Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 23 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 28643,28643 |
| Parties | Ralph WILLIAMS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Martin, Kilpatrick & Davidson, Paul V. Kilpatrick, Jr., Columbus, for appellant.
E. Mullins Whisnant, Dist. Atty., Columbus, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Stubbs, II, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard L. Chambers, William F. Bartee, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., John B. Ballard, Jr., Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
The conviction for murder, and sentence to life imprisonment, of appellant in Muscogee Superior Court are here for review on several enumerated errors which appellant contends require a new trial. These alleged errors are: (1) the trial court should have charged the jury without a request on voluntary manslaughter; (2) the law of accident and involuntary manslaughter should also have been charged even though not requested; (3) the jury was allowed to make telephone calls during the time of deliberation on the case; and (4) members of the appellant's race were systematically and improperly excluded from service on the grand jury and petit jury.
Turning first to the failure of the trial court to charge the law of voluntary manslaughter, we note it is well established in criminal homicide cases that, when the defense of justifiable homicide or a grade of homicide less than murder is advanced by the defendant, the trial judge should define for the jury every grade of homicide in issue in the case. Davis v. State, 10 Ga. 101 (1851). If there is any evidence of voluntary manslaughter it should be given in charge even without a request. Banks v. State, 227 Ga. 578, 182 S.E.2d 106 (1971).
' A person commits voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being, under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person . . .' Code Ann. § 26-1102. The 'sudden, violent and irresistible passion' referred to in the statute is often discussed as a theory of mutual combat in situations involving physical confrontations between the defendant and the deceased. For example, in Joyner v. State,208 Ga. 435(4), 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951), the defendant entered a store following an altercation with the deceased and stated the deceased came at him with a chair and that he shot the deceased in self defense. The defendant was convicted of murder and assigned error on the trial court's failure to charge on voluntary manslaughter. This court noted in its opinion in the case that mutual combat exists where there is a fight with dangerous or deadly weapons and when both parties are at fault and are mutually willing to fight because of a sudden quarrel. The essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, a readiness and an intention by both parties to fight. This is different from the situation where reluctance, or fighting to repel an unprovoked attack, is involved as that demonstrates self defense justifying the homicide. See Mathis v. State, 196 Ga. 288, 291, 26 S.E.2d 606 (1943); and McDaniel v. State, 197 Ga. 757, 30 S.E.2d 612 (1943). The evidentiary circumstances necessary to show voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to circumstances showing the homicide was justified, relate to a situation which arouses sudden passion in the person killing so that, rather than defending himself, he wilfully kills the attacker, albeit without malice aforethought, when it was not necessary for him to do so in order to protect himself. The distinguishing characteristic between voluntary manslaughter and justifiable homicide in such cases is whether the accused was so influenced and excited that he reacted passionately or whether the defendant acted simply to defend himself.
In the present case, the defendant had engaged in an argument with the deceased over whether appellant had tried to take something out of the deceased's stepdaughter's pocketbook. The two of them finally separated, shook hands and appellant left the premises of the bar where the argument had occurred. Approximately 15 to 25 minutes later, appellant returned to the bar-cafe and had a gun in his possession. (Appellant claimed he had the gun when he was in the cafe earlier, so did not leave to get it). As appellant entered the bar-cafe, the bartender, who was the stepson of the deceased, approached appellant and tried to talk to him. Appellant then backed out of the door and as he did the deceased came up from behind his stepson, the bartender, and was standing in the doorway when appellant shot him from about six feet away, outside the door. A witness for appellant testified the deceased had a beer bottle in one hand and a knife in the other hand, and swung the bottle at appellant. A second witness for appellant testified the deceased was cutting at appellant with the knife when appellant fired his gun and shot the deceased. In an unsworn statement appellant stated that as he entered the bar on the second occasion the deceased 'jumped up and started the same issue toward me again.' That 'the next thing I (knew), he had reached for a beer bottle over in the trash can . . . he was angry mad . . . I started moving out the door, and as I was going outside and he was approaching me, he started swinging with the beer bottle and that's about all what happened until I shot him . . .' Witnesses for the State testified the deceased had no knife or beer bottle in...
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