Williams v. State, 5064

• Citation: 174 So.2d 97
• Decision Date: 31 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 5064,5064
• Parties: E. Jack WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 97

174 So.2d 97

E. Jack WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5064.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 31, 1965.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1965.

David C. G. Kerr and Lawrence J. O'Neil, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Robert R. Crittenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

After hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the appellant's post-conviction motion seeking relief from a judgment and sentence of life imprisonment imposed in 1941. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to find that his plea of guilty, entered through counsel appointed to defend him against a first degree murder charge, was induced by a confession obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We find no error and affirm without deciding (1) whether or not the confession was in fact so obtained, or (2) whether or not relief is available from a conviction based upon or induced by such a confession through post-conviction proceedings since there is no evidence that the confession induced the guilty plea.

By indictment filed October 2, 1940, the appellant was charged with the premeditated murder of one Ross Arnold on August 17, 1940. The appellant was arrested in Tennessee and returned to Hillsborough County in January 1941. On February 1, 1941, the appellant was questioned by an assistant state attorney in the presence of two deputy sheriffs and a court reporter. The original transcript of this interrogation was produced by an assistant state attorney at the hearing on the appellant's Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 motion. The transcript indicates that the appellant was first advised, among other things, that he need not answer any questions that would incriminate him because his answers could be used against him in court. It contains acknowledgments by the appellant that he understood this advise, that the statement was given voluntarily of his own free will, and that he had been fairly treated by the assistant state attorney and the deputy sheriffs.

The interrogation proper contains statements by the appellant that he 'cut' Arnold while sitting in Arnold's car drinking. It states that the appellant got out, walked around to Arnold's side, struggled across a ditch, 'cut' him again, fell with him and took $6 from his pockets. The transcript discloses that the appellant drove off in Arnold's car, picked up a friend of his, Ed Barrios, asked Barrios 'what to do about it' and discussed blood stains on the car with his brother, Francis. ¹ The interrogation further discloses that Ed Barrios tried to sober the appellant up and take him home 'to confess everything;' that after he got home 'they were telling [him] all the things [he] did, and they found out and they were telling [him] what [he] had done;' ² and that 'they said there was a mob after [him], and [he] took [his] wife and left. * * *' Referring to a shirt which the assistant state attorney had shown him that afternoon, the appellant stated that it had blood on it, that he had become frightened and that he had taken it off and thrown it out of the car. ³ Finally, in answering questions which indicate that Ed Barrios already had discussed the matter with the state attorney's office, ⁴ the appellant confirmed the fact that he had stopped Arnold's car near the site of the crime and had said to Ed: 'Come over here, do you want to see something awful;' also, that, as they drove further down the road, he had said to Ed: 'Ed, how long does it take for a dead body before it starts smelling?'

On February 4th, three days after the interrogation, the appellant was brought to court, adjudged insolvent, counsel was appointed to represent him, and a plea of not guilty was entered. The next day the appellant appeared in court with appointed counsel, an experienced attorney, who moved that the appellant be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty, plead guilty to murder in the first degree and ask for the mercy of the court. The court granted this motion upon the recommendation of the state attorney. Thereupon, witnesses were sworn and the court proceeded to hear evidence. The hearing commenced at 2:20 P.M. and terminated at 3:10 P.M. after the court had sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment.

At the hearing on the appellant's Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 motion the transcript produced by the state attorney's office was introduced in evidence by the appellant. He then testified, contrary to this transcript, that prior to and during the course of the questioning he had repeatedly requested an attorney. In the order appealed the court denied the appellant's motion on the ground, among others, that the purported confession had never been used against him.

The appellant relies chiefly upon Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 1964, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, a recent five-four decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The majority there held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the introduction in evidence in a state criminal proceeding of an incriminating statement elicited under certain described circumstances, including, among others, a refusal by the police to honor the defendant's request to consult with his lawyer during the course of the interrogation which produced the statement. A casual reading of the Court's majority opinion discloses that it is based upon numerous circumstances many of which are not present here. However, since our decision turns upon another point, we may assume, without deciding, that the interrogation in the present case was conducted in such a manner as to have rendered it inadmissible under the Escobedo case. ⁵

The appellant does not contend that the confession was actually used against him. He contends that its mere existence rendered meaningless the subsequent appointment of counsel and virtually obviated the possibility of a trial on the issue of guilt. ⁶ In the absence of evidence we will not infer that a defendant who pleads guilty while represented by appointed counsel necessarily was induced to do so by a prior Escobedo-type interrogation. In re Seiterle, 1964, 39 Cal.Rptr. 716, 394 P.2d 556; Hornes v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 1964, 235 Md. 673, 202 A.2d 643. ⁷ The facts of the present case demonstrate the fallacy of such a presumption. The evidence available to the prosecutor in this case, apart from the interrogation, was sufficient of itself to cause the appellant and his appointed counsel reasonable apprehension concerning the possible imposition of the death penalty. Under these circumstances the reasonable inference is that such evidence induced both the confession and the plea. The sentence which the appellant is now serving was not based upon the confession of which he complains but upon his plea of guilty voluntarily made. ⁸

The court expresses its thanks to counsel appointed to represent the appellant on this appeal for their effective presentation of the appellant's case.

Affirmed.

ALLEN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.

1 Appellant stated that when his brother asked him where he got the car he advised him he had 'hit bolita and borrowed $150 from the Government. * * *'

2 Appellant stated that his father told him 'Lord have merecy, what have you done, son?'

3 The appellant stated that, before the picked up Ed Barrios, he bought a shirt from a boy at a 'station on No. 17 Highway,' that he drove to the 'Blue Moon' dance hall and later got some gas at a filling station across the street from the dance hall.

4 Ed Barrios was one of five witnesses listed on the murder indictment.

5 Another question which we expressly do not decide is whether or not the Escobedo case...