Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 06 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A03-0404-CR-164.,45A03-0404-CR-164. |
| Citation | 830 N.E.2d 107 |
| Parties | Allen WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Marce Gonzalez, Jr., Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Allen Williams ("Williams") was convicted of murder by a jury in the Superior Court of Lake County in 2004 and sentenced to fifty-eight years. He appeals, raising the following reordered and restated issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it upheld the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror;
II. Whether the trial court's response to the jury's request for additional guidance violated Williams's constitutional right to be present and Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 (1999); and,
III. Whether Williams's sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
Concluding that the trial court did not err in upholding the State's peremptory challenge, and that Williams's constitutional rights were not violated, we affirm.
On December 22, 2001, the State charged Williams with the murder of Anthony Batey. The State amended the charging information on February 8, 2002, adding a charge of murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The lesser-included offense of robbery was added during a pre-trial conference. Williams's first jury trial commenced on February 3, 2003, and ended in a deadlocked jury. His second jury trial began on August 18, 2003 and ended in a mistrial the following day. Williams's third jury trial began on October 27, 2003, and ended in a deadlocked jury on November 1, 2003.
A fourth jury trial commenced on January 12, 2004. During voir dire, the State used peremptory challenges to strike two potential jurors who were African-American. Williams objected based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court overruled Williams's objection and upheld the peremptory challenges.
During the jury's deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking: "If we find the defendant guilty of `Murder in the Perpetration of Robbery, a felony as to Count II' must we also fill out the verdict form for `Robbery, a Class A felony, as to Count II'?" Appellant's App. p. 94 (emphasis in original). Without notifying Williams or the State, the trial court returned the note to the jury with the following response: Id. The jury then found Williams guilty of murder, murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and robbery.
The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on March 5, 2004. At that hearing, the trial court informed Williams and the State of the jury's question and the trial court's response. Williams objected to the trial court's contact with the jury outside the presence of counsel. The trial court vacated the robbery conviction, merged the conviction for murder in the perpetration of a robbery into the murder conviction, and sentenced Williams to fifty-eight years for murder. Williams now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Williams first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that the State's use of a peremptory strike to exclude Mary James ("James") violated Batson. There are three steps to resolve a Batson claim in the trial court.
First, the party contesting the challenge must make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating that: "(1) the juror is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) [the challenging party] has exercised peremptory challenges to remove that group's members from the jury; and (3) the facts and circumstances of this case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race." Second, upon such a showing, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenge to provide a race-neutral explanation. If the explanation, on its face, is based on something other than race, the explanation will be deemed race-neutral. Third, the trial court must determine whether the party contesting the peremptory challenge has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind.2001) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
We review a trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory with great deference, and will set aside the decision only if clearly erroneous. Id. (citing McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997)). The trial court's decision on the question of discriminatory intent constitutes a finding of fact which is accorded great deference on appeal because the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104-05 (Ind.1997) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ().
Here, the State sought to exclude from jury service two African-American women, both from Gary. Williams objected to the peremptory strikes on the basis of Batson, and the trial court asked for the State's response. The prosecutor explained his reasons for striking the first African-American woman, Ms. Hemphill. The peremptory strike of Ms. Hemphill is unchallenged in this appeal.
The prosecutor then turned his attention to James:
As far as Ms. James goes, I mean, I don't even know if she understood why she's here, quite frankly. I mean, I was very concerned about her wanting to inject her religious concerns into what she felt was her ability to sit. It just — I don't — I don't feel confident in listening to her answers that she can make a decision based upon the evidence and not injecting her personal feelings relative to her faith.... I just do not and cannot feel comfortable with putting her in a position to decide something as significant as that when she may be hesitant to ultimately make a decision one way or the other in terms of rendering a verdict. And I don't want to see, you know, a jury of twelve people with someone unable to decide as we move forward in the matter.
The trial court then determined that the State's reasons for excluding James were race-neutral and observed,
Ms. James has indicated initially in her answers to questions that she did not want to sit because she did not want to pass judgment on another person given her faith. Later, during the course of questioning, she did indicate that if she were chosen, she would be a fair juror.
On appeal, Williams argues that the State's race-neutral reason for striking James was her religious beliefs. He further argues that Batson should be extended to religion.1 However, Williams did not raise this argument in the trial court. A defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal. Howard v. State, 818 N.E.2d 469, 477 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. The failure to raise an issue at trial waives the issue for appeal. Id.
Waiver notwithstanding, it is "proper to strike [a venireperson] on the basis of a belief that would prevent [her] from basing [her] decision on the evidence and instructions, even if the belief had a religious backing [.]" U.S. v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.1998) modified on other grounds, 136 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir., 1998). Here, the State's offered reason for the peremptory challenge was not James's religion, but rather her ability to be impartial and participate in deliberations.
The prosecutor responded to Williams's objection with a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge. It then "became the responsibility of the trial court to determine from all the circumstances whether the defendant had proved purposeful racial discrimination by the State." Forrest, 757 N.E.2d at 1005. Because we review the trial court's determination with great deference, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Williams's objection and permitting the peremptory challenge to James.
Next, Williams contends that the trial court erred when it failed to inform him of the jury's request for information during deliberations. He argues that the trial court's ex parte communication with the jury violated both his constitutional right to be present and Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6.
Our supreme court has outlined the proper procedure for trial courts to follow when a deliberating jury makes a request for additional guidance during its deliberations. The trial court should
notify the parties so they may be present in court and informed of the court's proposed response to the jury before the judge ever communicates with the jury. When this procedure is not followed, it is an ex parte communication and such communications between the judge and the jury without informing the defendant are forbidden. However, although an ex parte communication creates a presumption of error, such presumption is rebuttable and does not constitute per se grounds for reversal. When a trial judge responds to the jury's request by denying it, any inference of prejudice is rebutted and any error deemed harmless.
Pendergrass v. State, 702 N.E.2d 716, 719-20 (Ind.1998) (quoting Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 628 (Ind.1998)) (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Here, the trial court erred by communicating with the jury without notifying the parties. However, the court's response that the "instructions and verdict forms are your best guidance" was essentially a...
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