Williams v. State, 985S372

• Decision Date: 08 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 985S372,985S372
• Parties: Larry WILLIAMS, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1238

525 N.E.2d 1238

Larry WILLIAMS, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below).

No. 985S372.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 8, 1988.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Joseph N. Stephenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Larry Williams was indicted for murdering Jesse Hubbard at Hubbard's home in Plymouth. After a jury trial, Williams was convicted of murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and armed robbery. Williams was also found to be an habitual offender. The jury recommended the death penalty on the murder charge, and the trial court imposed it. The trial court also sentenced Williams to consecutive terms of 90 years in prison for felony murder, thirty years for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and thirty years for armed robbery, with thirty years added by the habitual offender finding.

On direct appeal this Court affirmed except with respect to the sentence for felony-murder. We remand the cause to the trial court to vacate the latter. Williams v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 759. The United States Supreme Court dismissed Williams' appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Williams v. Indiana (1982), 459 U.S. 808, 103 S.Ct. 33, 74 L.Ed.2d 47.

Williams filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging several errors. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Because we now remand for a new death penalty hearing and imposition of a new sentence, we address only the following issues:

1) Whether Williams was denied due process when the State allegedly failed to reveal inducements made to a prosecution witness;

2) Whether trial counsel was ineffective during cross-examination of that witness, whom he had earlier represented in an unrelated matter;

3) Sufficiency of the habitual offender evidence;

4) Whether the trial court entered sufficient findings concerning aggravating circumstances to justify enhancing Williams' term of imprisonment; and

5) Whether the trial court's erroneous instruction during the penalty phase of the trial constituted harmless error.

Williams, as petitioner, had the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule PC 1, Sec. 5, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies. To prevail on appeal from denial of post-conviction relief, Williams must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakingly to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court. Williams v. State (1987), Ind., 508 N.E.2d 1264.

I. Disclosure

Williams claims that the State denied him due process because it failed to disclose that the testimony of a prosecution witness, Ron Allen, was induced by threats from police officers and prosecutors. Williams characterizes the State's alleged conduct as a grant of immunity. He contends such a grant constitutes evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment which the State was required to disclose. See Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.

Allen was serving a prison sentence unrelated to the Hubbard murder at the time of the post-conviction hearing. At that hearing, Allen testified that a police officer and two prosecutors had threatened to bring criminal charges or probation revocation proceedings against him if he did not testify at Williams' trial. This testimony conflicted with his earlier statements.

The officer and the two prosecutors described Allen as cooperative at the time of trial and denied threatening him. According to their testimony, Allen said he wanted to help police convict Hubbard's killer because the decedent had been kind to him. Other evidence, including Allen's own statements, showed that members of William's family had threatened Allen's life.

Assessing this evidence, Judge Donald Martin entered excellent findings of fact in ruling on Williams' post-conviction petition. Judge Martin found that Allen lied at the post-conviction hearing and that Allen had in fact cooperated with police in testifying at Williams' original trial. The evidence on this issue is in conflict and does not lead unerringly to a different conclusion. Therefore, we find no error.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Williams alleges that his trial counsel, Jere Humphrey, had a conflict of interest which rendered him ineffective within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Specifically, Williams claims that Humphrey was unable to cross-examine Allen effectively because the attorney represented Allen in an earlier criminal proceeding.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams had the burden of proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. He also was required to prove that counsel's failure to function was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. To meet this burden, Williams had to overcome by strong and convincing evidence a presumption that counsel executed his defense effectively. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the accused be represented not only by counsel satisfying at least a minimum standard of professional competency but also by counsel whose undivided loyalties lie with his client. United States v. Jeffers (1975), 7th Cir., 520 F.2d 1256. To establish a conflict of interest amounting to a Sixth Amendment violation, Williams must show that counsel actively represented conflicting interests which adversely affected his performance. Aubrey v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 70. The mere possibility of a conflict of interest is insufficient to justify reversal of conviction. Bieghler v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 78.

During the post-conviction hearing, Williams presented evidence that Humphrey, in his capacity as a public defender, had represented Allen when he pled guilty to burglary and auto theft a year before Williams' trial. Humphrey testified that he could not remember any details of Allen's case, and Williams did not question him further about the alleged conflict of interest. Williams presented no other evidence to establish a conflict of interest nor did he specify how the alleged conflict encumbered Humphrey's cross-examination of Allen during Williams' trial. Indeed, the trial record showed that Humphrey conducted a seemingly thorough cross-examination of Allen which included impeachment based on prior crimes and prior inconsistent statements. The post-conviction court ruled that Williams had failed to substantiate his claim of a conflict of interest.

In his brief, Williams relies on numerous cases involving an ongoing relationship between defense counsel or his associates and a witness adverse to the accused. Such cases are inapposite, inasmuch as Williams is alleging a conflict of interest based on defense counsel's prior representation of a State's witness. Under these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit has determined that two factors may interfere with effective cross-examination and consequently the effective assistance of counsel:

First is concern that the lawyer's pecuniary interest in possible future business may cause him to avoid vigorous cross-examination which might be embarrassing or offensive to the witness. The second is the possibility that privileged information obtained from the witness might be relevant to the cross-examination.

United States v. Jeffers (1975), 7th Cir., 520 F.2d 1256, 1264-65 (footnote omitted).

The first factor is not significant in this case because Humphrey represented Allen as a public defender and Allen was incarcerated at the time of the hearing. It is highly unlikely that Humphrey would have limited his cross-examination simply because he believed Allen might provide lucrative business in the future. As for the second factor, Williams has failed to establish that Humphrey possessed any privileged information about Allen which might have prevented thorough cross-examination. If Humphrey ever had such information, he appeared to have forgotten it by the time of Williams' trial.

Williams has done no more than raise the possibility of a conflict of interest. The post-conviction court properly denied him relief on this issue.

III. Habitual Offender Evidence

Williams argues that the habitual offender determination is not supported by sufficient evidence of the chronological sequence of the predicate felonies. He is correct. ¹

In an habitual offender proceeding, the State must prove that the defendant was convicted and sentenced for two prior unrelated felonies. Ind. Code Sec. 35-50-2-8. The State must prove that the commission, conviction and sentencing on the first felony preceded the commission of the second felony. The State must further prove that the defendant committed the principal offense after he was sentenced on the second prior felony. Timmons v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 1212.

The habitual offender information alleged that Williams had been convicted of burglary and theft on September 24, 1976, and entering to commit a felony on October 20, 1976. The State did not prove the date on which either offense was committed. The State's evidence did show, however, that the information for entering to commit a felony was filed on August 19, 1976, more than a month before his burglary and theft conviction. Obviously, Williams committed the illegal entering before he was convicted and sentenced on the charges of burglary and theft in September 1976. Thus, the prior convictions clearly did not occur within the requisite...