Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 13 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 272A111,272A111 |
| Citation | 299 N.E.2d 882 |
| Parties | Josephus W. WILLIAMS and Maylon J. Rogers, Petitioners-Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Malcolm K. McClintick, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioners-appellants.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John McArdle, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for respondent-appellee.
Appellants were charged with Armed Robbery. They timely filed a Motion to Suppress evidence allegedly obtained by virtue of an unlawful detention. The motion was granted in part and denied in part. Trial upon the Armed Robbery charge resulted in a hung jury. Thereafter, the affidavit was amended to charge appellants with Robbery. They did not file a Motion to Suppress with respect to the Robbery charge. 1 The subsequent trial upon that charge resulted in a conviction from which appellants did not appeal. 2 Appellants' Post-Conviction Relief Petition was denied and this appeal resulted.
Certain items of evidence were seized following the stopping of appellants' automobile and their arrest. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the arresting officers acted properly in stopping the automobile in which they were riding despite the court's finding of fact that the officers did not have probable cause at the time to justify an arrest.
At approximately 10:00 P.M. on January 10, 1970, Sergeant Donald Cox and Trooper Robert Fox of the Indiana State Police were on patrol in uniform in an unmarked police car near West Lafayette when they received a radio dispatch that an armed robbery had just occurred at the King's Crown Motel in West Lafayette. The broadcast described the suspects as colored, both about six feet tall, one with a brown plaid jacket or shirt, and the other with a mustache. No description of a vehicle used, if any, was given nor was a direction of flight indicated.
Sergeant Cox and Trooper Fox proceeded to a near-by intersection located between West Lafayette and the temporary entrance to Interstate 65, the most direct route to Chicago, and parked so that they could observe the passing traffic. During the next few minutes three cars passed traveling north, away from the scene of the crime. The third car observed was a late model blue Lincoln with only one apparent occupant. Thinking that this occupant might possibly be a negro male, the officers pulled onto the highway and followed this third car which they then determined was proceeding at 70 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone.' 3 While following the car, the officers radioed the State Police for a check on the car's license plate and learned that there was no information on file concerning the car.
Sergeant Cox and Trooper Fox then overtook and passed the car, trying unsuccessfully to determine more about its occupant. Next, the officers pulled off the highway and again observed the car as it stopped for a flasher light and as it passed them, still apparently with but one occupant. The officers' respective testimony discloses a degree of uncertainty at this time as to whether the driver was a negro. The officers resumed following the car and by flashing a red light caused the driver to stop the vehicle. As soon as the automobile was stopped, the driver stepped out and was asked to produce his driver's license. At the same time, one of the officers observed movement, later determined to be the other appellant, inside the car. Williams and Rogers were arrested and were subsequently tried, and convicted for the robbery of the motel, and sentenced to the Indiana State Reformatory for a period of not less than one year nor more than ten years. Some evidence found in the car at the time it was stopped by Sergeant Cox and Trooper Fox was admitted at the trial.
The record discloses that neither Sergeant Cox nor Trooper Fox had an arrest or search warrant.
In the court's ruling upon the Motion to Suppress, it specifically found that the State Troopers 'had reasonable grounds to believe . . . that one or both of the persons committing the robbery might be in the blue Lincoln which they observed . . . (and) that they therefore had reasonable grounds to stop such Lincoln and interrogate the occupants briefly, although at the time they did so they did not have probable cause to believe that the occupants had committed the robbery.' In its ruling, the trial court specifically relied upon Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and quoting therefrom in its accompanying opinion said:
'One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.'
'And again (392 U.S. 26, 88 S.Ct. 1882):
'It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.'
'The contention that any interference whatever with a person's freedom of movement constitutes an 'arrest' is rejected (392 U.S. 26, 88 S.Ct. 1882): This statement comports with the definition of arrest found in Burns Ind.Stat.Ann. (1956 Repl.), Sec. 9--1004: 'Arrest is the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a public offense.'
'Clearly the rule today is that, provided he acts reasonably under the circumstances, a police officer has the right to halt and briefly detain a possible suspect while engaged in investigating the commission of a crime. Since the constitution by its terms prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, this interpretation of it makes more sense then the old mechanical assumption that every detention was an 'arrest' and must therefore be judged against the requirement of 'probable cause' to believe that the person detained had committed a felony. The rule now is based directly on the constitution: is the detention reasonable.
'Considering these criteria, it is clear that the stopping of defendants' car by the police in this case for the purpose of investigating a crime was reasonable, even though there was not probable cause at the time to justify an arrest.'
It is solely this aspect of the trial court's ruling, presumably together with the evidentiary questions which flowed therefrom which petitioners present by their Post-Conviction appeal.
In Indiana, investigative stops are authorized by IC 1971, 35--3--1--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--1048 (Burns' 1972 Supp.) which reads as follows:
The key provisions of this statute, applicable to the case before us, are:
(1) reasonable inference of criminal activity
(2) from the observation of unusual conduct under the circumstances and in light of the police officer's experience.
Looking first at the latter prerequisite, it is obvious that while an officer's inference may be supported by his experience, experience alone is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop. The statute requires unusual conduct from which the circumstances and the officer's experience permit an inference of criminal activity.
Thus, we must look to the record to determine whether Sergeant Cox and Trooper Fox observed conduct sufficiently unusual under the circumstances to permit, in light of their experience, a reasonable inference that the driver of the car which they stopped had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. In this connection, it is important to note that the officers did not stop appellants' vehicle for speeding. Were it othewise, a quite differnt question would be presented.
While we do not desire to unnecessarily hinder the use of 'hunches' by experienced police officers, we are unable to conclude that under the circumstances it could be reasonably inferred that the single apparent occupant of the third automobile to pass the intersection observed by these police officers had committed the robbery in question. Therefore, IC 1971, 35--3--1--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--1048 (Burns' 1972 Supp.) cannot serve as justification for the stopping of appellants' car. See Sayne v. State (1972) Ind., 279 N.E.2d 196.
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