Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 18 August 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 14-15-00236-CR,14-15-00236-CR
• Citation: 502 S.W.3d 262
• Parties: Brandon Joseph Williams, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

502 S.W.3d 262

Brandon Joseph Williams, Appellant

v.The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14-15-00236-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed August 18, 2016.

Rehearing Overruled October 4, 2016

Discretionary Review Refused January 11, 2017

Cary Marshall Faden, Sugar Land, TX, for Appellant.

Trey David Picard, Angleton, TX, for State.

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, McCally, and Busby.

OPINION

Sharon McCally, Justice

A jury convicted appellantBrandon Joseph Williams of murder and assessed his punishment at sixty-seven years' confinement and a $10,000 fine.Appellant timely appealed.We affirm.

I.BACKGROUND

Appellant does not dispute the fact that he shot the decedent; he only disputes why he did it—that is, whether he formed the requisite intent to murder.Thus, the facts are virtually undisputed.

Appellant, an Army veteran, shot and killed Veta Karla Conrad(Karla).According to appellant's mother, Belinda Sue Williams(Sue), appellant shot Karla while Karla and Karla's daughter, Sarah, were living with appellant at Sue's residence in Lake Jackson, Texas.Karla and Sarah were sharing Sue's bedroom while Sue slept on the living room couch; appellant had his own bedroom.On the night of the shooting, appellant, who had been using drugs—including synthetic marijuana and methamphetamine—woke Sue and said, "Mom, I hear something outside."Appellant told his mother to take Karla and Sarah, who were both asleep in their bedroom, into the bathroom.Sue did not want to scare Karla or Sarah, so she told appellant, "No."Appellant then went through the kitchen and out the backdoor.

Sue did not hear the backdoor close, so she rose and moved toward the living room fireplace in order to see out the backdoor.She saw appellant standing in the breezeway by the garage.Appellant appeared startled when he noticed her and fell backwards.Appellant then raised and pointed his gun at Sue and advanced toward her, yelling "get down on the ground."Sue walked backwards to a lamp in the living room, turned it on, and screamed, "It's me, mom."Appellant continued to approach, re-entered the house, and kept shouting at Sue to get on the ground.Frightened, Sue got down on one knee.Sue then heard a pop and thought she had been shot.She did not realize that Karla had entered the room behind her; Karla was hit by a single bullet fired from appellant's gun.When she realized she had not been shot, Sue lunged at appellant and tackled him; the gun "went flying" out of his hand.Sue struggled to keep appellant on the ground as Sarah walked into the living room.Sue shouted at Sarah to call 911.She also yelled at Sarah to "tell 911 that it was PTSD."Sue struggled to hold appellant down until the police arrived.

II.ANALYSIS

Appellant challenges his murder conviction in four issues.In his first issue, appellant urges that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of murder because the State failed to establish the requisite mental state for murder.In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress his oral confession because, in light of his claim to have been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), his confession was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony during the guilt/innocence phase concerning his mental illness, PTSD.Finally, in his fourth issue, appellant urges that the trial court erred by rejecting certain lesser-included offense instructions in the jury charge.

We first generally outline Texas law concerning mental illness as a defense or as rebutting evidence.We then address appellant's issues in the order he presents them and conclude that (1) the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for murder; (2) the record, and particularly the video recording of appellant's statement, supports the trial court's conclusion in the amended findings of fact and conclusions of law that appellant made his statements after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his legal rights; (3)the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony of PTSD that did not negate the mens rea for murder; and (4)appellant has waived his complaint about the lesser-included offense instructions through inadequate briefing.

A.Mental Illness: Insanity vs. Diminished Capacity

Texas law begins with the presumption that a criminal defendant is sane and that he intends the natural consequences of his acts.Ruffin v. State , 270 S.W.3d 586, 591–92(Tex.Crim.App.2008).However, a defendant may be excused from criminal responsibility if he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense of insanity.Tex. Penal Code § 8.01(a)("It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.").The insanity defense excuses the defendant from criminal responsibility even though the prosecution has proven every element of the particular offense, including the culpable mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt.Ruffin , 270 S.W.3d at 592.And, when insanity is relied upon as a defense, evidence of insanity is admissible as a matter of due process because "[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297(1973).

Apart from the insanity defense, upon which appellant does not rely in this case,¹ Texas does not recognize any other diminished capacity affirmative defense to criminal responsibility.SeeRuffin , 270 S.W.3d at 592.Instead, diminished capacity is a simple failure-of-proof defense in which a defendant argues that the State has failed to establish that, at the time of the offense, the defendant had the requisite state of mind.SeeJackson v. State , 160 S.W.3d 568, 573(Tex.Crim.App.2005).Therefore, "both lay and expert testimony of a mental disease or defect that directly rebuts the particular mens rea necessary for the charged offense is relevant and admissible unless excluded under a specific evidentiary rule."Ruffin , 270 S.W.3d at 587–88(reaffirming the holding inJackson , 160 S.W.3d at 568).

Our court has had few occasions to apply Jackson 's teachings regarding use of diminished-capacity evidence.SeeJackson , 160 S.W.3d at 574–75(holding that a trial court has the discretion to determine whether evidence of mental illness is relevant to negate the element of mens rea and, if admitted, whether such evidence raises the issue of a lesser-included offense);see alsoBurks v. State , No. 14–05–00921–CR, 2007 WL 2386321, at *10–11(Tex.App.—Houston[14th Dist.]Aug. 23, 2007, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication)(applyingJackson and determining that evidence of the appellant's mental disease actually provided the culpable mental state to support the offense charged).Our court has had no occasion to apply the evidentiary teachings of Ruffin .Ruffin , 270 S.W.3d at 587–88.Therefore, we examine those cases here to provide a framework for our analysis of appellant's substantive issues.

In Jackson , Jackson killed his brother following a fight.160 S.W.3d at 569–70.Jackson presented evidence that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.Id.After reviewing the proffered evidence of Jackson's illness and the testimony that Jackson was aware of what he was doing and knew the difference between right and wrong, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence did not negate the mens rea .Id . at 572(stating that evidence that "presented an excuse for the crime, i.e., that Appellant killed his brother because he was so paranoid that he thought his brother was out to get him" does not negate the intent to kill).

In Ruffin , Ruffin was "charged with first-degree aggravated assault by shooting at ten police officers during an armed ‘standoff’ on his rural property."270 S.W.3d at 587.This offense as charged required the State to prove that Ruffin intended to shoot a police officer.Id. at 594 & n. 25.After conviction, Ruffin appealed the trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony that he was suffering from severe delusions at the time of the offense and, thus, "believed that he was shooting at Muslims, not police officers."Id . at 587.He further argued that the expert testimony about his delusions negated the mens rea element that the persons he was shooting at were police officers and that the evidence would "support his theory that he was guilty only of the lesser-included offense of second-degree aggravated assault."Id . at 591.The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and reversed because the expert's testimony was "clearly relevant to the issue of whether appellant intended to shoot at police officers during the standoff or whether, because of a mental disease and the delusions that he suffered as a result of that disease, he believed he was shooting at Muslims or some other figment of his mind."Id . at 596.

The Court of Criminal Appeals further explained the Jackson rule in Mays v. State , 318 S.W.3d 368, 381(Tex.Crim.App.2010), involving an appeal from a conviction of killing a law enforcement officer during a shootout.In reliance upon Ruffin , Mays argued that his mental illness, including paranoid ideation, entitled him to a diminished capacity instruction regarding whether he acted intentionally or knowingly.Id . at 380–81.The Court disagreed.The Court noted that Mays' expert testified that paranoia does not prevent someone from acting intentionally or knowingly, though the person is " ‘influenced by the disordered thoughts.’ "Id . at 375.Thus, the Court concluded, the evidence went to motive for killing, rather than to mens rea .Id . at 380–81.As such, the paranoia that led...