Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 16 February 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 52335,52335 |
| Citation | 547 S.W.2d 18 |
| Parties | Jimmie Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder under the former Penal Code; punishment was assessed at life.
We find unassigned error that must be considered in the interest of justice. Art. 40.09(13), V.A.C.C.P.
The charge to the jury utterly failed to apply the law to the facts of the case. 1 In Harris v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 199 and Perez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 537 S.W.2d 455, we held such error to be fundamental. We reaffirm those holdings and take this opportunity to further elaborate upon the reasons why this is the law.
There was no objection to the charge for its failure to apply the law to the facts. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in such situations:
". . . the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial." Art. 36.19, V.A.C.C.P.
Applying this provision to the failure of the trial court to apply the law to the facts of the case in its charge to the jury, we find that this error was calculated to injure the rights of appellant and that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial for the following reasons.
The law must come from the court, the facts must be decided by the jury, and the charge, to instruct the jury properly, must apply the law to the facts raised by the evidence. It is not sufficient for the jury to receive an abstract instruction on the law and then to render a verdict according to a general conclusion on whether the law has been violated. The State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and must prove each element of the offense charged. This is the very basis of the case. The prosecutor as advocate for the State's position may emphasize some elements in his argument and defense counsel as advocate for the accused may emphasize others in his argument, but the court is the only neutral source to which the jury may look for an unbiased application of the law to the facts of the case. An abstract charge does not inform the jury of what facts, if found by it, would constitute proof of the elements of the offense.
A juror is not allowed to impeach his own verdict, and, although jury misconduct may be discovered and proven only by one in a position to know the facts, those with knowledge are properly privileged to decline to discuss the deliberations with anyone. This confidential character of the jury deliberation process, designed to insure the free exchange of viewpoints during that process, is essential to the jury system of criminal justice. However, this confidential character also requires that the members of the jury, before deliberations, receive proper instructions regarding the performance of their civic duty. To allow the jury to receive an application of the law to the facts only from the partisan advocates without a neutral and unbiased instruction on that matter in the charge is to risk the degeneration of trial by jury to a debating contest, where the persuasiveness of competing applications of the law to the facts determines guilt or innocence. There should be but one controlling application of the law to the facts, and that application should come from the court. Its absence impairs the right to trial by jury and, therefore, by definition, is "calculated to injure the rights of defendant," (Art. 36.19, supra) to a trial by jury.
It is not the function of the charge merely to avoid misleading or confusing the jury: it is the function of the charge to lead and to prevent confusion. A charge that does not apply the law to the facts fails to lead the jury to the threshold of its duty: to decide those fact issues. A charge that leaves application of the law to the facts solely in the hands of the partisan advocates does not guard against the confusion that such partisan claims inspire. Because a charge should affirmatively lead and dispel confusion, and because a charge that does not apply the law to the facts fails to give such guidance, error of this character should remain the subject of a per se rule. Furthermore, the per se rule of Harris and Perez, both supra, is not only fully justified, but also has its ease of understandability and application to commend itself for a permanent place in our jurisprudence.
Finding fundamental reversible error in the court's charge to the jury, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
The majority reverses this conviction on the ground that there was fundamental error in the court's charge. There was no objection to the court's charge before the trial court or before this Court. No harm is shown to the appellant. There is no showing that he was misled in any way by the court's charge or that the jury did not know what he was charged with.
The indictment charges in substance that "Jimmie Lee Williams, hereinafter styled the Defendant, on or about the 18th day of September in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and seventy-two in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully, and voluntarily with malice aforethought kill, Charley D. Sellars, by shooting him with a gun. . . ."
Appellant was hired to kill Charley D. Sellars.
At approximately 11:30 on the morning of September 18, 1972, Sellars, the deceased, was found dead in his pickup truck less than one mile from his place of employment at the National Aerospace Company in Mesquite. Death resulted from three gunshot wounds from a .38 caliber pistol fired at close range. The evidence showed that there was an agreement between Andrew Jacobson, owner of New Delaware Leasing Company, which leased tractors and trailers to the National Aerospace Company, and appellant. Jacobson offered to pay appellant $1,000 to kill Sellars and personally furnished the murder weapon and the ammunition. After the murder appellant told his brother, James Archie Williams, and Joseph Goodson that Jacobson had offered him $1,000 to kill Sellars and that he in fact did kill him. The evidence is more than sufficient to show murder.
There is no question about it. The indictment was for murder; the evidence proved murder. There is no indication that any other crime was charged or submitted to the jury.
The court's charge to the jury, which the majority of this Court, on its own, says harmed the appellant (even though there has been no such claim until this day), is sufficient to inform the jury that the appellant was indicted for murder, that it...
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