Williams v. State, CACR06-1184 (Ark. App. 9/26/2007)

• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Wendell L. Griffen
• Decision Date: 26 September 2007
• Docket Number: CACR06-1184
• Citation: Williams v. State, CACR06-1184 (Ark. App. 9/26/2007), CACR06-1184 (Ark. App. Sep 26, 2007)
• Parties: Craig WILLIAMS, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

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Craig WILLIAMS, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

CACR06-1184

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

Division III

Opinion Delivered September 26, 2007

An Appeal from Union County Circuit Court [CR2005-459-4], Hon. Carol Anthony, Judge, Affirmed.

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, Judge.

On June 30, 2006, a Union County jury found Craig Williams guilty of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, and possession of a firearm by certain persons. The jury also found that appellant possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver within one thousand feet of a school. For these crimes, appellant was sentenced to a 182-year term in the Arkansas Department of Correction. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support that he possessed a firearm and that he possessed cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. In addition, he alleges that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds; (2) by denying his motion for continuance prior to the suppression hearing; (3) by overruling a hearsay objection; (4) by failing to ensure that he was adequately represented by counsel; and (5) by refusing to quash an amended information filed by the State. We affirm, holding (1) that the State presented substantial evidence that appellant possessed a firearm and that he committed drug crimes within one thousand feet of a school; (2) that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress despite appellant's argument that the traffic stop was pretextual; (3) that appellant failed to show prejudice when the court denied his motion for continuance; (4) that the trial court did not erroneously admit hearsay evidence; (5) that the trial court did not err by refusing to allow appellant time to seek new counsel; and (6) that appellant was not prejudiced when the State filed an amended information adding a sentencing enhancement for committing a drug offense within one thousand feet of a school the day before his trial.

Factual and Procedural History

On August 9, 2005, the State filed a criminal information alleging that appellant committed four offenses: possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, and possession of a firearm by certain persons. The day before trial, the State amended the information to allege a sentencing enhancement for committing a drug offense within one thousand feet of Barton Junior High School. Appellant filed a motion to quash the amended information, arguing that the enhancement changed the nature or degree of the crime charged and was added to the information without permission from the court. In his written motion, he sought exclusion of any evidence going toward the enhancement or, alternatively, a continuance to adequately prepare. The court denied the motion before trial.

A suppression hearing was held on June 26, 2006, and the trial was held on June 30, 2006. At the beginning of the suppression hearing, appellant's counsel requested a continuance. He received a call the previous Wednesday or Thursday informing him that the suppression hearing would be on June 26 at 9:00 a.m. However, he was advised the following Friday afternoon that the attorney in the companion case had a medical problem and that the case would be continued. Counsel then received a telephone call from the prosecutor the day of the hearing at 8:35 a.m., stating that the motion to suppress was going forward despite the information he received the previous Friday afternoon. He admitted that he had not prepared to the degree that he would have normally prepared had he stayed on schedule; however, he asked that the suppression hearing be rescheduled at a time that would give him at least twenty-four hours' notice. The trial court indicated that the suppression hearing had been continued several times because of an unavailable witness, and the court offered to allow the State to present its case that day and have appellant present his case the following morning or evening. At the conclusion of the State's case during the suppression hearing, appellant presented his case. However, at the conclusion of the hearing, he renewed his motion to continue the matter, stating that he understood that this case would not be heard and that he had planned his week accordingly. The court again denied his motion.

The evidence at the suppression hearing and at trial shows that on July 1, 2005, a confidential informant for the El Dorado Police Department informed Lieutenant Matt Means that appellant was coming into town with a large quantity of drugs. Testimony regarding the informant's statement was admitted over appellant's hearsay objection; the State argued and the court agreed that the information was introduced for the limited purpose of explaining how police involvement began in the case. Lieutenant Means passed this information to Officer Randy Conley, who set up surveillance near appellant's residence. Lieutenant Means testified at trial that appellant's residence was 625 feet from Barton Junior High School, measured from the fence along the edge of appellant's residence to the rear of a parking lot area near the rear of the school.

Officer Conley was later informed that appellant was driving north on College Street. Appellant appeared fidgety, was tapping his brakes, and was looking around and in his mirrors. According to Officer Conley, appellant turned on his passenger side blinker, indicating that he intended to turn north. Instead, appellant turned south without flashing his driver side blinker. Conley radioed Officer Aaron Morris, who spotted appellant's vehicle, pulled behind the vehicle, and activated his blue lights. According to Officer Morris's testimony, the vehicle came to a stop at an intersection. Then, both the driver and passenger doors opened and appellant fled the vehicle while holding a plastic grocery bag. Officers chased and caught him in a parking lot. After appellant was placed in handcuffs, Officer Morris noticed a gun between appellant's legs. The gun did not belong to Officer Morris or any other police officer. Officers recovered the bag, which contained 249.6 grams of crack cocaine. Appellant's vehicle was later taken to the police station, where police found 46.1 grams of marijuana under the passenger seat.

While watching appellant's home, Officer Conley observed two women moving items into the trunk of an automobile. One of them later drove away in the automobile. Officer Conley followed the automobile and initiated a traffic stop after the driver ran a stop sign. Various items were found in the car, including 123 grams of marijuana, approximately $2000 cash, and a safe. The safe contained approximately $39,000 in cash, a large quantity of cocaine, and a life insurance policy for appellant. In a statement to police, appellant admitted that the contents of the safe belonged to him.

However, during the suppression hearing, appellant testified that he made a complete stop at a stop sign, continued through the intersection, and made a left turn past a church. He stated that he signaled for and made a left turn. Minutes later, he noticed a police car speeding off the church parking lot and a police officer standing in the middle of the street with a gun pointed at him. He testified that he stayed in the truck for about two or three minutes and that he did not "stop and jump and run." Appellant also presented the testimony of Frederick Colvin, a passenger in appellant's vehicle at time of the incident, and Carolyn Burgie, who was working at a restaurant that was located at the intersection. Both testified about the stop similar to appellant. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied appellant's motion to suppress, specifically noting that the police did not have probable cause to search appellant's vehicle when they initially stopped him, but that "once [appellant] ran he kind of set himself up."

During the trial, appellant complained about his trial counsel. After the lunch recess and toward the conclusion of the State's case, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Mr. McDonald you indicated to me, note that it's one o'clock right as we were about to get started, you notified me that there is a problem.

MR. MCDONALD: Yes, Your Honor, Mr. Williams has indicated to me that I'm no longer needed as his attorney, that he wanted to fire me. Is that right?

APPELLANT: Yes, he left out some information that really hurt me at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, let me just caution you first of all we are in the middle of this trial and it's going to proceed. Are you telling me that you wish to represent yourself?

APPELLANT: No, I don't wish to represent myself.

THE COURT: Those are your choices. I'm not stopping in the middle of a trial or declaring a mistrial. We are close to having the State rest.

APPELLANT: I've got some important information that he left out and it's going to hurt me if I don't get it out now.

THE COURT: I don't want to ask and I don't think I need to know what you're talking about. He has successfully suppressed your video tape confession. Do you understand that, it's not going to get played?

APPELLANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you understand that with a delay it will?

APPELLANT: I'm just trying to get a fair trial, Your Honor. Like I said he left out some things that was ordered to me by a Judge back in January that I haven't received. I feel like I'm entitled to them.

THE COURT: A higher Judge?

APPELLANT: He went to a civil rights trial or something about me that I didn't even know about it.

THE COURT: I don't know what that has to do with this case.

APPELLANT: It was about my property.

MS. HARP [PROSECUTOR]:...