Williams v. State, 14-15-00220-CR

• Citation: 502 S.W.3d 254
• Decision Date: 16 August 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 14-15-00220-CR,14-15-00220-CR
• Parties: Vincent Lamon Williams, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

502 S.W.3d 254

Vincent Lamon Williams, Appellant

v.The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14-15-00220-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed August 16, 2016

Discretionary Review Refused December 14, 2016

Sarah Vernier Wood, Houston, TX, for Appellant

Jessica Alane Caird, Houston, TX, for State

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Wise

OPINION

Kem Thompson Frost, Chief Justice

Appellant Vincent Lamon Williams challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from a house he claimed to have been occupying under an oral lease. Appellant argues that the police officer's actions in removing him from the residence, and searching the residence, violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. We affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While incarcerated, Eugene Johnson, Jr. sent a letter to his sister's children. In the letter, Eugene described his concerns that unauthorized persons were living in the home he and his sister owned. Eugene stated that he believed the occupants of the house were engaged in illegal activities, specifically selling drugs. Eugene believed the unauthorized persons had changed the locks and were preventing entry to the individual Eugene asked to watch the home while he was incarcerated. Eugene wrote that two individuals "Roland" and "Vincent" were in the house and he did not know how they got into it. Eugene asked his sister to "[p]lease make everyone get out."

Upon receipt of the letter, Eugene's sister, Geraldine Johnson, went to a police storefront and asked for help. Officer Cody Robinson responded. He and Geraldine went to the home. Geraldine showed the officer a copy of Eugene's letter and their father's will, under which their father had left the property to Geraldine and Eugene in equal shares. The officer looked up the property on the Harris County Appraisal District website and the website showed the Johnson Trust as the property owner.

The officer then knocked on the door of the home to investigate. Appellant answered. As soon as appellant opened the door, the officer smelled a strong scent of marijuana. As the officer began to handcuff appellant, appellant mentioned that his girlfriend was in the home. The officer called the girlfriend's name, but she did not respond. The officer asked Geraldine for consent to enter the property, and Geraldine consented.

Upon entering, the officer found a woman asleep on a bed. On the dresser in the room where the woman was sleeping, he saw in plain view a pistol and a substance that appeared to be cocaine.

The officer arrested appellant. Charged with possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing more than one gram and less than four grams, appellant pleaded, "not guilty." Before trial by jury, appellant moved to suppress evidence from the search, claiming it was illegal because the officer did not have a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. In the hearing on the motion to suppress, appellant argued that he had an informal, oral lease agreement with Eugene that made the property his residence. Appellant argued that the Officer's search violated his rights because the officer did not get a warrant and there was no probable cause to search the property. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.

The jury found appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance of more than one gram and less than four grams and assessed punishment at twenty-five years' confinement. In this appeal, appellant raises two issues challenging the pretrial suppression ruling.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole finder of fact and is free to believe or disbelieve any or all of the evidence presented. Wiede v. State , 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's application of the law to facts if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We review de novo the trial court's application of the law to facts if resolution of those ultimate questions does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.

ANALYSIS

In the trial court and on appeal, appellant has argued that his rights were violated under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const. IV ; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. Appellant correctly points out that, for a violation of the Texas Constitution, the State must prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence; whereas, for a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the State must prove voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Weaver , 349 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) ; State v. Ibarra , 953 S.W.2d 242, 243–45 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Except on this point, appellant has not provided any argument or authority that the Texas Constitution provides him greater protection than the United States Constitution with regard to the issues raised in his motion to suppress. Therefore, except on this point, we analyze this issues under Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence. See Black v. State , 26 S.W.3d 895, 896 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) ; Johnson v. State , 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

A. Does appellant have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search of the house under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory of search?

What constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes—and therefore, what may serve to confer Fourth Amendment "standing"—may be predicated, as the Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized, on either an intrusion-upon-property theory of search or a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory of search. See Florida v. Jardines, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ; United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949–51, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) ; State v. Huse , 491 S.W.3d. 833, 839–40, 2016 WL 1449627, at *5 (Tex.Crim.App.2016). Appellant has preserved error as to each of these search concepts.

The State argues for the first time on appeal that appellant lacks standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search of the house. The State may raise this standing issue for the first time on appeal. See Kothe v. State , 152 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) ; State v. Klima , 934 S.W.2d 109, 110–11 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). We first address whether appellant has standing to challenge the search under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory and then we address this issue as to the intrusion-upon-property theory.

Under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory, a person has "standing" to contend that a search or seizure was unreasonable if (1) the person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or object searched, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as "reasonable" or "legitimate."

State v. Granville , 423 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.2014). The "standing" doctrine ensures that an accused may claim only that the accused's own rights have been violated; the accused cannot assert that he is entitled to benefit because the rights of another have been violated. Id. A person's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches is a personal right that cannot be asserted vicariously. Id.

An accused normally has standing to challenge the search of places and objects that the accused owns. Id. at 406. For example, a homeowner has standing to challenge the search of a home that he owns. Id. at 406. A "legitimate" expectation of privacy acknowledges the lawfulness of the person's "subjective" expectation of privacy. Id. at 406. (stating that one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property in all likelihood will have a legitimate expectation of privacy and indicating that those who do not own or lawfully possess or control property likely will not have a legitimate expectation of privacy). The factors that courts use in deciding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or object searched include the following:

(1) whether the person had a proprietary or possessory interest in the place or object searched;

(2) whether the person's presence in or on the place searched was legitimate;

(3) whether the person had a right to exclude others from the place or object;

(4) whether the person took normal precautions, before the search, which are customarily taken to protect privacy in the place or object;

(5) whether the place or object searched was put to a private use;

(6) whether the person's claim of privacy is consistent with historical notion of privacy.

Id. at 407–08. Under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory, ownership or legal possession of the property searched is not the "be-all-end-all" in deciding whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property. Id. at 408. We review the legal issue of standing de novo although we defer to the trial court's factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Kothe , 152 S.W.3d at 59.

The record contains (1) evidence that the Harris County Appraisal District listed the house as belonging to the Johnson Trust, (2) a will from Eugene and Geraldine's father leaving property to them, (3) and a letter written by Eugene stating that no individuals should be on the premises. In particular, Eugene wrote in the letter that he didn't know how "Vincent" and "Roland" came to be living there...