Williams v. The Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Citation: 29 Pa. 102
• Parties: Williams versus The Commonwealth.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 102

29 Pa. 102

Williams versus The Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Oyer and Terminer of Dauphin county.

H. C. Alleman and W. T. Bishop, for plaintiff in error.—1st. The true criterion is to ascertain whether those statements were voluntary or not. Of this we can only judge by the attending circumstances. Williams had been to see the body, and there made the expression, "I suppose I am the last man seen Hendricks." Was in bed — called up at a late hour — and then sworn by Richard Nolen, the foreman of the jury (and the acting constable of the township), in the presence of the jury and others. From these circumstances we may naturally infer that his mind must have been more or less under the influence of fear, whether guilty or innocent, as the minds of most men would be under similar circumstances, time and place. The mind agitated and confused by the apprehension of danger, cannot reason with coolness, and resorts to falsehood when the truth would be safer. Neither false statements or confessions afford any certain evidence of guilt. As laid in Thompson's case, Leach's C. C. 291, too great caution cannot be observed on this subject: Haworth's case, 4 Car. & Payne 524; Rex v. Lewis, 6 Car. & Payne 161; Rex v. Davis, 6 Car. & Payne 177; Rex v. Wheeley, 8 Car. & Payne 250; Owen's case, 9 Car. & Payne 83; State v. Broughton, 7 Iredell's Reports 96; 1 Greenleaf's Evidence Par. 219, 226; Joy on Con. 67, 68; 7 Car. & Payne 486.

2d. The intimation by the court that Williams had his gun, either at the mine or in the woods, was unsupported by the evidence in the case; it was an unwarrantable assumption on the part of the court, and therefore contrary to law. If the court instruct the jury that they may indulge a presumption not warranted by the evidence, a new trial will be awarded: Wh. Am. C. L. 994, and note 10, 3d Ed.

3d. Possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of the guilt of larceny; but is not evidence of the high crime of murder. The fouler the crime, the stronger should be the proof required for conviction: Wills Cir. Ev. *157; Phil. Ev. 460, 8th Ed.

4th. If this broad doctrine is the law of the land, there is but little difference in the testimony required to convict of petty larceny or of murder, and is in direct conflict with the principle, that the more flagrant the crime, the more convincing should be the proof of its commission.

5th. There was no lawful authority for holding an adjourned court of Oyer and Terminer on the 18th day of December, 1857, as no special precept was issued, and the prisoner was unlawfully sentenced, for want of jurisdiction of the court at that time: Mills v. Com., 1 Harris 627; Pur. Dig. 694, § 23, 24.

A. J. Herr, District Attorney, for Commonwealth.—Where a person having been examined as a witness, answers questions to which he might have demurred as tending to criminate himself, his answers are voluntary: 2 Stark. Evid. 28; Wheater's case, 2 Lewin 157; 2 Mood. 45; Joy on Con. 62; Roscoe Evid. 45; 2 Stark. 366; 4 Camb. 10; 5 Car. & Payne 530; 9 Car. & Payne 83; State v. Vaigner, 5 Richardson 391.

Possession of fruits of crime, recently after its commission, is strong ground for presuming guilt: Car. & Payne, 11 p. 457; Wills Cir. Evid. 72, 81, 82.

An adjourned court of Oyer and Terminer have power to pass sentence of death: 25th section Act of 14th April, 1834.

The opinion of the court was delivered by PORTER, J.

The probable dependency of a human life on this decision, has compelled our attention to the case in its minutest points. We are satisfied with the regularity of the proceeding. The defendant was indicted, arraigned, tried, and convicted at the regular term of the Oyer and Terminer, and by the Act of 14th April, 1834, the court was lawfully adjourned to the time at which he was sentenced. The case of Mills, 1 Harris 627, is not in point; for there the defendant was wholly tried at an adjourned session. — The question most discussed, was the admission of Richard Nolen's testimony. When the inquest had been summoned, this person, who acted as constable of the township, was designated its foreman, — a dangerous and reprehensible act. In this capacity he examined the defendant as a witness, and afterwards detailed his statements in court. If the defendant had been awakened out of sleep, charged with crime, and then, in the necessary confusion of his faculties, sworn to testify, I should have steadfastly resisted the subsequent introduction of the testimony against him. The common law, which justifies an accused man in entire silence, appears in beautiful contrast to the Continental systems, which...