Williams v. State
| Citation | 246 Md.App. 308,228 A.3d 822 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 858, Sept. Term, 2019,858, Sept. Term, 2019 |
| Parties | Richard W. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Anne K. Olesen (George Washington University, Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Argued by: Andrew J. Dimiceli (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD., for Appellee.
Panel: Nazarian, Leahy, Friedman, JJ.
Nazarian, J. Richard Williams was pulled over by Sergeant Rudell Brown, a police officer in Pocomoke City, Maryland, for talking on his cell phone while driving. When Mr. Williams stopped his car, both he and Sergeant Brown got out of their vehicles. Sergeant Brown approached Mr. Williams quickly from behind and took him down to the ground. While Mr. Williams was handcuffed, Sergeant Brown discovered three baggies of marijuana, all (and collectively) non-criminal in amount, and $443 in cash on and about Mr. Williams's person. Sergeant Brown then searched his car and found a scale and a criminal amount of marijuana.
Mr. Williams was charged and convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, and driving on a suspended license. He argues on appeal that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury because its method of selecting the jury excluded significant parts of the community. Mr. Williams contends that Sergeant Brown violated his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures when he arrested him without a warrant. And he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest. We hold that Mr. Williams's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal arrest and search and that the evidence could not support his conviction for resisting arrest, and we reverse the judgments for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest. We affirm his conviction for driving on a suspending license. We observe as well that the method used to select the jury in this case risks excluding members of the venire in ways the Constitution forbids and, as a result, seems to undermine the judicial economy objectives it seeks to achieve.
On April 2, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing to resolve pending motions, including a defense motion to "suppress evidence that was recovered ... from a search of a vehicle subsequent to a traffic stop," arguing that it was "sort of a warrantless search" and for a ruling that the State had the "burden of showing that [the search] fits into one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement."
Sergeant Brown was the sole witness for the state. He testified he was on patrol on October 20, 2018, in an unmarked vehicle at the intersection of Linden Avenue and 6th Street in Pocomoke City. Sergeant Brown saw Mr. Williams driving westbound on Linden and turn left onto 6th Street with "his cell phone up to his ear," so he turned his car around on 6th Street and initiated a traffic stop.
The Sergeant's testimony on the mechanics of this traffic stop vacillated. He stated on direct that Mr. Williams pulled over "[a] short time later," after taking a right onto Bank Street, which is a block away from the 6th Street/Linden Avenue intersection. But he indicated later that it took Mr. Williams "two to five minutes" to stop after he turned on his emergency equipment. On cross-examination, he testified that he didn't turn his emergency signal on until both he and Mr. Williams were on Bank Street, where Mr. Williams stopped his car on the edge of another individual's property. He did not clarify how it took him "two to five minutes" to stop Mr. Williams after they turned onto Bank Street, which only stretches a few blocks in that direction.1
Regardless, as Sergeant Brown got out of his car, he noticed Mr. Williams "quickly [getting] out of his vehicle" without being instructed to do so. Sergeant Brown stated on direct that he "approached [Mr. Williams] quickly as he got out" and observed that Mr. Williams had his back to him and that he "held something in his hands" that were "clenched" together. On cross, he indicated that he "didn't see anything in [Mr. Williams's] hands" and that "normal people don't jump out of their car" during routine traffic stops.
Sergeant Brown didn't identify himself as an officer, but he was in uniform. He "grabbed" Mr. Williams, he said, because he "didn't know what he had in his hands." Then Sergeant Brown wrestled Mr. Williams to the ground, "told him to put his hands behind his back" and to "stop resisting," and pepper sprayed him. After being pepper sprayed, Mr. Williams complied and quit struggling or resisting. He then threw "two bags of marijuana underneath the car" and Sergeant Brown "eventually" placed him in handcuffs.
Sergeant Brown's testimony on the order in which he searched Mr. Williams's person and car wasn't clear:
Nonetheless, Sergeant Brown testified on cross that the two baggies of marijuana tossed under the car and the baggie recovered from Mr. Williams's jacket pocket were not criminal in quantity. After Mr. Williams was handcuffed, and "obviously not free to leave," Sergeant Brown searched the car and found a "large amount" of "plastic baggies" in the center console, a cell phone, and a larger, criminal quantity of marijuana and a scale in the trunk of the car. Sergeant Brown later towed the vehicle "for safekeeping" without allowing Mr. Williams to try to contact a licensed driver to move the car.
The State argued that Sergeant Brown was "okay with putting his hands first on Mr. Williams and then placing him in handcuffs" and relied "upon either the risk of flight or danger to the police officer." The prosecutor stated that Sergeant Brown "definitely had probable cause" to search the car because of the recovery of the three baggies of marijuana and because Mr. Williams had been observed exiting the car. Alternatively, the State argued that the evidence would have been found under the inevitable discovery doctrine because the car was towed. Defense counsel argued that the detention and use of handcuffs moved the search from a "Terry-style limited detention or your routine traffic stop into arrest ... conducted without probable cause." And defense counsel responded that the State failed to meet the threshold showing necessary to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine.
The suppression court first made findings of fact about the pursuit and searches:
The suppression court ruled that Sergeant Brown had probable cause to search the car because there were baggies in the center console:
So the question is, does he have probable cause to believe that there's an additional quantity of marijuana in the vehicle? The Court finds that under all the circumstances that he does have probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle. He searches the interior of the vehicle. Among other things, he finds a number of plastic bags in the center console, additional evidence, if you would, that would cause a reasonable police officer to suspect that there's additional marijuana in...
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