Williams v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 23 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-70046.,08-70046. |
| Citation | 602 F.3d 291 |
| Parties | Jeffrey Demond WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick THALER, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
602 F.3d 291
Jeffrey Demond WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Rick THALER, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 08-70046.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 23, 2010.
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Jonathan Paul Sheldon, Fairfax, VA, Anthony Seymour Hsughton, Houston, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Georgette P. Oden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Postconviction Lit. Div., Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PRADO, Circuit Judge:
Jeffrey Demond Williams appeals the district court's denial of a certificate of appealability ("COA") on his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, which raised claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") at sentencing; and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, which accused the State of discovery violations for not serving him subpoenas duces tecum ("SDTs") that it issued. The district court held that Williams had not made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, and we agree. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of a COA on Williams's two motions.
A. Factual Background
In May 1999, Houston Police Officer Tony Blando drove an unmarked Jeep Cherokee around the parking lot of a hotel looking for stolen cars. Blando wore plainclothes, but a badge identifying him as a law enforcement officer hung around his neck. Blando observed a man driving a Lexus, and after running a computer search, learned that someone had stolen the car in an aggravated robbery several months earlier.
At trial, two witnesses testified that the man in the Lexus stepped out of the car, and Blando approached him with his weapon drawn, in accordance with departmental practice. Blando and the man began to argue, and the man told Blando not to
Houston police arrested Williams, wearing one handcuff, a short time later near the scene of the shooting. An officer read Williams his Miranda warnings, and after acknowledging that he understood his rights, Williams made two inculpatory statements. The police also recovered shell casings from three different weapons near the scene of the shooting, some of which came from Williams's gun. Law enforcement investigators found Williams's fingerprints on both the stolen Lexus and Blando's unmarked Jeep Cherokee.
B. Procedural Background
1. State Court Proceedings
At trial, the State introduced the printout from Blando's mobile data terminal, the tape of Blando's last communications with dispatch, and the audiotaped statements that Williams made to police after his arrest. In one audiotape, Williams discussed the carjacking of the Lexus, and in another, he discussed other extraneous violent crimes. The State also introduced testimony from the owner of the stolen Lexus and evidence that Williams had shot another individual during an unrelated robbery with the same weapon used to kill Blando.
The Defense presented no witnesses during the guilt phase of Williams's trial. In his statement to police, however, Williams stated that he did not know that Blando was a police officer, and claimed that he shot Blando in self defense because he thought Blando intended to rob him. The jury found Williams guilty of capital murder.
At the penalty phase, Williams's mother testified on his behalf. She stated that her and Williams's father had been married for twenty-five years and that she worked at a psychiatric hospital enrolling emotionally disturbed children in a school program. She also stated that Williams attended church regularly and assisted with the congregation. She further testified that Williams's family did not suffer economically, and that Williams had both parents readily available to him.
Although she reported no problems with her pregnancy or Williams's birth, Williams's mother testified that it took Williams longer than normal to learn to walk and talk. She also characterized Williams as a loner in grade school, and testified that he did not always understand instructions and that she helped him with his school work. She testified that by the time Williams reached high school, she thought that "something up there was not right."
In high school, school officials diagnosed Williams as emotionally disturbed after Williams began to exhibit behavioral problems, such as breaking into lockers and stealing items from the mall. The Defense introduced the results of an intelligence quotient ("IQ") test administered to Williams in the ninth grade, which reported that Williams had a verbal IQ of 79, a performance IQ of 65, and a full scale IQ of 70, which placed him in the "borderline" mentally retarded range. Williams, however, continued to progress from grade to grade.
Williams also presented evidence that after high school, he enlisted in the Navy, and received a general discharge under honorable conditions. Williams then worked for an auto-parts supplier driving a delivery truck and as a night stockman for a grocery store.
One of Williams's fellow church members also testified that Williams was a very nice, courteous individual, and a church
The jury found that Williams posed a future danger to commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society, and found insufficient mitigating evidence to warrant a life sentence. Accordingly, Williams was sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA") affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence, Williams v. State, No. 73,796 (Tex.Crim. App.2002), and denied his first application for state post-conviction relief. Ex Parte Williams, No. 50,662-01 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Williams did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
In 2003, Williams filed a successive petition for state postconviction relief, alleging that he was mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Williams also argued that the Sixth Amendment barred his execution because the jury did not make a determination on his mental retardation claim. The TCCA dismissed his petition as an abuse of the writ after finding that Williams failed to make a prima facie case of mental retardation. Ex Parte Williams, No. 50,662-02 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
2. Federal Court Proceedings
i. Williams's Habeas Motion
In 2004, Williams filed a petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting the same issues in his state petitions. The district court dismissed most of the issues in Williams's petition on procedural grounds. These dismissed claims included Williams's allegation of IAC at sentencing, which the district court found unexhausted and procedurally barred.
The district court, however, found that the Texas state court's determination that Williams failed to plead a prima facie case of mental retardation "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Because Williams satisfied this threshold inquiry under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), the district court allowed Williams to argue the merits of his Atkins claim.
The seven day evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge resulted in significant evidence tending both to support and refute Williams's claim of mental retardation.1 The parties presented the magistrate judge with evidence from three different IQ tests recording Williams's score as either a 70 or a 71, which suggested at least borderline mental retardation, and a slew of academic achievement tests in which Williams scored in the non-mentally retarded range. Williams argued that despite the discrepancies, the magistrate judge should consider him mentally retarded, while the State argued that because of the discrepancies, the magistrate judge should not. The State's expert produced evidence adduced during one of the IQ
The magistrate judge also heard testimony that while in the sixth, seventh, and eighth grades, Williams took a national standardized test called the Metropolitan Achievement Test and, although he scored below grade level in some subjects, he scored above grade level in others. Also while in the seventh grade, Williams demonstrated mastery in mathematics, reading, and writing on the Texas Educational Assessment of Minimum Skills, a separate achievement test. In the ninth grade, Williams passed the reading and writing sections of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills Test, but failed the mathematics portion.
Williams also offered testimony tending to show that he suffered from adaptive deficits, specifically in the areas of self-care, home living, social and personal skills, work, and leisure. Williams introduced testimony that he failed to dress appropriately for the weather, could not keep an apartment or working car on his own, had been fired from every job...
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