Williams v. State
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | FRAUENTHAL, J. |
| Citation | Williams v. State, 139 S.W. 1119, 100 Ark. 218 (Ark. 1911) |
| Decision Date | 02 October 1911 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. STATE |
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Robert J. Lea Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
X. O Pindall, for appellant.
1. The proper application of the rule allowing the examination of supporting witnesses to a motion for a continuance depends upon the particular facts in the case. The notoriety given to this case by newspaper accounts, all of which were unfavorable to the defendant, and by discussion of the same on the streets, etc., necessarily resulted in many expressions of opinion unfavorable to the defendant. Who can say that the supporting witnesses were reckless or false in their statements that the defendant could not obtain a fair and impartial trial on account of the prejudice against him? 98 Ark. 139; 22 Id. 283; 83 Ark. 36; 80 Ark. 360.
2. Instructions 6 and 7, requested by the defendant, should have been given, and the court's refusal to give the same amounted to withholding from the jury the proper consideration of the issue of manslaughter. 162 U.S. 313, 40 L.Ed. 980; 74 Ark. 453, 456; 162 U.S. 466, 40 L.Ed. 1039.
Hal L Norwood, Attorney General, and William H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee.
1. It has often been held that the trial court may examine the supporting witnesses for the purpose of testing their credibility and to discover the extent of the information upon which they base their affidavits; and that where the testimony of such witnesses develops the fact that they have heard persons from only one or two communities discuss the case, and that they did not know the general consensus of opinion, it is not error to overrule the motion for change of venue. Cases cited by appellant, and 85 Ark. 518; 76 Ark. 276; 86 Ark. 357; 91 Ark. 65; 54 Ark. 243; 71 Ark. 180.
2. The court, having already fully instructed the jury on the questions of manslaughter and self-defense, did not err in refusing instructions 6 and 7 requested by appellant. 54 Ark. 4.
Defendant, Will Williams, was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree, charged with murdering one J. O. Miller by shooting him with a pistol. He was convicted of murder in the second degree by a petit jury, who assessed his punishment at twenty-one years in the State penitentiary. There are three assignments of error which are specially urged by him why the judgment of conviction should be reversed: (1). Because the court erred in refusing to grant him a change of venue; (2). On account of errors committed in rulings upon the instructions; (3). Because of improper remarks made by the attorney for the State in his argument to the jury.
The deceased was a policeman of the city of Little Rock, and the defendant was a negro, who had moved to said city some months prior to the killing. For some time before the homicide the defendant had been keeping company with a colored woman named Martha Neighbors, who was employed as a cook by one Russell Miller, in said city. She lived in a room on the premises of said Miller, and at the rear of the residence. The homicide occurred on the night of April 23, 1911, on said premises. Prior to that time, defendant and this woman had had one or two difficulties; and about 9 or 10 o'clock of that night she saw him down in the city, where, as she expressed it, "he had tried to fool with her," but had not injured her. She returned to the premises of Mr. Miller, and, not having the key to her room, she sat down on the porch to wait for one John Ham, a colored man who worked around the Miller premises, and who had the key. About 11 o'clock of that night while she was sitting on the steps of the porch, the defendant came up with a pistol, and putting his hand upon her head, said, "What in the h are you doing sitting out here?" She replied that she was doing nothing, and asked the defendant what he was doing there at that time of night, and he replied, "That is none of your d business."
In a short time John Ham returned, and the three then went into the woman's room. After a time, the woman said to the defendant that she wished that he would go home, and said that he must be looking for trouble. Shortly after this, Mr. Russell Miller returned to his residence, and rang the door bell, and this woman then left her room, and went to him, and told him that the defendant had a pistol, and that she was afraid of him. Mr. Miller then telephoned to the police headquarters for an officer, and the deceased and another policeman, named F. C. Brown, were sent to his aid. When they arrived, Mr. Miller told them that the defendant was trying to kill his cook, and that he desired them to protect her.
The testimony on the part of the State tended to prove that the officers then went to the rear of the residence where the woman's room was located, and, it being dark, they lighted a match or two at the gate near the door of this room in order to open same. In the meanwhile, the defendant had stationed himself in the door of the room, and when the officers came near where he was, Brown said, "Now, I want you;" and as he reached up the defendant immediately fired a shot, which struck the deceased in the neck, causing his instant death. After the defendant fired the first shot, Brown began to fire, but did not draw his pistol until after the defendant had fired the first shot. Deceased's pistol was found afterwards upon his person, and it had not been discharged. The defendant fled from the scene, and made his escape, and later was captured in a distant county.
The defendant testified that when the officers approached he did not know who they were, and did not fire upon them until they had first fired upon him two or three times. He also stated that he fired his pistol twice, but only to protect himself because he was afraid.
The defendant filed a petition for a change of venue, upon the ground that the minds of the inhabitants of Pulaski County, where the crime was committed, were so prejudiced against him that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial therein. This motion was supported by the affidavits of two persons. The court examined these affiants under oath, in order to test their credibility and to discover their knowledge as to the state of the minds of the inhabitants of the county concerning the defendant. Each of them had talked with two or three persons in the city of Little Rock, who had expressed an opinion that the defendant ought to be hung, or that he would be lynched if the people "got a chance at him." One of these affiants also heard one person say that he supposed that the defendant would be "railroaded through." But these affiants had not heard any other person in any other locality in the city or county give any expression relative to the case or the defendant. The examination showed that these affiants based their opinion upon statements made by two or three persons, living in as many localities in the city of Little Rock, and that they did not know the general sentiment of the inhabitants throughout the county, or even throughout the city. The information obtained by these affiants relative to the sentiment of the people concerning the defendant was not sufficient to form an opinion of the state of mind of the inhabitants of the county, so that they could say that the inhabitants thereof were so prejudiced against the defendant that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that it is proper for a trial judge to examine the supporting witnesses to a motion for a change of venue touching their knowledge of the subject-matter of their affidavits, and that it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse such motion when it appears that said supporting affiants had knowledge only as to expressions of persons in one or two localities in the county and were not informed as to the state of mind of the inhabitants of the county to a more general extent.
From an examination of the two supporting witnesses in this case, the trial court found that they did not possess definite and sufficient information as to the state of mind of the inhabitants of the county towards the defendant, and denied the change of venue. In this action of the court we find no reversible error. Price v. State, 71 Ark. 180, 71 S.W. 948; White v. State, 83 Ark. 36, 102 S.W. 715; Kinslow v. State, 85 Ark. 514, 109 S.W. 524; Bryant v. State, 95 Ark. 239, 129 S.W. 295.
It is earnestly insisted by counsel for the defendant that the court erred in refusing to give certain instructions requested by him relative to the crime of manslaughter. These instructions in effect stated that manslaughter differed from murder in that in murder the element of malice always exists, whereas manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, but under such circumstances that the slayer was actuated by a passion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible, or, believing himself in imminent danger from assault with a deadly weapon, he acted too hastily and without due care, but without malice. One of these instructions requested by him is as follows:
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