Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 48S05–1507–CR–424.,48S05–1507–CR–424.
• Citation: 43 N.E.3d 578
• Parties: Wenzel WILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

43 N.E.3d 578

Wenzel WILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant)

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 48S05–1507–CR–424.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 26, 2015.

David W. Stone, IV, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 48A05–1407–CR–321

RUSH, Chief Justice.

Indiana Evidence Rule 704(a) generally allows witness opinion testimony to “embrace” an ultimate issue—but as a matter of constitutional right, only a jury may resolve an ultimate issue. And Evidence Rule 704(b) explicitly prohibits, in criminal cases, witness opinions concerning the ultimate issue of guilt.

In Defendant's trial for drug dealing, the detective who observed a controlled buy testified, “there's zero doubt in my mind that that was a transaction for cocaine.” This opinion did not merely “embrace” an ultimate issue by implying Defendant's guilt. It was rather an outright opinion of guilt—rendering it inadmissible under Evidence Rule 704(b) and violative of the jury's right to determine the law and facts in criminal cases. The trial court therefore should have excluded that testimony. But because that error was harmless, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In April 2013, Madison Country Drug Task Force officers and a confidential informant (“CI”) set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine from Defendant Wenzel Williams—at the time, known to them only by his street name “Bear.” On April 11, Detective Keith Gaskill, acting under-cover, checked the CI for drugs, and after confirming that he had none, he drove the CI to meet Williams to complete the buy, while Detectives Jake Brooks and Clifford Cole recorded video from approximately thirty feet away. The three officers watched as the CI (wearing a body recording device or “wire”) left the car, approached Williams, and made a hand-to-hand exchange. The CI and Williams returned to Gaskill's undercover vehicle where Williams asked for a ride to a nearby residence. After they dropped off Williams, the CI gave Gaskill the recording equipment and 0.98 grams of crack cocaine.

Soon after, the Task Force arranged a second controlled buy between the CI and Williams. Detective Gaskill dropped off the CI (again wearing a wire) at Williams's home, and after the CI retrieved Williams from inside, Gaskill drove the two men to a nearby barbershop to get the drugs. Detective Cole and Detective Leanne Dwiggins conducted surveillance from a short distance away. Gaskill and the CI stayed in the car and watched Williams walk to the barbershop. Williams came back a few minutes later, got in the backseat, and handed the CI a baggie. Detective Gaskill then drove Williams home. After Williams left, the CI again handed Gaskill the baggie containing 1.30 grams of crack cocaine and the recording equipment.

The State charged Williams with two B-felony counts of dealing in cocaine. Ind.Code § 35–48–4–1(a)(1)(C) (2013). Evidence at trial included audio of a phone call setting up the two buys; audio-video recordings of the buys themselves; testimony from the CI; and testimony from Detectives Brooks, Cole, Dwiggins, and Gaskill. Over the defense's objection, Detective Gaskill testified:

STATE: You gave the confidential informant money when he got out of the vehicle. Any doubt in your mind that a drug transaction took place in front of you?

GASKILL: On buy number one (1) on April 11th?

STATE: Yes, sir.

GASKILL: No. Having conducted over two hundred and fifty of these types of investigations, there's zero doubt in my mind that that was a transaction for cocaine.

The jury found Williams guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to two sixteen-year terms, served concurrently, with five suspended to probation. Williams appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision. Williams v. State, 29 N.E.3d 144 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), vacated. In relevant part, the Court of Appeals held that Detective Gaskill's opinion testimony on witnessing a drug transaction led only to an inference of guilt, and was not an opinion of guilt itself in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). Id. at 150.

We granted transfer and now hold that Detective Gaskill's statement was an opinion of Williams's guilt that violated Rule 704(b), but its admission was harmless error. On all other issues, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

Standard of Review

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion resulting in prejudicial error. Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind.2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is either clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when the court misinterprets the law. Id. at 703. To determine whether an error prejudiced a defendant, “we assess the probable impact the evidence had upon the jury in light of all of the other evidence that was properly presented.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind.2014). If the conviction is properly supported by other independent evidence of guilt, the error is harmless. Id.

Discussion

I. Forbidden Guilt Testimony Under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) Includes Opinion Testimony That the Defendant Was Dealing in Cocaine.

Our evidence rules allow witnesses to testify to their opinion of the facts and circumstances if the opinion is “(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.” Ind. Evidence Rule 701. Such an opinion is admissible even if “it embraces an ultimate issue.” Evid. R. 704(a).

But Evidence Rule 704(b) draws a bright-line exception: “Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning ... guilt[ ] or innocence in a criminal case.” Ind. Evidence Rule 704(b). The jury, not the witness, is responsible for deciding the ultimate issues in a trial, and opinion testimony concerning guilt “invades the province of the jury in determining what weight to place on a witness' testimony.” Blanchard v. State, 802 N.E.2d 14, 34 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind.1988) ). In other words, such testimony usurps the jury's “right to determine the law and the facts,” Ind. Const. art. I, § 19, and is therefore inadmissible.

Taken together, those principles establish that even in criminal cases, opinion testimony may include “evidence that leads to an [incriminating] inference, even if no witness could state [an] opinion with respect to that inference.” Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 526 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 13 Robert L. Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice Series § 704.201 at 589 (3d ed. 2007)). But an opinion must stop short of the question of guilt—because under Rule 704(b) and our constitution, that is one “ultimate issue” that the jury alone must resolve.

Here, Detective Gaskill's testimony that he saw a “transaction for cocaine” overstepped that line. His opinion did not just merely imply guilt by addressing some of the elements of Williams's dealing charges. Rather, his testimony extended to the ultimate issue of guilt on one of those charges by stating, not merely implying, that Williams's conduct satisfied every element of the dealing offense. Those elements include (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) delivering, (3) cocaine. I.C. § 35–48–4–1(a). In the context of Detective Gaskill's entire testimony, “transaction” necessarily refers to delivery by exchanging one thing for another, and the phrase “for cocaine” necessarily refers to Williams's knowledge or intent that cocaine was the subject of that exchange. The testimony establishes both the prohibited act and the mens rea, leaving nothing for the jury to decide. In sum, the phrase “transaction for cocaine” in this record simply parrots the underlying offense, thereby establishing guilt.

Nor is Detective Gaskill's testimony admissible because it is cloaked as an objective statement of fact instead of a more general statement of guilt. Paraphrasing all elements of an offense resolves the ultimate issue of guilt just as much as saying, “I know the Defendant did it.” We have found error in admitting officer statements like, “I thought it was you,” Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Ind.1999), “you were there and we know it, and you know it.” Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 686 (Ind.2009), or even as subtle as, “Something stinks ... I think you was looking out for Boogie,” Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ind.2002). Cf. Walker v. State, 988 N.E.2d 341, 348 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied (finding error for admission of “if I thought that this individual didn't do nothing, I would be in this court saying this man is innocent”). Detective Gaskill's factual assertion that a “transaction for cocaine” occurred is equally inadmissible—it declares an ultimate opinion of Defendant's guilt, which Rule 704(b) leaves for the jury alone to decide.

The State argues that excluding Detective Gaskill's testimony would require overruling precedent allowing officers to testify to other facts like defendants' intoxication or identity. But such cases are distinguishable because an opinion of intoxication or identity does not reach every element of the offense. An opinion on those issues may imply guilt, see Steinberg, 941 N.E.2d at 526, but does not embrace the ultimate question of guilt, because the State still must prove the other elements in order for the jury to find guilt.

In Robles v. State, for example, the Court of Appeals allowed opinion testimony from three Sheriff's deputies that the defendant, charged with OWI, was intoxicated following his arrest. 705 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). The deputies' testimony did not fully resolve the OWI charge because the State still had to prove the defendant had been operating a vehicle while he was inebriated. See...