Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 31 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 53A01-9303-CR-99,53A01-9303-CR-99 |
| Citation | 634 N.E.2d 849 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Deborah WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
William E. Daily, Daily & Worden, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Suzann Weber Lupton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Deborah Williams appeals her convictions of criminal confinement, a class D felony, and two counts of interference with a custody order, both class B misdemeanors. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On January 26, 1991, Williams persuaded Angela Siebe, the college student who had been appointed to supervise Williams' visitation with her children, Meghan, then age 5, and Jaime, then age 3, to drive to Vincennes, Indiana with the children to visit a relative. When the vehicle arrived in Lawrenceville, Illinois, and Williams had picked up her mother, Williams informed Siebe that she was getting out. Siebe was left off at a motel in Vincennes, Indiana. The authorities apprehended Williams with the children in Kansas. 1
Williams raises five issues in this appeal:
(1) whether the trial court erred by not dismissing counts II, III, and IV of the amended information when it granted Williams' motion for judgment on the evidence on these counts;
(2) whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of extrinsic crimes;
(3) whether the trial court erred in excluding Williams' Exhibit G, a psychological evaluation of her former husband which had been prepared by his former employer;
(4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Williams' convictions of each of the three counts; and,
(5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without specifically articulating its reasons.
Williams argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss counts II, III, and IV of the information which charged Williams with three distinct acts of confinement. She argues that further prosecution on these counts would subject her to double jeopardy because the court granted her motion for judgment on the evidence as to the three counts at the close of the State's case in chief, finding that the evidence did not show venue to lie in Monroe County.
The record supports Williams' assertion that the trial court did in fact withdraw the counts from the jury's consideration and granted Williams' "written motion which is designated as defendant's motion for judgment on the evidence ... as to Counts Two, Three and Four." 2 But, the court also deferred dismissal of the counts "pending further pleadings filed in the cause relating to any possible transfer to the county having proper venue." Neither party thereafter filed any pleadings to request or object to a transfer or to obtain a dismissal.
We are squarely presented with the question of whether a criminal defendant may be tried a second time when a trial court has determined, after the State's case in chief, that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving that the offenses charged occurred in the county identified in the charging instrument. The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 41, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2217, 72 L.Ed.2d 652.
This prohibition, lying at the core of the Clause's protections, prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance.
Id. (Citations omitted).
A judgment of acquittal is especial in the jurisprudence of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. Even where an acquittal is "based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation," a defendant may not be retried for the same offense. Sanabria v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 54, 65, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2179, 57 L.Ed.2d 43. Indeed, historically, "the most fundamental rule" has been that " '[a] verdict of acquittal ... [may] not [even] be reviewed ... without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy and thereby violating the Constitution.' " United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977), 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642.
We therefore direct our attention to the constitutional significance of the ruling made in the present case. Whether the trial court's action constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not to be ascertained from the form of the judge's action, id. at 572, 97 S.Ct. at 1355, although the form of the order entered by the trial court should not be ignored, Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 67, 98 S.Ct. at 2180, but rather by determining whether the substance of the ruling, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571, 97 S.Ct. at 1354; State v. Lewis (1989), Ind., 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1118.
Williams requested that the trial court grant her a judgment on the evidence pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 50 and the court expressly did so. The trial rule provides that where some of the issues tried before a jury are not supported by sufficient evidence, the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon. A judgment entered pursuant to the rule is explicitly intended to terminate a pending proceeding following the completed presentation of evidence by the party having the burden of proof, for the rule provides that "a judgment shall be entered thereon." This means that in a criminal prosecution an "acquittal" as defined for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause may take the form of a judgment on the evidence in Indiana.
Nonetheless, the judgments on the evidence entered here were acquittals in substance as well as form. As the court's colloquy with the jury elucidates, the court granted Williams' motion on the ground that the State had not proved venue, a necessary fact in any criminal conviction in Indiana. 3 The court evaluated the State's evidence and determined it to be legally insufficient to permit a conviction in Monroe County. Whether or not the counts were dismissed or the court's ruling was correct, the court's action brought an end to the jeopardy which had attached when the first witness was sworn before this particular jury.
Williams may not now be retried. "The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee ... that its limitations [can be avoided] by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spacial units." Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 72, 98 S.Ct. at 2183. We direct that counts two, three and four of the information be dismissed.
Williams challenges the admission of evidence she attempted to hire someone to kill her former husband. The State sought admission of the evidence on the ground it tended to show consciousness of guilt. 4
The State first brought the evidence to the jury's attention during cross-examination of Williams, after Williams had made her state of mind an issue, by asking Williams how many people she had attempted to hire to kill her former husband. After a second question on the topic, Williams voiced the following belated objection: 5 "Your Honor for the record I would in the courts ruling would like to know if I could continue an objection for the record." The court granted Williams' request, though a specific ground for the objection was never stated and no clear reference was made to the court's earlier ruling. Since the objection did not refer to any specific motion by Williams, it is not sufficiently specific to preserve any alleged error for appellate review. Cf. Johnson v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 892, 904. Cf. Ind.Evidence Rule 103(a) ().
On appeal, Williams acknowledges that she may not have adequately preserved error. However, she maintains that the error is fundamental in nature, and thus, despite her procedural default, is available for review. As a general rule, the erroneous admission of evidence of extrinsic acts is not fundamental error. See e.g. Lewis v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1054; Greentree v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 47, 351 N.E.2d 25; Stout v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 1076, trans. denied; Ried v. State (1993), Ind.App., 610 N.E.2d 275; Dorsey v. State (1977), 171 Ind.App. 408, 357 N.E.2d 280.
Whether or not the evidence was properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 6 and its erroneous admission rises to the level of fundamental error, it is our conclusion that the admission of the evidence in this case was harmless.
No error in the admission of evidence is ground for setting aside a conviction unless such erroneous admission appears inconsistent with substantial justice or affects the substantial rights of the parties. Ind.Trial Rule 61. The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. Jaske v. State (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 14, 22. To decide if the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence of extrinsic offenses is harmless, we therefore evaluate whether the jury's verdict was substantially swayed. Hardin [v. State (1993), Ind.], 611 N.E.2d [123,] 132.
Wickizer v. State (1993), Ind., 626 N.E.2d 795, 800-01.
Williams admitted the essential facts constituting the elements of confinement and interference with a custody order but...
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