Williams v. State University of New York

• Decision Date: 15 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86 CV 985.,86 CV 985.
• Citation: 635 F. Supp. 1243
• Parties: Margarita WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, and State University Health Center at Brooklyn a/k/a S.U.N.Y. Downstate Medical Center a/k/a State University Hospital, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

635 F. Supp. 1243

Margarita WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, and State University Health Center at Brooklyn a/k/a S.U.N.Y. Downstate Medical Center a/k/a State University Hospital, Defendants.

No. 86 CV 985.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

May 15, 1986.

Steven Wildstein, New York City, for plaintiff.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., New York City by Charles F. Sanders, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLATT, District Judge.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case arises under the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1982), which were enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4) (1982).

The Costa Rican born plaintiff, Margarita Williams (Williams), is a black Hispanic woman currently residing in Brooklyn, New York. She is a registered nurse and was awarded a master's degree in community health administration in 1974. From April 4, 1980 until April 2, 1986 she was employed as the associate director of nursing at the State University of New York Downstate Medical Center (the Hospital). She brings this lawsuit against her former employer on the grounds that her discharge was an act of intentional discrimination based on her color, sex and national origin.

Plaintiff primarily seeks equitable relief. The complaint requests both a preliminary and permanent injunction compelling defendants to reinstate her to her former job and grant her employment tenure and enjoining defendants from refusing to do so solely because of her race, color and national origin. The case is currently before the Court on plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction.

BACKGROUND

A recitation of the factual and procedural history of this case is warranted because they factor heavily in the Court's decision on plaintiff's application.

A. The Facts of the Case

Plaintiff was initially hired as the associate director of nursing for staffing at the Hospital in April 1980. Her managerial responsibilities included supervising the staffing of 800 nurses and hospital attendants, directing the "float staff," conducting certain training activities and performing labor relations liaison work. Pl's Aff. at ¶ 2.

Plaintiff was hired for a term appointment pursuant to Article XI, Section D, of the Policies of the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York (the Policies). A term appointment is one "for a specified period of not more than three years which shall automatically expire at the end of that period unless terminated earlier because of resignation, retirement, or termination."¹ Goldwasser Aff. at ¶ 5 (quoting Section D(1) of the Policies). A term appointment, of itself, shall not be "deemed to create any manner of legal right, interest or expectancy in any other appointment or renewal." Id. at ¶ 6 (quoting Title D, Section (4), of the Policies).

For the first three years of her employment Williams received favorable job evaluations. Then, commencing in January 1983, plaintiff's white supervisor allegedly began to criticize plaintiff's performance and undermine her authority. Pl's Aff. at ¶ 5.

In April 1984 plaintiff applied for the newly created position of deputy director of nursing. Her application, according to Williams, was utterly ignored — the Hospital failed to even acknowledge receipt of her papers. On the heels of this incident plaintiff states that her supervisor subjected her to increased harassment and a second negative performance evaluation. Id. at ¶ 13.

Plaintiff asserts that she requested that the Committee on Professional Evaluation review the unsatisfactory report according to guidelines established in a "Memorandum of Understanding Between S.U.N.Y. and United University Professions Relating to a System of Evaluation for Professional Employees." The Committee met in response to plaintiff's request, but a quorum was not present, nor were any third parties called and questioned to substantiate the unfavorable evaluation. In plaintiff's words the session merely applied a "rubber stamp" to her supervisor's report. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.

On January 18, 1985 the Hospital president informed Williams that her employment would be terminated on April 2, 1986. Three months later Williams filed a racial discrimination in employment complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. That agency failed to undertake an investigation and ultimately surrendered its jurisdiction to the EEOC, before which the complaint is presently pending. Plaintiff did not seek judicial intervention until April 1986, purportedly because her union representative lulled her into the belief that the matter would be resolved amicably and that she would not be discharged. Pl's Reply Mem. at 3.

B. Procedural Posture

This case arrived on the Court's doorstep on the eve of plaintiff's job termination. Plaintiff attempted to obtain a temporary restraining order enjoining her termination without giving notice to the defendants. The Court refused to grant this drastic relief and instead set the matter down for argument on April 4, 1986.

On that date the Court learned that plaintiff had failed to file a complaint. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly and succinctly indicates that "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Prior to the filing of a complaint a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and is powerless to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir.1985).

Plaintiff rectified this deficiency by serving and filing a verified complaint with the Clerk of the Court on April 8, 1986. The complaint sought "relief for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982)." It did not seek any relief under Section 1981 and 1983 of Title 42.

The parties reconvened before the Court on April 11, 1986, at which time the defendants submitted a memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The basis for the motion was plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies by first filing charges with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter. Completion of these administrative steps are statutory prerequisites to suit under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Movement For Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.1980).

The plaintiff simultaneously provided the Court with an amended complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in addition to the violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Although the section 1981 and 1983 safeguards overlap the protective parameters of Title VII, they do not require preliminary exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit. See, e.g., Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.1984) (Title VII's administrative machinery not prerequisite for maintaining § 1981 suit); Smith v. New York City Transit Authority, 535 F.Supp. 1114 (E.D. N.Y.1982) (no administrative prerequisites in § 1983 action).

Subsequently, on April 29, 1986 the Court received a letter from defendants reporting that the motion to dismiss had been withdrawn. Thus, the case is presently an action for employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983.² The Court now considers the merits of plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction.

DISCUSSION

A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard

The law in the Second Circuit governing the granting of a preliminary injunction is now well settled. Since 1976 to successfully seek a preliminary injunction in this Circuit a moving party must show (1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping in movant's favor. See Power Test Petroleum Distributors v. Calcu Gas, 754 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.1985); Gemini Supply Corp. v. Zeitlin, 590 F.Supp. 153, 155-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).

Both plaintiff's and defendants' exposition of the law on this issue is outdated. Plaintiff cites Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir.1974), and defendants cite a 1974 decision of this Court³ for the proposition that a preliminary injunction will issue upon a showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. See Pl's Supp. Mem. at 3 and 8; Defs' Mem. at 5, Defs' Supp. Mem. at 6-7.

The Court notes that two years after the Gresham decision the Second Circuit instituted a slight semantic change in the standard with substantial legal significance. In Triebwasser & Katz v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir.1976), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged that irreparable harm is "a fundamental and traditional requirement of all preliminary injunctive relief," citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). Reasoning that if a showing of irreparable harm is required where a plaintiff must also establish probable success on the merits, "then a fortiori where the plaintiff establishes something less than probable success as to the merits, need for proof of the threat of irreparable damage is even more pronounced. In sum the balancing of hardships test ... necessarily includes the showing of irreparable harm." 535 F.2d at 1359.

B. Irreparable Harm

Satisfying this test is critical to plaintiff's application and...