Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 71039.,71039.
• Citation: 402 P.3d 1260
• Parties: Jessica WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and Jo Gentry, Warden, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

402 P.3d 1260

Jessica WILLIAMS, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and Jo Gentry, Warden, Respondents.

No. 71039.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED OCTOBER 05, 2017

Ellen J. Bezian and John Glenn Watkins, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Daniel M. Roche, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondents.

BEFORE HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and STIGLICH, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

NRS 209.4465(7)(b) provides that credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465"[a]pply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole."¹ In this opinion, we consider whether credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 apply to eligibility for parole as provided in NRS 209.4465(7)(b) where the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute that requires a minimum term of not less than a set number of years but does not mention parole eligibility. Where an offender was sentenced pursuant to such a statute, we conclude that credits do apply to eligibility for parole as provided in NRS 209.4465(7)(b). Because appellant Jessica Williams was sentenced pursuant to such a statute, the credits she earns under NRS 209.4465 should be applied to her eligibility for parole. The district court erred in ruling to the contrary. We therefore reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 19, 2000, Williams struck and killed six teenagers with her vehicle. She was convicted of six counts of driving a vehicle with a prohibited substance in her blood or urine causing death in violation of NRS 484.3795 (now codified as NRS 484C.430 ). For each count, Williams was sentenced to a minimum term of 36 months and a maximum term of 96 months with each sentence to be served consecutively.²

Williams petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2016, arguing that she was entitled to have credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 apply to her eligibility for parole. The district court concluded that the legislative intent was for a prisoner to serve his or her minimum term before being eligible for parole and therefore that credits did not apply to Williams' eligibility for parole. Accordingly, the district court denied the petition. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is "the only remedy available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation of time that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction." NRS 34.724(2)(c). Williams' claim—that credits are not being applied to her eligibility for parole—challenges the computation of time served and therefore is raised properly in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Griffin v. State , 122 Nev. 737, 742–43, 137 P.3d 1165, 1168–69 (2006) (interpreting the language of NRS 34.724(2)(c) as logically referring to "credit earned after a petitioner has begun to serve the sentence specified in the judgment of conviction").

Williams asserts that NRS 209.4465(7)(b) requires credits be applied to her eligibility for parole (i.e., her minimum terms) whereas the State contends that both NRS 209.4465(7)(b) and NRS 213.120(2) require that she serve her minimum terms without any reduction for credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465. The State argues, and the district court agreed, that the Legislature intended for prisoners to serve the minimum term imposed before becoming eligible for parole.

The issue before us is a matter of statutory interpretation. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review." State v . Catanio , 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004). The goal of statutory interpretation "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Hobbs v . State , 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). To ascertain the Legislature's intent, we look to the statute's plain language. Id. "[W]hen a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the apparent intent must be given effect, as there is no room for construction." Edgington v. Edgington , 119 Nev. 577, 582–83, 80 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2003). This court "avoid[s] statutory interpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous," Hobbs , 127 Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179, and "whenever possible ... will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules or statutes," Watson Rounds v . Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 131 Nev. ––––, 358 P.3d 228, 232 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).

NRS 209.4465(7) provides that credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 : (a) "[m]ust be deducted from [a prisoner's] maximum term" of imprisonment and (b) "[a]pply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole." The first part of subsection 7(b) establishes a general rule—that credits earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 apply to eligibility for parole. The second part of subsection 7(b) sets forth a limitation—the general rule does not apply if the offender "was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole." Thus, if the sentencing statute did not specify a minimum sentence that had to be served before parole eligibility, credits should be deducted from a prisoner's minimum sentence, making an inmate eligible for parole sooner than he or she would have been without the credits.

Williams was not sentenced pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence that must be served before she becomes eligible for parole

For purposes of NRS 209.4465(7)(b), the question is whether Williams was sentenced pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence she had to serve before she would be eligible for parole. Williams was sentenced pursuant to former NRS 484.3795(1) (currently codified as NRS 484C.430(1) ), which provided that a person convicted of driving with a prohibited substance in the blood or urine causing death "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 20 years." 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 622, § 28, at 3422. Although that statute required a minimum term of not less than two years, it was silent regarding parole eligibility .³ The plain language of the sentencing statute therefore does not specify a term that an offender must serve before becoming eligible for parole.

The State argues that, based on legislation passed in 1995, all statutes that require a minimum term of not less than a set number of years inherently require that the offender serve the minimum term before becoming eligible for parole. That argument has some appeal, as indicated by the district court decisions in this case and numerous similar cases currently pending before this court. We nonetheless discern two problems with it that render the interpretation unreasonable.

The first problem is the plain language used in the sentencing statute at issue here in contrast to the language used in other sentencing statutes. The Legislature has used language in other sentencing statutes that expressly requires a particular sentence be served before a person becomes eligible for parole. These "parole-eligibility" statutes delineate a "[maximum sentence], with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of [x] years has been served." See, e.g. , NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2)–(3) (listing sentencing options for first-degree murder, including "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served ," or "a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served " (emphases added)); NRS 200.366(2)(a)(2) (providing that person convicted of sexual assault that results in substantial bodily harm may be sentenced to "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 15 years has been served " (emphasis added)); NRS 200.366(2)(b) (providing that person convicted of sexual assault that does not result in substantial bodily harm may be sentenced to "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served " (emphasis added)); NRS 453.334(1)–(2) (specifying that a person convicted for a second or subsequent offense of selling a controlled substance to a minor must be sentenced to "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 5 years has been served " or "a definite term of 15 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 5 years has been served " (emphases added)). In contrast, sentencing statutes like the one at issue in this case provide for "imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than [x] year(s) and a maximum term of not more than [y] years" and do not reference parole eligibility. See, eg. , NRS 200.380(2) (designating the penalty for robbery as "a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15 years"); NRS 200.481 (providing minimum-maximum penalties for certain types of battery); see also NRS 193.130(2)(b)–(e) (outlining minimum-maximum penalties for category B, C, D, and E felonies). In some instances, the Legislature has utilized both formats within a single statute. See NRS 453.3385(1) (providing minimum-maximum sentences for trafficking under 28 grams of a controlled substance but parole-eligibility sentences for trafficking 28 grams or more of a controlled substance).

We must presume that the variation in language indicates a variation in meaning. See generally Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. , 582 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1718, 1723, 198 L.Ed.2d 177 (2017) ("And, usually at least, when we're engaged in the business of interpreting statutes we presume differences in...