Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 02 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2117 Sept. Term 2015,2117 Sept. Term 2015 |
| Citation | 149 A.3d 1220,231 Md.App. 156 |
| Parties | Deon Leroy Williams v. State of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Rachel Simmonsen (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Todd W. Hesel (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Deborah S. Eyler, Wright, Paul E. Alpert (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Alpert, J.Deon Leroy Williams, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Caroline County of three counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (heroin, hydrocodone, and marijuana); three counts of possessing each of those drugs; and six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 Appellant raises four questions on appeal, which we have slightly reworded:
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments.
On the evening of September 17, 2013, Sergeant Leonard Nichols2 , an 11–year veteran with the Maryland State Police, the last five years with the Caroline County Drug Task Force, executed a traffic stop of appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked driver's license in the Easton area of Talbot County. The sergeant had been told earlier by a confidential informant that appellant would have drugs on him. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, however, no drugs were found on appellant or in his car, although he had a large sum of cash ($1,356) on his person and he was nervous. Appellant was transported to the police barracks in Easton in Talbot County where he was strip searched and a baggie was seen protruding from his anus. Pursuant to a search warrant, the baggie was removed by medical personnel. The baggie contained two additional baggies: one contained heroin, the other contained cocaine.
The sergeant then obtained and, about four hours later, during the early morning hours of September 18, executed a second search warrant for appellant's residence at 7188 American Corner Road in Denton, in Caroline County. From the residence, the police seized drugs (heroin, hydrocodone and marijuana) and six guns—three handguns and three rifles. Appellant was subsequently charged in Caroline County with six drug counts and six gun counts relating to the seizure of the items from his residence.
Prior to trial on those charges, appellant sought to suppress the drugs and guns recovered pursuant to the Caroline County residential search warrant. In his written motions, appellant argued that the events in Talbot County were illegal and poisoned the search and seizure warrant issued for his residence in Caroline County—the traffic stop was invalid because it was pretextual, and the cavity search and the manner in which it was conducted were illegal. In a written response, the State argued that any issues concerning the initial vehicle stop and subsequent cavity search had already been heard and decided in the State's favor in appellant's Talbot County case.3
At the subsequent suppression hearing, the State again raised the same argument—that the Talbot County Circuit Court had already determined that the initial vehicular stop, arrest, and subsequent cavity search were valid. Defense counsel seemed to agree but also argued, indistinctly, “something [ ] survived from Talbot County.” After some discussion, the suppression court stated that while there was no res judicata or collateral estoppel in this case, the issue before it was “very limited”—whether there was a substantial basis for the Caroline County magistrate to issue the warrant for appellant's residence. The State then presented the testimony of Sergeant Nichols and admitted into evidence the 24–page affidavit in support of the residential search warrant. Appellant testified in support of his motion.
Sergeant Nichols testified that around 6:30 p.m., on September 17, 2013, he received a telephone call from a confidential informant (CI# 3) about appellant. During the telephone call, the informant told the sergeant that appellant was attending a “Narcotics Anonymous ... or some kind of meeting,” and that when he left the meeting he would enter a described car that was parked behind the Wal–Mart on Teal Drive in Easton. Appellant would leave the area in the car and make drug “drops”—selling specified amounts of drugs to individuals. After the sergeant received the call, he learned and confirmed through dispatch that appellant's license had been suspended and revoked.
The sergeant and his partner set up a surveillance of the area, and a short time later appellant was observed leaving the area in the described vehicle. The sergeant followed appellant's car for about a ¼ of mile when the sergeant, who had prior contact with appellant, believed that appellant had spotted him. Appellant pulled into a parking lot and stopped. The sergeant pulled his car next to appellant's car and likewise stopped. The sergeant arrested appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked license.
Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, the sergeant searched appellant and his car but found nothing of note, except $1,356 on appellant's person. During the search, the sergeant noted that appellant was cooperative but nervous—his chest was rapidly “moving up and down,” the muscles in his neck “were visibly contracting,” and he was sweating, even though the temperature was a mild 75 degrees. The sergeant testified that he believed “criminal activity was afoot” based on his prior contact with appellant, the information from CI# 3, the large sum of cash, and appellant's nervousness. The sergeant had appellant transported to the Easton Barrack where he could be processed for driving on a suspended and revoked license and strip searched.
Appellant was taken to the “intoximeter room”—a multipurpose room of the Easton Barrack where DUI's and fingerprints are processed, and a “secure” area of the barrack where the public is not allowed. Appellant, the sergeant and two, possibly three, other officers were present in the room. Appellant was asked to take off his clothes, turn around, bend over, and spread his buttocks apart. According to the sergeant, appellant did as he was instructed, except he did not spread his buttocks so the sergeant could see appellant's anus clearly. Nonetheless, the sergeant did see a plastic baggie protruding from appellant's rectal area. The sergeant “tried” to spread appellant's buttocks apart to retrieve the baggie but could not because appellant “clench[ed]” his muscles. When the sergeant tried to handcuff appellant, a scuffle ensued between appellant and the officers. Once appellant had been handcuffed, the sergeant told appellant what he had seen but appellant refused to retrieve the baggie himself. The sergeant left appellant naked in the room for about an hour while he applied for and received a search warrant for medical personnel to remove the baggie from appellant's anus. Appellant was then taken to a hospital where, around 12:50 a.m., a doctor physically removed from appellant's anus a plastic baggie containing what was later determined to be a baggie of heroin and a baggie of crack cocaine.
Sergeant Nichols then applied for a search warrant for appellant's residence at 7188 American Corner in Denton in Caroline County. Appellant had listed that address with the Motor Vehicle Administration, the Maryland Sex Offender Registry, and during a prior traffic stop and a prior arrest. In the application in support of the search warrant for the American Corner residence, the sergeant provided the following information:
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