Williams v. State
| Citation | 42 N.E.3d 107 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 35A02–1412–PC–864.,35A02–1412–PC–864. |
| Parties | Willie D. WILLIAMS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Deidre R. Eltzroth, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Chief Judge.
[1] Willie D. Williams pled guilty to a Class C felony, a Class D felony, a Class A misdemeanor, and being a habitual substance offender; in exchange, the State dismissed a Class B felony and a Class D felony. Although sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court, the maximum sentence Williams faced under the plea agreement was twenty years; in contrast, he faced a maximum sentence of thirty-two years under the original charges. The trial court ultimately sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of sixteen years.
[2] Williams later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because defense counsel misadvised him about whether he was actually eligible for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement. But even assuming that Williams was ineligible for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement, because Williams benefited from his plea agreement and the specific facts do not establish an objective reasonable probability that competent representation would have caused him not to enter a plea, we conclude that Williams is not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court.
[3] On September 1, 2009, Williams exited I–69 in Huntington County at the Markle exit. Ex. D (factual basis contained in plea agreement). When Williams failed to stop at a stop sign at U.S. 224, a police officer pulled him over. The officer approached Williams' van and asked for his driver's license and registration; Williams, however, drove off. As Williams continued driving on U.S. 224, he threw a plastic bag containing pills out his van window. Williams eventually stopped his van again. When the officer ordered Williams out of his van, he refused to get out. The officer therefore unlocked the van door through the window, removed Williams from the van, and handcuffed him. Williams told the officer that he did not have a driver's license. The police found $150 in cash inside Williams' van and 504 pills—including methadone
and alprazolam—packaged for sale inside the bag that Williams had thrown out his van window.
[4] The State charged Williams with five counts: Count I: Class B felony dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance; Count II: Class C felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance; Count III: Class D felony possession of a controlled substance; Count IV: Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and Count V: Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. Ex. A.
[5] In October 2009 the State extended to Williams the following offer: Williams would plead guilty to Counts I, IV, and V; in exchange, the State would dismiss Counts II and III and “not file a habitual substance offender enhancement.” Ex. 1. In addition, the State agreed to a sentence of eighteen years with no probation. Id. Williams, however, rejected this offer because he believed that the State could not prove Count I: Class B felony dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance. P–C Tr. p. 18. The matter was set for a jury trial.
[6] Based on Williams' rejection of the offer, in December 2009 the State added a new count alleging that Williams was a habitual substance offender because he had committed two prior unrelated substance offenses. Ex. B. The State amended this count in May 2010 to add a third prior unrelated substance offense. Ex. C. Specifically, the State alleged that Williams was a habitual substance offender because he had accumulated the following prior unrelated substance offenses:
Id. Williams filed an objection to this amendment, see Appellant's App. p. 7 (CCS entry dated May 10, 2010), but the record does not reveal the grounds for the objection.1
[7] On May 13, 2010, the day Williams' jury trial was scheduled to start, Williams and the State entered a plea agreement in which Williams pled guilty to Count II: Class C felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance, Count IV: Class D felony resisting law enforcement, Count V: Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, and being a habitual substance offender. Ex. D. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss Count I (a Class B felony) and Count III (a Class D felony). Id. Although sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court, see id., the maximum sentence Williams faced under the plea agreement was twenty years.2
[8] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court commented as follows:
Mr. Williams your record is one of the worst ones that I've seen in quite a while. This makes your ninth and tenth (9th and 10th) felony offenses. By the Probation's count you have a[t] least eleven (11) prior misdemeanor offenses [,] you have three (3) Petitions to Revoke[,] you've committed a Battery offense while you [were] awaiting sentencing for these offenses[,] your record shows that you have at least two (2) prior Batter[ies] and one (1) prior Strangulation.
Ex. G, p. 39. The court sentenced Williams to eight years for Count II, enhanced by eight years for being a habitual substance offender; one and one-half years for Count IV; and one year for Count V. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for an aggregate term of sixteen years.
[9] In July 2011 Williams, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by counsel in February 2014. Specifically, Williams alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and that his trial counsel was ineffective because the three convictions the State used to support his habitual-substance-offender enhancement were improper. At the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, Williams testified that he was never advised that he was ineligible for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement and that had he known he was ineligible, P–C Tr. p. 16. When asked why he would have chosen to go to trial, Williams explained:
[10] Following the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. See Appellant's App. p. 99–104 (post-conviction court's order).
[11] Williams now appeals.
[12] Williams contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief. In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1(5)
; Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.2008). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and the standard of review is rigorous. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind.2004) ; see also
Trujillo v. State, 962 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). “To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind.2010), reh'g denied. Here, the post-conviction court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post–Conviction Rule 1(6). “A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben–Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind.2000) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied. “The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.1998), reh'g denied. Accordingly, we accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to the post-conviction court's conclusions of law. Wilson v. State, 799 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).
[13] Williams first contends that the three convictions the State used to support his habitual-substance-offender enhancement were improper. Specifically, he alleges that his conviction for possession of paraphernalia does not qualify as a “substance offense” under the habitual-substance-offender statute and that the other two convictions—both for possession of cocaine—“are not in the proper sequence.” Appellant's Br. p. 6.
[14] On appeal, the State does not challenge Williams' assertion that his two possession-of-cocaine convictions are not in the proper sequence. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35–50–2–10 (West 2012)
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