Williams v. Thomas, 81-1376
| Decision Date | 06 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1376,81-1376 |
| Citation | 692 F.2d 1032 |
| Parties | Donald WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. Carl THOMAS, et al., Defendants, Joseph Bolt, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Sue L. Lagarde, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.
Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Robert T. Mowrey (court-appointed), Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before RUBIN and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and VERON*, District Judge.
Donald Williams initiated this section 1983 action seeking redress for injuries inflicted upon him while imprisoned in the Dallas County Jail, Dallas, Texas. Williams maintained that deputies Joseph Bolt and Larry Smith 1 imposed cruel and unusual punishment upon him and deprived him of his liberty without due process of law by grabbing him and slamming him against the wall and the floor of the Dallas County Jail. In an amended complaint, Williams added a state assault and battery action pursuant to the district court's pendent jurisdiction and sought recovery of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The case was tried before a jury, and, thereafter, the district court rendered judgment against deputy Bolt and awarded Williams $500 in compensatory damages and $2500 in attorneys' fees. Deputy Bolt raises thirteen issues on appeal and Williams has filed a cross-appeal contending that the district court abused its discretion by making an insufficient award of attorneys' fees. This Court affirms the district court's award of $500 in compensatory damages, reverses the district court's inadequate award of attorneys' fees, remands this case for a determination of the proper amount of attorneys' fees due, and holds that the attorneys' fees award lies against the County.
Donald Williams was an inmate in the Dallas County Jail on February 21, 1979. On that date, another male inmate in Williams' cell was caught by a female officer violating a jail rule, and, apparently, the inmate refused to cooperate with the officer. The supervisor of the third floor, Officer Riggins, was informed of the conflict and he requested that four male officers, including Deputy Bolt, and one female officer assist the investigating female officer in her attempt to curtail the inmate's violation of the jail rule. Since many of the male inmates had questioned the female officers' authority, Officer Riggins decided to send the two female officers into the cell in an attempt to establish their authority.
Williams claims to have been asleep during this potentially explosive situation. However, when the female officers entered the cell, Williams maintains that another inmate awakened him and told him that he had been requested to come out of the cell. As Williams came out of the cell, Officer Bolt, who was waiting outside with the other male officers, recognized Williams as "the inmate other deputies and I had fought with several times previously." Williams testified that as he exited the cell, Deputy Bolt grabbed him and slammed him against the wall and the floor. Moreover, Williams testified that Deputy Bolt kicked and beat him after he fell to the floor. As a result of Deputy Bolt's actions, Williams received injuries of sufficient severity to cause a doctor to refer Williams to Parkland Hospital for examination. The Dallas County Jail's medical records indicate that Williams sustained "bruises" to his left side, left arm, and left wrist.
In an attempt to vindicate his constitutional rights, Williams initiated this section 1983 action pro se. After the district court appointed counsel to represent Williams, an amended complaint was filed joining a pendent assault and battery action under Texas common law. At the close of the evidence, the district judge submitted special issues to the jury on the section 1983 cause of action and the state assault and battery action. The jury's responses indicated that Deputy Bolt was the officer responsible for Williams' injuries. The pertinent special issues were answered in the following manner:
Section 1983 claim:
1. Deputy Bolt used excessive force against Williams.
2. Deputy Bolt acted in good faith.
3. Deputy Bolt's use of excessive force was a proximate cause of Williams' injuries.
4. Williams was entitled to no monetary compensation for Deputy Bolt's use of excessive force.
State assault and battery claim:
1. Deputy Bolt committed an assault and battery against Williams.
2. Deputy Bolt's assault and battery was a proximate cause of Williams' injuries.
3. Deputy Bolt was not acting in self defense.
4. Williams was entitled to $500 as compensation for Deputy Bolt's assault and battery.
After the jury returned its verdict, Williams moved for judgment in conformity with the verdict. However, Deputy Bolt opposed entry of judgment in Williams' favor and moved for judgment in his favor based on the jury's affirmative response to the good faith issue that was submitted with the section 1983 claim. The district judge, concluding that the good faith defense was inapplicable in this case as a matter of law, rendered judgment for Williams and awarded $500 in compensatory damages pursuant to the jury's findings on the assault and battery claim. Moreover, deciding that Williams was a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, the district court awarded Williams $2500 in attorneys' fees. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.
Deputy Bolt contends on appeal that the jury's finding of good faith bars recovery by Williams on the state assault and battery action. Initially, it should be noted that the good faith defense was submitted only in relation to the section 1983 cause of action. The district court judge prefaced his instructions to the jury by stating: "I will first instruct you as to the federal law claims and then instruct you as to the state law claims." Thereafter, the district court judge instructed the jury on excessive force and good faith. After concluding the portion of the charge relating to the federal claim, the trial judge stated: "I will now instruct you as to the laws of the State of Texas as they relate to Williams' state claim of assault and battery." However, in instructing the jury on the state claim, no mention was made as to a good faith defense and no issue was submitted in that regard. Therefore, it is clear that the jury was directed to consider the issue of good faith only as it applied to the section 1983 claim.
Significantly, Deputy Bolt did not object to the trial court's failure to submit the good faith defense in relation to the assault and battery claim. Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.
Consequently, Bolt has waived any complaint he has concerning the district court's charge as it relates to the good faith defense and the assault and battery action.
In his final attempt to persuade this Court to apply the good faith defense to the state tort claim, Deputy Bolt contends that the section 1983 cause of action and the state assault and battery action merged into one claim, and, hence, the good faith finding bars recovery under both theories. Bolt's merger theory fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between state common law torts and federal constitutional torts. Although the Supreme Court has stated that section 1983 must be "... construed against a background of common law tort principles ...," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Court has refused to transform state common law tort liability into federal constitutional tort liability. As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." Heeding the Supreme Court's advice, this Court has held that proof that a government official acted in good faith will not enable the official to avoid liability under state common law principles. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.1980). Moreover, recognizing that "... federal rights protection [may be] far less extensive than that afforded by the common law ....," this Court has refused to deny recovery on a pendent state tort action simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on the section 1983 action. Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, this Court holds that the federal and state claims did not merge, and, hence, the district court did not err in awarding the plaintiff $500 in compensatory damages based upon the jury's response to the state assault and battery action.
Deputy Bolt maintains that the district court erred in concluding that the good faith defense was inapplicable to the instant section 1983 action as a matter of law. However, as noted previously, the district judge entered judgment for Williams based upon the state assault and battery claim, rather than the section 1983 claim. Thus, even if the district court erred in refusing to apply the good faith defense to the section 1983 claim, and this Court expresses no opinion on this matter, Williams would still be entitled to recover under the state assault and battery action. As noted in Section II of this opinion, a jury finding of good faith under the section 1983 action would not bar Williams' recovery under ...
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...prevailed on a state law claim pendent to a substantial federal civil rights claim that was left undecided. Citing Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3115, 77 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1983), Shimman argues that the same rationale applies where the ......
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