Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 2015
• Docket Number: CR–14–0612.
• Citation: 203 So.3d 888
• Parties: Cornelius WILLIAMS v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

203 So.3d 888

Cornelius WILLIAMS

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–14–0612.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 18, 2015.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 2016.

Certiorari Denied April 15, 2016

Alabama Supreme Court 1150668.

Jennifer Rhea Lacy, Birmingham, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and William D. Little, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

WELCH, Judge.

Cornelius Williams appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court's denial of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. The petition challenged his July 28, 2003, conviction for first-degree robbery, a violation of § 13A–8–41, Ala.Code 1975, and his resulting split sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, including an order that Williams serve 2 years of confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections, the balance of the sentence being suspended, followed by 5 years' probation.

Williams filed an in forma pauperis application, which was granted. The instant petition, Williams's first, was deemed filed on August 24, 2014.

Williams filed the standard Rule 32 form attached as an appendix to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P. Williams selected the following claim provided on the form as a ground for relief: 12(B): "The court was without jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose the sentence."

Petitioner's Claims

In his supplement to the petition, Williams raised the following claim:

"Attachment to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., Petition

"Comes now the Petitioner Cornelius Williams, pro-se, in the above styled cause hereby Petition's [sic] this Court for relief from conviction and sentence under Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P.:

"I. Procedural History:

"In the spring term of the Jefferson County Grand Jury, Williams was indicted and charged with first-degree robbery in violation of § 13A–8–41 of the Code of Alabama 1975.

"On July 28, 2003 pursuant to a plea agreement, Williams pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and was sentenced to 20 split with two (2) years to serve followed by 5 years probation.

"There was no appeal taken therefore, Williams seeks relief from the conviction and sentence on the following ground(s):

"II. Ground(s) for Relief:

"I.

"The trial court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment and impose the sentence

"Williams argues that the conviction of first-degree robbery and sentence of 20 years split with 2 years to serve are due to be vacated. On the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea to first-degree robbery because the plea agreement called for an illegal sentence.

"In the case of Calloway v. S[t]ate, 860 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), the court, with respect to a plea agreement, said:

" ‘In this case, the trial court actually accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Calloway in accordance with the agreement. However, the sentence was illegal under § 15–18–8, which prohibits splitting a sentence in excess of 20 years. A trial court cannot accept a plea agreement that calls for an illegal sentence.’

"

"And in the case of State v. Gaines, 932 So.2d 118 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), the court recognized that a sentence of 20 years split two (2) was illegal under § 15–18–8(a)(1). In so doing, the court said:

" ‘In Austin [v. State, 864 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ], the trial court sentenced Austin to 20 years; it then split his sentence and ordered that he serve 26 months in the State penitentiary. We remanded the case and stated: "Under 15–18–8 Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement. The Circuit Court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to order that Austin serve only 26 months in confinement." 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore [v. State, 871 So.2d 106 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ]. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20 year sentence so that the [defendant] serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.’ 932 So.2d at 123.

"In the case at bar, it is without question that the State and defense reached a plea agreement. Wherein, Williams would plead guilty to first-degree robbery and in exchange therefore, the State would recommend a 20 year sentence split with two (2) years to serve followed by 5 years probation. It is also without question that the trial court on or about July, 28, 2003 accepted that plea agreement and sentenced Williams in accordance with that agreement. Its [sic] also without question that the two (2) years of confinement was less than the mandatory minimum term requireed [sic] under 15–18–8(a)(1) Code of Alabama 1975. As a result thereof, the two (2) years of confinement was illegal and rendered the entire plea agreement illegal and outside the trial court's jurisdiction to accept. Calloway v. State, supra, and State v. Gaines, supra. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea to first-degree robbery because the guilty plea was based upon an agreement that called for an illegal sentence, and thus, the conviction and sentence thereon are due to be vacated. Id.

"In light of the above Williams prays that this Court will issue process of service, order the STate [sic] to Respond within 30 days, and/or grant this petition and vacate the conviction and sentence."

(C. 27–29.)

State's Response

The State filed a response, noting that "Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, entered a guilty plea to Robbery in the first degree on July 28th, 2003 and [was] sentenced as a habitual offender to 20 year split 2 year to serve sentence." (C. 34.) The State then asserted that the claims were procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(c), precluding claims raised in an untimely petition; Rule 32.2(a)(3), precluding claims which could have been raised at trial; and by Rule 32.2(a)(5), precluding claims which could have been raised on appeal. The State also requested that the court set a hearing date on the claim that the court was without jurisdiction and that the sentence was illegal.

In an addendum to its response the State realleged the procedural bars pleaded earlier, then alleged that the 20–year portion of Williams's sentence was legal. The State argued:

"The Agreement and explanation of rights that were signed by the Petitioner both indicated that the agreed upon sentence was 20 years under HFOA [Habitual Felony Offender Act]. The Petitioner, under the Agreement, bargained for and received the sentence agreed upon by the parties and imposed by the Court under the HFOA. The only illegal portion of Petitioner's sentence is the split to serve 2 years. If this Honorable Court finds that the split sentence is illegal under the Alabama Code § 15–18–8, the State avers that a sentence can be reached legally, without setting aside the Petitioner's Guilty Plea."

(C. 41.)

The State next cited Bland v. State, 565 So.2d 1240, 1242–43 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), for the proposition that a defendant's dissatisfaction with a sentence does not invalidate a guilty plea, and Whitman v. State, 903 So.2d 152, 155 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), for the proposition that the factual basis of a plea does not affect the voluntariness of the plea and is not jurisdictional; and Adkins v. State, 930 So.2d 524, 549 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), for the proposition that a claim that a sentence is disproportionate may be procedurally barred.

The State then requested that the circuit court resentence the petitioner without setting aside the guilty plea.

"The State further avers that a sentence can be reached that would not impose harm to Petitioner's sentence more so than Petitioner originally bargained for under the Agreement, would not prejudice the Petitioner or the State, and would ultimately meet the Agreement bargained for by both parties legally and without setting aside the Petitioner's Guilty Plea. ‘When a court imposes sentence in excess of that authorized by law, it exceeds its jurisdiction and the sentence is void.’ Barnes v. State, 708 So.2d 217, 219 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). ‘An illegal sentence may be challenged at any time, because if it has imposed an illegal sentence, the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction and the sentence is void.’ Mosley v. State, 986 So.2d 476, 477 (Ala.Crim.App.2007). In Holley v. State [, [Ms. CR–12–2023, Oct. 3, 2014] ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (Ala.Crim.App.2014),] the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals remanded this case to the Circuit Court for resentencing due to an illegal split sentence and in support of their decision stated in their brief [opinion] the following:

" ‘This case must be remanded for the circuit court to conduct a sentencing hearing and to resentence Holley. To avoid a violation of Holley's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, however, the circuit court may not impose a sentence greater than the original sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. Mewborn v. State, [170] So.3d [709] at 711, n. 1 [ ( Ala.Crim.App.2014) ] ("We note that in resentencing Mewborn the circuit court may not impose a sentence greater than [the original sentence] because doing so ‘would be a violation of [Mewborn's] rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.’ Ex parte Tice, 475 So.2d 590, 592 (Ala.1984) (citing Rice v. Simpson, 274 F.Supp. 116 (M.D.Ala.1967).")).'

"Therefore, the State would respectfully ask this Honorable Court, insomuch that if the Court finds that Petitioner's sentence is illegal, to set aside the sentence and to resentence the Petitioner in accordance with the law."

(C. 42.)

Circuit Court's Order

After an evidentiary hearing the circuit court issued the following order denying the petitioner relief.

"ORDER DENYING RELIEF AND APPOINTING APPELLATE COUNSEL

"This Court has reviewed the Petition, the State's Response and the Addendum to the State's Response and the Memorandum of Law filed on behalf of the Petitioner by his court appointed attorney, Ken Gomany. This Court also takes judicial notice of the court's own files. The Court makes the following findings and orders:

"In July 2003 the Petitioner entered into

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