Williams v. State, CR

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GLAZE
• Citation: Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 67, 894 S.W.2d 923 (Ark. 1995)
• Decision Date: 20 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Parties: Gary WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 94-662.

Page 923

894 S.W.2d 923

320 Ark. 67

Gary WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 94-662.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 20, 1995.

Val P. Price, Jonesboro, Brent Crews, Newport, for appellant.

Vada Berger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

GLAZE, Justice.

Appellant Gary Williams killed his parents, and was subsequently charged and convicted with two counts of capital murder. Prior to trial, Williams requested a psychiatric examination, which was granted. The Arkansas State Hospital's initial determination resulted in finding him incompetent to stand trial. After about nine months of treatment, state hospital officials found Williams had improved to the point where he was competent to stand trial. Those officials, however, still omitted any conclusion regarding whether Williams appreciated the criminality of his conduct at the time he killed his parents. Consequently, Williams asked for a second evaluation, stating he was entitled to an opinion on the criminal responsibility issue. The trial court denied that request. At trial, Williams raised the insanity defense, but the jury rejected it, finding him guilty of both counts of capital murder and sentencing him to life without parole.

On appeal, Williams first contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury concerning what would happen to Williams if the jury acquitted him on the grounds of mental disease or defect. Williams proffered a modified AMCI 4009 instruction, adding a paragraph, reflecting that, if Williams is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the trial court must commit him to the Department of Human Services for further examinations and treatment. The trial court's ruling rejecting Williams's instruction was correct.

This court has repeatedly held that the jury is not to be told the options available to the trial court when a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect because such an instruction raises questions foreign to the jury's primary duty of determining guilt or innocence. Hubbard v. State, 306 Ark. 153, 812 S.W.2d 107 (1991); Robertson v. State, 304 Ark. 332, 802 S.W.2d 920 (1991); Love v. State, 281 Ark. 379, 664 S.W.2d 457 (1981); Curry v. State, 271 Ark. 913, 611 S.W.2d 745 (1981); Campbell v. State, 216 Ark. 878, 228 S.W.2d 470 (1950). Williams cites to an annotation in 81 ALR4th 659 which states that a substantial number of jurisdictions have held or recognized that the trial judge in a criminal case involving the insanity defense must instruct the jury as to hospital confinement or other dispositional consequences of an acquittal on grounds of insanity. That same annotation, however, recognizes that courts in a large number of jurisdictions (including Arkansas) still adhere to the view that such instructions are generally inappropriate and unnecessary. The rationale announced in the annotation for rejecting such an instruction is consistent with that adopted by this court--it would permit or encourage the jury to base its verdict on speculation regarding the defendant's subsequent disposition rather than on the law and evidence as to his mental responsibility at the time of the crime. For twenty-five years, this court has adhered to this sound reasoning, and we decline Williams' suggestion to repudiate it now. ¹

Williams next argues the trial court erred when it denied his request for a second opinion on the issue of his criminal responsibility at the time of the crime. He points to Doctors Hall's and Simon's evaluation letter which stated that, "We feel unable to reach a definitive decision with regard to Mr. Williams' criminal responsibility in this case and thus respectfully leave the decision to the trier of fact."

Williams cites Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-305(d)(4) (Repl.1993) which provides that the mental examination report shall include an opinion as to the extent, if any, (1) to which the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or (2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired at the time of the conduct alleged. He argues the state hospital's report did not contain an opinion bearing on his mental capacity when the crimes occurred. The state responds, stating that the statute requires no unequivocal opinion, but provides only that such reports contain an opinion as to the extent to which the defendant's mental capacity was impaired. The state is correct.

Doctors Hall and Simon concluded that there was little doubt that Williams was mentally ill, and they classified him as atypical psychosis, psychotic disorder not otherwise specified. They said this classification means Williams has some kind of mental problem, defect or disease, but they cannot fit him in any categories. The doctors further stated that it could certainly be argued Williams' criminal behavior was a direct product of his mental illness, and thus, he should not be held responsible for his actions. The doctors then opined that other factors suggested Williams appreciated the criminality of his conduct, and more than likely he could have conformed his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the crimes. In support of this statement, the doctors related in their evaluation letter that Williams had (1) called the police and informed them he had murdered his parents, (2) refused to give a statement until he could speak to an attorney, (3) feared that his parents had planned to put him back in jail (when in fact evidence existed showing his parents were afraid of him and wanted him out of their home), and (4) appeared to appreciate the fact that he could be charged with murder for his acts and sent to prison, if found guilty.

The foregoing evidence reflects the doctors rendered an opinion that Williams suffered from an atypical psychosis (psychotic disorder), mental illness, but the doctors could not otherwise specify or fit him in any category. Nonetheless, the doctors' report did contain factors and opinions bearing on "the extent" to which Williams may have been mentally impaired when he murdered his parents.

In Walker v. State, 303 Ark. 401, 797 S.W.2d 447 (1990), this court held § 5-2-305(d)(4) was satisfied when a psychiatrist gave a conditional evaluation. There, the psychiatrist said it was difficult for her to evaluate the defendant's mental condition at the time the offense was committed because she had not known him at the time. She further stated that the defendant would have been able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct if defendant's condition was the same at the time of the offense as it was on the date of her report and evaluation.

Like in Walker, the psychiatrists here experienced difficulty in giving an unqualified opinion, bearing on the criminal responsibility issue of the defendant. And while Williams argues a conclusive opinion is necessary under § 5-2-305(d)(4), this court has made it quite clear that a jury is not bound to accept opinion testimony as conclusive even when it exists and is introduced. Robertson, 304 Ark. 332, 802 S.W.2d 920. Thus, even when several competent experts concur in their opinions and no opposing expert evidence is offered, the jury is still bound to decide the issue upon its own fair judgment. Id.

Before leaving this issue, we point out that Williams' argument seems to rest on the suggestion that the psychiatrists'...