the men in Leake county could not arrest him, he was not taken into custody. It was only after the appellant, Williams, was notified of threats against him and his brother by the decedent, that he armed himself. The purpose of appellant in going to the church was to protect his brother if his brother should be in danger. While it is true that different friends of the appellant urged him to leave the grounds a short time before the encounter, this was merely because of the general apprehension of trouble if Henson, in his drunkenness and violent condition, should meet appellant. It is not denied that the appellant told different persons that he would not seek Henson and that appellant had no idea of meeting Henson at the place where the difficulty took place. When appellant met Henson his salutation was courteous, but Henson replied by cursing him. Different witnesses, including one witness for the state, testified that Henson made a motion as if to reach for his pistol when Williams struck his hand down. But for the fact that Henson's pistol and hand caught in his shirt while drawing it, appellant would have been shot. Henson was a very strong man, weighing almost 180 pounds. The appellant was a man of delicate appearance, weighing about 125 pounds. It cannot be denied that the appellant shot in self-defense, firing two shots very rapidly at Henson, whereupon Henson fell, and that thereupon Williams turning sideways continued to shoot and fired the last three shots.

Under the facts as above stated it was error for the court to grant the third instruction to the state. This instruction was to the effect that if the jury found that the appellant Williams armed himself in order to kill Henson and went to where Henson was, and provoked a difficulty with him to kill him, and being so armed for the purpose stated, raised a difficulty with Henson, and in pursuance of such purpose killed Henson, then the appellant could not claim self-defense. In the first place, the instruction is not technically accurate, because if the jury should believe that the conduct of appellant provoked the difficulty, they were incorrectly authorized by the instruction to ignore appellant's right of self-denfense, even though they should believe from the evidence that appellant had no intention of provoking any difficulty when he procured the weapon. The instruction rendered worthless the testimony of the appellant himself as to his purpose in getting his pistol. In the second place, there was no evidence of which to predicate the instruction, for it is not shown that the appellant armed himself for the purpose of going in search of Henson and provoking a difficulty with him in order to kill him. And in any case it is a dangerous instruction, for a set of circumstances could hardly be framed to which the instruction could be profitably applied on the part of the state. Circumstances strong enough to warrant this instruction are strong enough to make it very certain that the jury will convict. Instructions like this have been more frequently condemned by this court than any other form of instruction in homicide trials. Appellant made no search for Henson. The difficulty was a mutual combat. If appellant in any way provoked the difficulty, he did it simply by going into Henson's presence,--an act insufficient to show provocation. Wharton on Homicide (3d ed.) par. 325; Long v. State, 52 Miss. 23; Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 838, S.C., 19 So. 711; Patterson v. State, 75 Miss. 670, S.C., 23 So. 647; Lofton v. State, 79 Miss. 723, S.C. , 31 So. 420; Cooper v. State, 80 Miss. 175, S.C., 31 So. 579; Rogers v. State, 82 Miss. 479, S.C., 34 So. 320; Pulpus v. State, 82 Miss. 548, S.C., 34 So. 2; Jones v. State, 84 Miss. 195, S.C., 36 So. 243; Herring v. State, 87 Miss. 628, S.C., 40 So. 230; Saffold v. State, 76 Miss. 259, S.C., 24 So. 314.

The fourth instruction for the state is also erroneous, and there was palpable error in granting it. There was ample evidence, as above shown, that appellant shot in self-defense, and that when Henson had partly fallen after having been shot twice and was attempting to shoot appellant, the latter shot three times. But, as we have above shown, there was no evidence that these last three shots shortened the life of the decedent. Yet this fourth instruction for the state is to the effect that if accused by these last three shots shortened the life of decedent, appellant was under such circumstances guilty of manslaughter, even though the appellant in the heat of passion fired the last three shots. There was no testimony to show that these last three shots in any way hastened decedent's death, hence no jury would be warranted in drawing the conclusion that the last three were the fatal shots. Beasley v. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 234.

O. A. Luckett, on the same side.

The third instruction granted to the state was fatally erroneous, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and the total absence of evidence to support the instruction. We are at a loss to know upon what theory the court could have granted such an instruction taking away altogether the appellant's right to defend himself against a murderous attack. The granting of this instruction is alone sufficient to reverse the case. Cooper v. State, 80 Miss. 175, S.C., 31 So. 579; Oliver v. State, 39 Miss. 526; Fortenbery v. State, 55 Miss. 403; Spradley v. State, 80 Miss. 82, S.C., 31 So. 534.

While it is true, as contended by the learned attorney-general, that a large number of instructions were granted for the appellant, there was no instruction granted to either side which cured the vice contained in the aforesaid third instruction for the state. We must conclude that this instruction misled the jury into bringing in the verdict of manslaughter.

There was no way for the jury to reconcile this third instruction for the state with the other instructions, especially those for appellant. Hence, as the jury had no chart nor compass to which they could look for safety as to the law of this case in their deliberations and were doubtless tossed about by every wind of doctrine, one can hardly wonder at their verdict. Where the evidence is as sharply drawn as existed in this case, it is essentially important that there should be no conflict in the instructions. Whitfield v. Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311; Chapman v. Copeland, 55 Miss. 476; May v. State, 35 Tex. 650; Enc. Pl. & Pr., 145; Hughes Crim. Law & Proc., 862.

The granting of the fourth instruction for the state was also erroneous. As shown in the brief of colleagues, this instruction was to the effect that if the jury should find from the evidence that Williams shot Henson twice, disabling him, and that while Henson was lying on the ground appellant, being in no real or apparent danger of great bodily harm, fired three more shots into Henson's body, whereby Henson's life was shortened, then the jury should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, even though defendant, in the heat of passion, fired the last three shots. Such instruction is erroneous for several reasons: (1) it assumed a disputed fact, namely, that Henson was disabled and lying prostrate on the ground when the last three shots were fired; (2) that appellant was at the time in no danger real or apparent; (3) and that there was a measurable interval of time between the first two and the last three shots; and (4) that these last three shots shortened the life of decedent. These assumptions of fact being unwarranted from the evidence, made the granting of the instruction manifest error. Cooper v. State, 80 Miss. 176, S.C., 31 So. 579; Bell v. State, 89 Miss. 810, 42 So. 542; Bonds v. People, 39 Ill. 26; Hatch v. Garza, 20 Ark. 171.

There were no elements of murder in the case, and it was a close case of facts whether the defendant was guilty of manslaughter or acted in necessary self-defense.

An additional reason why this fourth instruction was erroneous is that the court nowhere defines to the jury what were the essential facts to constitute manslaughter under our statute, hence it was a leap in the dark for twelve ordinary farmers, such as were the jury, to tell just exactly what did or did not constitute manslaughter. State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; Payne v. Comm., 1 Met. (Ky.), 370. See also the able dissenting opinion of WHITFIELD, C. J., in the Lipscomb case, 75 Miss. 599, S.C., 23 So. 210, which, in our opinion, is the law.

Byrd,...