Williams v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | C/W No. 18-31161,No. 18-31159,18-31159 |
| Parties | TARSIA WILLIAMS; BRECK WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. TAYLOR SEIDENBACH, INCORPORATED, Defendant—Appellee, CONSOLIDATED WITH TARSIA WILLIAMS; BRECK WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. MCCARTY CORPORATION, Defendant—Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before HAYNES, GRAVES, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
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Tarsia and Breck Williams ("Plaintiffs"), claim their father was killed by asbestos products sold and installed by Defendants McCarty Corporation ("McCarty") and Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. ("TSI"). The district court granted Defendants summary judgment. We affirm.
Frank C. Williams worked as a mechanical engineer at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility ("MAF") in New Orleans from around 1974 to 1993. See Williams v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., 748 F. App'x 584, 585 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). The MAF comprises dozens of buildings across several hundred acres. Williams worked primarily in Building 350, but sometimes worked in and visited other MAF buildings. Deteriorating asbestos was present in Building 350, and asbestos remediation occurred in that building in the mid-1980's.
In 2008, Williams was diagnosed with mesothelioma. That same year he sued multiple defendants, including McCarty and TSI, in Louisiana state court, asserting various tort claims. The suit was removed to the federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and then transferred by a multidistrict litigation panel to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Williams, 748 F. App'x at 585. Williams died in 2009 and his children, Tarsia and Breck, were substituted as plaintiffs. In 2014, the district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court found no evidence Williams was exposed to respirable asbestos at the MAF. Even assuming he was, however, the court also found no evidence linking Williams' exposureto Defendants' products. The district court remanded the case back to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Williams, 748 F. App'x at 585. Plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 585-86.1
We must first address the jurisdictional question of whether the case was properly removed to federal court. See Golden v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., 934 F.3d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 2019). Lockheed Martin ("Lockheed"), Williams' employer, removed the case based on the "federal officer removal" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). See generally Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The transferee district court in Pennsylvania twice denied remand to state court. The Eastern District of Louisiana later denied a third motion to remand. Plaintiffs argue that removal was improper and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction. We disagree.
The federal officer removal statute provides in relevant part that a "civil action . . . commenced in a State court" against "any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States" may be removed to federal court under certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Removal is proper if:
(1) the defendant is a "person" within the meaning of the statute; (2) the plaintiff's claims are based upon the defendant's conduct "acting under" the United States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) the plaintiff's claims against the defendant are "for, or relating to" an act under color of federal office; and (4) the defendant raises a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff's claims.
Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); accord Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 296.2 The parties dispute only the third and fourth factors.
As to the third factor, it is "sufficient for there to be a connection or association between the act in question and the federal office." Papp, 842 F.3d at 813; Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 296. Here, this requirement is satisfied because the record shows that part of Plaintiffs' case concerned alleged asbestos exposure from Williams' work on "rockets" produced by Lockheed for NASA. Just before Lockheed removed the case, Williams testified that his work for Lockheed had involved "firing [rockets] up," that these rockets contained asbestos, and that they had been built for NASA. Lockheed also produced an affidavit attesting that its only product built at MAF for NASA was the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) and detailing NASA's oversightof the project. That showed the required "connection or association between the acts complained of by [Plaintiffs] and the federal government." Id.3
The fourth factor is satisfied because Lockheed adequately pled a colorable government contractor defense. See generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). While Plaintiffs argue that Lockheed failed to plead the defense's requirement that "the United States approved reasonably precise specifications," id. at 512, Lockheed has supported this element with an affidavit attesting to NASA's detailed specifications for its fuel tanks. Plaintiffs argue that Lockheed would have to show the government specified that Lockheed use asbestos in the relevant products, and that Lockheed did so, but Plaintiffs construe this element of the defense too narrowly. See Papp, 842 F.3d at 814-815.4 The case was therefore properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
Federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against McCarty and TSI is supplemental to this federal-officer jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. "[R]emoval of the entire case is appropriate so long as a single claim satisfies the federal officer removal statute." Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2016), overruled on other grounds by Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 291. Plaintiffs' claims against the various defendants form a single controversy: a claim for damages from Williams' death from mesothelioma, allegedly caused by asbestos exposure on the job. Furthermore, because Plaintiffs argue that no federal contractor work is at issue in this suit anylonger, we review a district court's determination to retain supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion, looking to "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Estate of Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs do not specifically claim, and we do not find, any abuse of discretion in the district court's decision. We thus proceed to the merits.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Salinas v. R.A. Rogers, Inc., 952 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Such a dispute "exists 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Salinas, 952 F.3d at 682 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). We may "affirm summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record and presented to the district court." Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment because a reasonable jury could conclude that Williams was exposed to asbestos products installed and supplied by McCarty and TSI. We first set out the causation standard required by Louisiana law. We then consider the evidence as to McCarty and TSI. Agreeing with the district court, we conclude that no evidence raises a genuine dispute that either Defendant's products substantially contributed to Williams' injury.5
Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff claiming asbestos-related injury must prove "significant exposure to the product complained of to the extent that it was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury." Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 2008-1163, p. 35 (La. 9/4/09); 16 So. 3d 1065, 1091. Louisiana courts have applied this test to require evidence linking a plaintiff's injury to a defendant's asbestos-containing product.6 So, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs must point to evidence creating a genuine dispute whether Williams was exposed to a product connected to either Defendant. Proof is sufficient "if defendants' products are likely to be present at a specific location within the workplace," because "plaintiffs are likely to have been exposed to the products if they worked near those specific locations, even without explicit testimony that the plaintiff worked near the specific product." Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying similar Texas law). For example, Plaintiffs might show "[D]efendants' products were . . . installed randomly and evenly all over" the MAF campus. Id. at 171. Even a photograph of products at the specific worksite at the relevant time might do. Egan v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 94-1939, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/96); 677 So. 2d 1027, 1034. Butsome evidence must connect Defendants to asbestos where Williams was exposed. Otherwise, summary judgment was proper.
Plaintiffs may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1089. Circumstantial evidence "must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of certainty," but need not "negate all other possible causes." Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, "a plaintiff's burden of proof against multiple defendants in a long-latency case, such as a tort claim for mesothelioma, is not relaxed or reduced because of the degree of difficulty that might ensue in proving the contribution of each defendant's product to the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 1091.
With these principles in mind, we ask whether the evidence raised a genuine dispute that either Defendant's products were a substantial factor in bringing about Williams' injury.
First, we consider McCarty. The district court concluded that, assuming Williams was exposed to asbestos during the 80's-era remediation in Building 350, ...
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