Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 02 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 45S03-0011-PC-618.,45S03-0011-PC-618.
• Citation: 737 N.E.2d 734
• Parties: Richard Calvin WILLIAMS, JR., Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

737 N.E.2d 734

Richard Calvin WILLIAMS, JR., Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).

No. 45S03-0011-PC-618.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

November 2, 2000.

Stephen Bower, Cohen and Thiros, Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas D. Perkins, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Richard Calvin Williams, Jr., was convicted of attempted murder as an accomplice. For the reasons discussed in our recent decision, Bethel v. State, the jury instruction used at trial on the intent necessary to be convicted of attempted murder as an accomplice violated the rule of Spradlin v. State. We find Williams is entitled to the post-conviction relief he seeks.

Background

On the afternoon of February 17, 1991, Richard Calvin Williams was driving a Geo Tracker through Hammond, Indiana. His brother-in-law, Albert Gaines, was in the front passenger seat, and a minor, David Allen, was in the back seat.¹ Gaines, testifying for the State, stated that at some point a pickup truck, traveling in the opposite direction, swerved at them and the driver called them "niggers."

Williams turned the Geo around eventually catching up to the truck, which was driven by Scott Spotten. Williams said to Allen, "give me my gauge," referring to a 12-gauge pump shotgun that Williams kept in the back of the Geo. According to Gaines, Allen picked up the shotgun and said, "`I'll do it,' and you know, immediately shot." (R. at 223: "We had no idea he was going to shoot the gauge for real."). Gaines then testified inconsistently as to how much time elapsed between the first and a second shot.

Gaines and other witnesses also testified inconsistently as to whether the two vehicles were stopped or moving when the shooting occurred. (This testimony was important in establishing the driver's (i.e., Williams's) intent to kill Scott Spotten. See infra note 5.) Gaines ultimately acknowledged that he could not recall whether the vehicles were stopped side-by-side at a traffic light or traveling down the street. (R. at 269: Q: "Do you recall or if I were to suggest to you that the shooting did not take place at the light, would you dispute that?" A: "No, I wouldn't." Q: "Okay. Exactly where the shooting took place, you really do not know, do you?" A: "Not exactly, no." Q: "Okay. All you know is that the shooting took place?" A: "By the light somewhere, yes.").

The only other witness to the shooting, Mr. Amin, a United States postal worker, observed the shooting as he stood nearby on the street. His testimony throughout was that the shooting occurred as the vehicles were stopped in the middle of the street with their engines running.²

Finally, a crime scene technician testified that in his opinion the vehicles were moving when the shots were fired, but defense counsel pointed out on re-cross that the technician's original report stated the vehicles were "either stopped or in front of 833 Sibley Street." Neither Williams nor Allen, the shooter, testified.

After the shooting, it was undisputed that Williams quickly drove to his home in Gary, Indiana, and parked the Geo in the garage. Williams then switched the convertible top from black to white. Believing that Allen would be the only one charged as the shooter, Gaines told police about the incident the next day.

On February 20, 1991, Williams was

charged with the attempted murder³ of Scott Spotten. On November 7, 1991, a jury convicted Williams and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Williams appealed his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court committed fundamental error⁴ in not instructing the jury regarding the elements of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Williams v. State, No. 45A03-9210-CR-328, 615 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.Ct.App. June 17, 1993) (mem.). This Court denied transfer on November 4, 1993, thus ending Williams's direct appeal.⁵

On January 19, 1995, Williams filed his amended petition for post-conviction relief again claiming fundamental error in the attempted murder instruction. In his petition, Williams cited two decisions from this Court where we found fundamental error in an identical instruction.⁶ In denying the petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court turned to the Court of Appeals's previous ruling on the issue of fundamental error and determined that Williams's claim was res judicata.

On August 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction trial court's denial of Williams's petition for post-conviction relief. Williams v. State, 715 N.E.2d 882, 888 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it had been incorrect to reject Williams's Spradlin claim on direct appeal, but it nevertheless held that Williams was not entitled to relief because, as an accomplice, Williams's "intent was not an issue," id., and so the Spradlin rule was not implicated.

Discussion

I

On April 15, 1991, this Court issued its now familiar decision in Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.1991). In Spradlin, we established that it was reversible error for a trial court to instruct a jury that a "knowing" mens rea was sufficient to establish guilt of attempted murder. Id. at 951.⁷ Notwithstanding our directive in Spradlin, the trial court used this defective attempted murder instruction — containing the problematic "knowingly or intentionally" conjunctive — nearly seven months later in Williams's November 1991 trial. The attempted murder instruction read as follows:

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony. A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. An attempt to commit murder is a Class A felony.

To convict the defendant of the crime of attempted murder, the State must have proved the following elements:

1. The defendant knowingly or intentionally

2. took a substantial step to accomplish

3. a knowing or intentional killing of Scott Spotten.

(emphases added).

We have consistently held that this form of attempted murder instruction misinforms a jury as to the appropriate mens rea and thus constitutes fundamental error. See, e.g., Metcalfe v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind.1999)

(Fundamental Spradlin error consisted of an instruction informing the jury that a "knowingly" mens rea was sufficient to establish guilt of attempted murder.); Wilson v. State, 644 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind.1994) (Fundamental Spradlin error consisted of an instruction informing the jury that a "knowingly or intentionally" mens rea was sufficient to establish guilt of attempted murder.); Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346, 347 (Ind.1994) ("knowingly or intentionally"); Greer v. State, 643 N.E.2d 324, 325 (Ind.1994) ("knowingly or intentionally"); Simmons v. State, 642 N.E.2d 511, 511 (Ind.1994) ("knowingly or intentionally"); Taylor v. State, 616 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ind.1993) ("knowingly"); Hill v. State, 615 N.E.2d 97, 98 (Ind.1993) ("knowingly or intentionally"); Woodcox v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (Ind.1992) ("knowingly").

And although there have been cases where, despite clear Spradlin error, we did not vacate an attempted murder conviction because (i) the intent of the perpetrator was not a central issue at trial;⁸ (ii) the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of intent to kill;⁹ or (iii) both,¹⁰ that is not the case here.

To the contrary, Williams's intent as a non-shooting accomplice was seriously disputed at trial, where the jury heard evidence that (1) no one was aware that Allen would impulsively fire the shotgun from the backseat; (2) the two shotgun blasts were delivered in rapid succession; and (3) the vehicles were idle and stopped on the side of the street. Moreover, nowhere in the instructions was there any statement sufficiently informing the jury of the State's burden of proving that Williams specifically intended to kill Scott Spotten.¹¹ Despite this rather straightforward case of reversible Spradlin error, the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded in June of 1993 that no fundamental error had occurred. Williams v. State, No. 45A03-9210-CR-328, 615 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.Ct.App. June 17, 1993) (mem.), transfer denied. We can only attribute this incorrect ruling — as we have on other occasions — to the admitted confusion surrounding the proper standard for attempted murder jury instructions, which existed during this time. See, e.g., Arthur v. State, 663 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind.1996)

("At the time of the first Court of Appeals decision, this court had decided Spradlin but had not expressly overruled Worley and Santana. Thus, some confusion remained on the standard for attempted murder jury instructions.").

We do not revisit these previous rulings as to fundamental error for improperly instructing the jury on the elements of attempted murder and the Court of Appeals's application of the doctrine of res judicata to them. Instead, we address Williams's continuing argument—made in both his direct and post-conviction appeals—that the jury instructions failed "to address the legal issue of accomplice liability in an attempted murder prosecution,"¹² and Court of Appeals holding on this issue that "Williams' intent was not an issue because he was convicted as an accomplice." Williams, 715 N.E.2d at 888.

II

Earlier this year—after the Court of Appeals's decision in this case—we explained for the first time how Spradlin applies to persons "convict[ed] for the offense of aiding an attempted murder." Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind.2000)

(emphasis added).

In Bethel, a jury found the defendant guilty of multiple counts of attempted robbery, robbery, and attempted murder for his participation in a two-man crime spree. On appeal, Bethel...