Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 02 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 249, 2007.,249, 2007.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: Jordan M. WILLIAMS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

962 A.2d 210

Jordan M. WILLIAMS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

No. 249, 2007.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: September 3, 2008.

Decided: December 2, 2008.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, ID No. 0610011877.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court.

AFFIRMED.

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esquire (argued) and Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Esquire (argued), of the Office of the Public Defender, Georgetown, Delaware for appellant.

Paul R. Wallace, Esquire (argued) and Abby Adams, Esquire (argued), of the Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

RIDGELY, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Jordan M. Williams appeals from his conviction of one count of carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Williams contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. We agree with the Superior Court that Williams was not seized during the initial consensual encounter. Even if he was, the stop was permissible under the community caretaker doctrine because Williams appeared to be in peril, distress, or need of assistance. As a result of the encounter, the police officer learned of outstanding warrants and the weapon was seized pursuant to a search of Williams incident to a lawful arrest. We find no merit to William's appeal and affirm.

I. Factual Background

Corporal Shawn Brittingham of the Georgetown, Delaware Police Department noticed Williams walking along the median of Route 113 in Georgetown at approximately 3:50 a.m. on October 13, 2006. Because it was cold and windy, Officer Brittingham approached Williams to offer assistance. Officer Brittingham pulled his car up about 10 feet behind Williams and activated his strobe light. He then approached and asked Williams if he needed a ride. Williams declined, explaining that his car had broken down and that he was walking to a nearby gas station where he was going to be picked up by his mother.

Officer Brittingham testified that he did not notice anything about Williams before or after the encounter that created any suspicion that Williams was engaged in criminal activity. The officer also testified that Williams's direction of travel was consistent with his explanation and that he was polite, calm, and friendly while answering questions. As a matter of routine, Officer Brittingham asked Williams for his name and date of birth, which Williams gave him.¹ After the encounter, which lasted approximately two to three minutes, Williams continued on his way. Officer Brittingham then ran the name and date of birth through his mobile computer. That search revealed that Williams had outstanding arrest warrants for unpaid traffic fines.

Acting upon the warrants, Officer Brittingham again approached Williams and asked, "You know why I am back, right?" Williams responded affirmatively, acknowledging that he had outstanding warrants. Officer Brittingham then asked Williams whether he had any weapons on his person that would be of concern. Williams voluntarily responded that he had a handgun. Officer Brittingham ordered Williams to put his hands on top of his head, searched Williams, and found a handgun positioned in Williams's waistband. Williams was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon.

Williams filed a motion to suppress, alleging an unlawful search and seizure in violation of his rights under 11 Del. C. § 1902(a), the Delaware Constitution, and the U.S. Constitution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied the motion, holding that Williams was not "seized" by Officer Brittingham during the initial encounter. Williams was convicted by a jury of one count of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon and sentenced. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

We review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.² To the extent the trial judge's decision is based on factual findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous."³ To the extent that we examine the trial judge's legal conclusions, we review them de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts.⁴

Williams was not seized during the initial encounter

Williams contends that his encounter with Officer Brittingham, which resulted in Williams's giving his name and date of birth, was an unreasonable seizure in violation of 11 Del. C. 1902, Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Williams argues that once Officer Brittingham determined that he did not need assistance, the officer no longer had any reason to detain Williams, and Officer Brittingham lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for further detention and questioning.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that not every encounter with the police is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.⁵ Where, as here, the alleged seizure was a brief investigatory stop, the Fourth Amendment does not require that the officer have probable cause to support an arrest. Rather the officer need only possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.⁶ However, before we can determine whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion, we must first answer the threshold inquiry of whether a seizure actually occurred.⁷

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, under the Fourth Amendment "police can be said to have seized an individual `only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'"⁸ Later, as its jurisprudence evolved, the Court indicated in California v. Hodari D.,⁹ that this standard must be read more closely, explaining that "it states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for ... a seizure effected through a show of authority." The Court clarified that a seizure requires more than a mere assertion of authority, even if it would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave. Instead, there must be some physical force or submission to the assertion of authority.¹⁰ Consistent with this requirement, the Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment "mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual."¹¹

Although we have acknowledged the parameters of the Fourth Amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court,¹² we have declined to follow Hodari when enforcing the protection from illegal searches and seizures afforded by the Delaware Constitution.¹³ Instead, we have retained a pre-Hodari standard based on the articulation by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Chesternut.¹⁴ Like Chesternut, our standard under the Delaware Constitution focuses on the actions of the police officer and whether a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.¹⁵

Even under this more stringent standard, "law enforcement officers are permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of asking questions."¹⁶ This type of interaction is an encounter and, if consensual, neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the Fourth Amendment.¹⁷ During a consensual encounter, a person has no obligation to answer the officer's inquiry and is free to go about his business. Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the police officer's actions would cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to ignore the police presence does a consensual encounter become a seizure.¹⁸

Here, Williams's first encounter with Officer Brittingham was not a seizure. The officer observed Williams walking on a highway median at 3:50 a.m. in cold and windy weather. He parked his patrol car about ten feet behind Williams, activated his strobe light—not his emergency flashers—and approached Williams to ask if he needed a ride. Williams voluntarily answered Officer Brittingham's questions, including his name and date of birth. After a brief period, the encounter ended with Williams continuing to walk toward his destination.

Under the Fourth Amendment, this encounter lacked the physical force or submission to the assertion of authority to amount to a seizure. Furthermore, viewing the totality of the circumstances—Officer Brittingham's inquiry, Williams's voluntary response to questions, and the amicable end to the encounter—a reasonable person would believe he was free to ignore the police presence. Because the encounter was consensual and not a seizure; the pedigree information gathered by Officer Brittingham was obtained lawfully.¹⁹

Even if there was a seizure, the community caretaker doctrine applies

Assuming arguendo that Officer Brittingham's encounter with Williams constituted a seizure, his actions during the initial encounter were nonetheless reasonable and valid. Although a warrantless seizure is presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, this presumption may be rebutted by showing that a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies.²⁰

One exception recognized by many jurisdictions is the non-criminal, non-investigative "community caretaker" or "public safety" doctrine.²¹ The doctrine stems from a recognition that "[l]ocal police have multiple responsibilities, only one of which is the enforcement of criminal law...."²² The modern police officer is a "jack-of-all-emergencies," with "`complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses'; by default or design he is also expected `to...