Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 25 October 2018
• Docket Number: No. 70868,70868
• Citation: 429 P.3d 301
• Parties: Gregory Anthony WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

429 P.3d 301

Gregory Anthony WILLIAMS, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 70868

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED OCTOBER 25, 2018

Howard Brooks, Public Defender, and Audrey M. Conway and Kevin Charles Speed, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for Appellant.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Stacy L. Kollins, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

The United States Constitution prohibits parties from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. When a defendant claims that the State has removed a potential juror because of the juror’s race, the law requires the district judge to conduct a three-step inquiry. If, after conducting the inquiry, the district judge finds no unlawful discrimination occurred, we give great deference to the district court’s finding and will only reverse if the district court clearly erred. But where, as here, the court fails to properly engage that inquiry, and it appears more likely than not that the State struck the juror because of her race, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

Gregory Williams was convicted of lewdness and sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14—six counts in all—for sexual misconduct involving his girlfriend’s two daughters. Four of the counts were based on the sexual assault and touching of T.H., a 10-year-old girl, and the other two counts were based on lewdness with A.H., who was 12. T.H. testified at trial that Williams anally and vaginally penetrated her with his penis on three separate occasions, and touched her vagina, butt, and breasts on another. Rectal swabs taken from T.H. contained both sperm material and protein found in semen, and were consistent with Williams’s DNA. A.H. also testified that Williams once lifted up her shirt and sucked on her breasts, and that another time Williams lifted up her shirt halfway but then stopped after she began to cry.

On appeal, Williams argues multiple errors in his trial require reversal, but we address only two of his arguments in this opinion. First, Williams argues, and we agree, that the district court clearly erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American woman from the venire. Second, Williams argues that he should have been allowed to present evidence that the two young girls had the ability to contrive sexual allegations due to exposure to sexual information in the girls’ home—or, at the least, that the district court should have let him question the girls under oath outside the presence of the jury to understand their knowledge of their mother’s career in the pornographic film industry and their exposure to sexual information in the home. We agree that Williams should have received a hearing, and set forth the procedure to follow in determining whether to admit evidence to show that a young victim could have contrived sexual allegations.

II.

During jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory strike to remove prospective Juror No. 23, an African-American woman. Williams made a Batson challenge to the peremptory strike, claiming that Juror 23 was unconstitutionally removed due to her race. Under Batson v. Kentucky , the use of a peremptory strike to remove a potential juror on the basis of race is unconstitutional. 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). If established, such discrimination in the jury-selection process constitutes structural error requiring reversal. Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 423, 185 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2008).

When analyzing a Batson challenge at trial, a district court must engage in a three-step process. See Batson , 476 U.S. at 93-100, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332-35, 91 P.3d 16, 28-30 (2004). First, the opponent of the peremptory strike "must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race." Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ); Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 332-33, 91 P.3d at 29. Second, if that showing has been made, the proponent of the peremptory strike must present a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 ; Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 333, 91 P.3d at 29. Finally, the court should hear argument and determine whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proven purposeful discrimination. Id. at 333-34, 91 P.3d at 29-30. Because the district court is in the best position to rule on a Batson challenge, its determination is reviewed deferentially, for clear error. Id. at 334, 91 P.3d at 30.

We have repeatedly implored district courts to adhere to this three-step analysis and clearly spell out their reasoning and determinations. See Libby v. State, 115 Nev. 45, 54, 975 P.2d 833, 839 (1999) ("We take this opportunity to instruct the district courts of this state to clearly spell out the three-step analysis when deciding a Batson ... issue."); Kaczmarek , 120 Nev. at 334, 91 P.3d at 30 ("We have directed Nevada’s district courts to ‘clearly spell out the three-step analysis’ when deciding Batson - type issues."); McCarty v. State, 132 Nev. 218, 230, 371 P.3d 1002, 1010 (2016) ("Although the three-step Batson analysis is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence, we continue to see that analysis not being followed.") (Douglas, J., concurring). Yet district courts continue to shortchange Batson challenges and scrimp on the analysis and findings necessary to support their Batson determinations. We take this opportunity to, yet again, urge district courts to follow the three-step Batson procedure.

A.

The first step of a Batson challenge requires the party challenging the peremptory strike to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Batson , 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712. To make a prima facie showing of discrimination, the defendant must do more than point out that a member of a cognizable group was struck. See Watson v. State, 130 Nev. 764, 776, 335 P.3d 157, 166 (2014) ("[T]he mere fact that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a cognizable group is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson ’s first step; ‘something more’ is required."). The defendant must show "that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This showing is not onerous, nor does it require the defendant to meet the ultimate burden of proof. See Watson, 130 Nev. at 775, 335 P.3d at 166. The defendant may make this showing by demonstrating a pattern of discriminatory strikes, but a pattern is not necessary and is not the only means by which a defendant may raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 776, 335 P.3d at 166. Other evidence a defendant might present could include "the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes, the nature of the proponent’s questions and statements during voir dire, disparate treatment of members of the targeted group, and whether the case itself is sensitive to bias." Id. at 776, 335 P.3d at 167.

Here, Williams argued that Juror 23 was one of eight African-American venire members, that the State used its second peremptory strike on her, and that given her answers in voir dire, she was excused solely because of her race. Before the court determined whether Williams made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the State interjected, objecting that Williams himself had excused an African-American veniremember for cause, and that there was no pattern of discrimination. The State went on, saying "[t]he State does have a race-neutral reason for excluding that juror, but does not feel that it’s required to put on the record right now because no pattern has been shown that we’ve exhibited." Nonetheless, the State did offer a reason for Juror 23’s exclusion before the district court determined whether Williams established a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Thus, while the record indicates the district court intimated that it would ask the State for a race-neutral explanation after Williams completed his argument, the district court never actually determined whether Williams raised an inference of purposeful discrimination. Where, as here, the State provides a race-neutral reason for the exclusion of a veniremember before a determination at step one, the step-one analysis becomes moot and we move to step two. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ; Fordv. State, 122 Nev. 398, 403, 132 P.3d 574, 577 (2006) ; Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 332, 91 P.3d at 29.

B.

At step two, the burden shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral reason for the veniremember’s exclusion. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The State’s reason cannot be that the veniremember may be biased due to his or her race. Id. Nor can the prosecutor rebut the defendant’s prima facie showing by denying a discriminatory motive or making general assertions as to his or her integrity and professional reputation. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Under this step, the prosecutor’s explanation only needs to be race neutral; it does not need to be "persuasive, or even plausible." Diomampo, 124 Nev. at 422, 185 P.3d at 1036 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) ). At this point, the district court should determine only whether the prosecutor has offered an ostensibly race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike; it should not make an ultimate determination on the Batson challenge until conducting the sensitive inquiry required by step three. See United...