Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 02 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-04-00011-CR.,No. 03-04-00012-CR.,No. 03-04-00010-CR.,03-04-00010-CR.,03-04-00011-CR.,03-04-00012-CR.
• Citation: 191 S.W.3d 242
• Parties: Daniel WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

191 S.W.3d 242

Daniel WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 03-04-00010-CR.

No. 03-04-00011-CR.

No. 03-04-00012-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

March 2, 2006.

Rehearing Overruled March 22, 2006.

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From the District Court of Travis County, 331st Judicial District, Nos. 3031132, 2032066 & 2032067, Bob Perkins, Judge Presiding.¹

Madeleine Connor, Austin, for appellant.

Ronald Earle, Dist. Atty., M. Scott Taliaferro, Asst. Dist. Atty., Austin, for appellee.

Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PURYEAR and ONION.^*

OPINION

JOHN F. ONION, JR., Justice.

Appellant Daniel Williams appeals his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of cocaine in an amount of less than one gram, and robbery. Appellant waived trial by jury and entered pleas of guilty to the three offenses before the trial court. The trial court found the enhancement allegations in the aggravated assault and robbery indictments to be true as confessed by appellant, and assessed a punishment of fifty-five years' imprisonment in each of these cases. The trial court assessed punishment for the possession of cocaine at one year in a state jail facility. All true sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Notice of appeal was filed in all three cases. Different counsel was appointed on appeal.

Points of Error

Appellant advances ten points of error, most of which relate to a pretrial competency to stand trial hearing before a jury. On November 18, 2003, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant competent to stand trial. First, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict at the competency hearing. Second and third, appellant urges that the trial court committed fundamental error when at the competency hearing it twice impermissibly commented on the weight of the evidence. Fourth, appellant complains of the admission of Officer Shawn Lapuszynski's "expert" opinion testimony at the competency hearing. Fifth, appellant argues for a number of reasons that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence at the competency hearing his pro se motion to substitute counsel. Sixth, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding at the competency hearing his application for the appointment of a guardian containing allegations that the probate court later acted upon favorably.

Seventh, turning to the trial itself, appellant contends that the trial court failed to sua sponte withdraw appellant's pleas of guilty when the evidence of appellant's incompetency became overwhelming "at punishment." Eighth, appellant asserts it was error to introduce evidence of the victim's injuries and photographs of the crime scene pertaining to a prior conviction alleged for enhancement after he had pleaded "true" to such allegations. Ninth, appellant urges that the cumulative effect of all the errors violated due process of law under the United States Constitution. Tenth, appellant complains that the two sentences of fifty-five years' imprisonment constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Texas law and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or in the alternative, that the evidence of mental illness adduced "at punishment" mitigated his conduct and required the imposition of lower sentences.

Background

At about 2 a.m. on May 30, 2003, Annette Harris was awakened by a knocking on the front door of her house in Travis County. When the knocker identified himself as "Dee Dee," an acquaintance of Harris's, she opened the door. Appellant and another man barged in. Appellant threatened Harris and demanded money. She gave him money. Appellant then tried to kiss her and pulled her into a bedroom, squeezing her neck with his arm. Harris was choked until she lost consciousness. When Harris regained consciousness, she was on the living room couch in her nightgown, and her face was swollen and bloody. No rape examination was performed at the hospital where she was treated. Harris had no recollection of any sexual encounter but she later developed a sexually transmitted disease. These facts lead to the robbery charge to which appellant pleaded guilty.

On the same morning at about 3 or 4 a.m., appellant and his girlfriend appeared at the apartment of Timothy McCraney. McCraney had once lived for a time with appellant and his mother and considered appellant his "brother." Appellant and his girlfriend had earlier been invited by McCraney to stay overnight at the one bedroom apartment. However, they arrived with another couple. McCraney found that the other couple was still there when he awakened. Tracy, McCraney's girlfriend, came to the apartment later that morning. McCraney explained to appellant that the apartment was subsidized by "a section 8 program" and he was concerned about too many people being there. Appellant became nervous and upset. He punched Tracy in the head and McCraney in the face. Appellant was worried that they might call the police. Appellant forced Tracy into a closet where he and another male tried to strangle her. Appellant explained that he was only trying to put Tracy to sleep so she would not call the police. Eventually, appellant stabbed McCraney in the knee with a knife and threatened to kill McCraney and Tracy because "he didn't want to leave any witness behind." Later, when McCraney was trying to escape, he was stabbed in the shoulder and neck by appellant with scissors. When McCraney broke a window, appellant and the other man ran away. These actions by appellant formed the basis of the aggravated assault charge.

After the assaults upon McCraney and Tracy, appellant was arrested during his attempted escape from the police. Appellant told the arresting officer that he had intended to kill McCraney and regretted not finishing the job, and that he should have killed "the bitch." The arresting officer later learned that appellant had a rock of crack cocaine in his watch pocket.

Competency to Stand Trial

Factual Sufficiency

In his first point of error, appellant claims that the evidence at the pretrial hearing was factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant was competent to stand trial. Thus, appellant argues that he was incapable of entering valid guilty pleas and that the judgments of conviction must be reversed.

Prior to trial, appellant was accorded a hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial before a jury. The proceedings were conducted under the provisions of Article 46.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time (November 17-18, 2003).² Article 46.02 has now been repealed. See generally Chapter 46B, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (West Supp. 2005) (effective January 1, 2004).

Article 46.02, section 1A in effect at the time provided:

(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:

(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or

(2) a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.

(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.

Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 561, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3092 (repealed). (Current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003 (West Supp.2005)).

Section 4(a) of article 46.02 in effect at the time provided:

If the court determines that there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial, a jury shall be empaneled to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The determination shall be made by a jury that has not been selected to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 561, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3092 (repealed). (Current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.651 (West Supp.2005)).

The jury proceedings under article 46.02 were civil in nature. Parker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. ref'd). In a competency hearing before a jury, a defendant has to overcome the presumption of competency and has the burden of proving incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 187. The jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses at the competency hearing and the weight to give to the testimony. The jury accept or reject all or any of a witness's testimony. It is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve conflicts. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.); Parker, 667 S.W.2d at 187.

At the conclusion of testimony in the competency hearing, the trial court charged the jury in accordance with article 46.02 and the applicable law. The jury returned its verdict finding appellant competent to stand trial.

The Standard of Review

Now on appeal following his convictions, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict at the competency hearing. Appellate review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is governed by the following standard:

[W]hen the courts of appeals are called upon to exercise their fact jurisdiction, that is, examine whether the appellant proved his affirmative defense or other fact issue where the law has designated that the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence, the correct standard of review is whether after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.

Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (emphasis added); see also Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 215; 42 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and...