Williams v. Superintendent

Decision Date24 September 2018
Docket NumberNo. 9:17-cv-00380-JKS,9:17-cv-00380-JKS
PartiesLARRY WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Larry Williams, a New York state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Williams is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and incarcerated at Cayuga Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered the Petition, and Williams has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On June 17, 2010, Williams was charged him with second-degree arson, two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, first-degree attempted assault, two counts of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, first-degree reckless endangerment, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, second-degree menacing, second-degree reckless endangerment, and two counts of fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Williams held his fiancee at gunpoint, locked her in a bedroom, and set fire to their apartment.

Williams filed a pre-trial motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his person when he was arrested, which were found in his pockets and in the lining of his coat. Following a hearing, the trial court denied suppression of the physical evidence, finding that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Williams prior to searching him based upon information obtained at the scene and the identification of Williams with specificity.

Defense counsel also hired an expert to examine William's mental capacity and filed a notice of intent to use a mental disease or defect defense on the grounds that Williams suffered from hallucinations. The court noted that the notice was untimely and deficient because it identified a symptom rather than an alleged disease or defect. Counsel subsequently filed another notice of intent, which apparently included a preliminary diagnosis of psychotic disorder induced by a recreational drug.1

On November 15, 2010, Williams appeared with counsel for the purposes of entering a guilty plea. Under the negotiated disposition agreement, Williams would plead guilty to the first count of the indictment (second-degree arson) in exchange for a single 10-year determinate term of imprisonment with 5 years of post-release supervision. After the court explained the terms of the agreement in detail, and responded to Williams' question about the post-release supervision term by explaining the concept of post-release supervision, Williams confirmed that he understood the terms of the plea bargain. Williams answered in the negative when asked whether he had been induced to accept the agreement by any other statements or promises or any threats. When asked whether he had any physical or mental problems or had taken any drugs or alcohol that might impair his understanding of the plea proceedings, Williams answered, "No, sir." Williams additionally agreed that he had sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney and acknowledged that he understood that he would be giving up his right to trial and the attendant rights by pleading guilty.Williams stated that he had no questions about the rights he was "giving up, the terms of the plea bargain or the consequences of pleading guilty."

Williams then admitted that he "intentionally caused damage to a building . . . by starting a fire, and . . . another person . . . who was not a participant in the arson, was present in the building." The court accepted Williams's plea as "a voluntary plea with a factual basis." Williams additionally admitted that he had been convicted of second-degree murder in 1980, and was in custody for that crime until 2003 and on parole for that conviction until 2006.

At sentencing, defense counsel presented a November 27, 2010, report from the defense expert who had diagnosed William with substance-induced psychosis and asked that the report be made part of Williams' confinement record. Williams was subsequently sentenced as a second felony offender to the agreed-upon term of 10 years' imprisonment and 5 years of post-release supervision.

Williams filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 440.10 on the ground that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to: a) investigate witness statements and determine whether the rifle was operable and/or loaded; b) request a mental competency examination; c) request that the court inspect the grand jury minutes; d) object to the People's failure to response to his speedy trial claims; and e) object to jurisdictional defects in the indictment. The People opposed the motion. The county court denied the motion in a reasoned, unpublished decision issued on March 22, 2013.

Through counsel, Williams additionally appealed his conviction,2 arguing that: 1) Williams's written statement to law enforcement when he was arrested was involuntary and obtained inviolation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 2) his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and 3) his sentence was unduly harsh and severe.

Williams then filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that appellate counsel was ineffective because he "omitted significant and obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker." The People opposed the petition. The Appellate Division summarily denied the petition, People v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S.3d 504, 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal without comment on September 18, 2015, People v. Williams, 40 N.E.3d 587, 587 (N.Y. 2015).

Williams filed a second pro se motion to vacate the judgment and to set aside his sentence pursuant to CPL §§ 440.10 and 440.20, challenging the arson conviction as well as his 1980 second-degree murder conviction. The county court denied the motion in a reason, unpublished opinion issued on November 10, 2015.

Williams filed the instant pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on March 31, 2017. Docket No. 1 ("Petition"); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

II. GROUNDS RAISED

In his pro se Petition before this Court, Williams raises the following claims: 1) the police did not have probable cause to arrest him; 2) his prior conviction was constitutionally invalid because it was obtained through the prior court's ruling that allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine Williams with statements made to law enforcement after Williams had invoked his right to counsel; 3) Williams was mentally incompetent, he was not able to testify at the suppression hearings, he was unable to understand the proceedings, and he is actually innocent of the crime; 4) and trial counsel was ineffective because he: a) misquoted facts at the "arreststage;" b) allowed the court to conduct hearings while Williams was in the mental health unit cell and unable to assist in his defense; c) allowed a police officer to perjure himself; d) failed to challenge the constitutionality of his prior conviction; e) failed to challenge the judge's impartiality; and f) failed to object to the description of the resident who called an ambulance for Williams.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).

To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and applicationof state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist for not addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it. See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (applying a de novo standard to a federal claim not reached by the state court). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. ...

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