Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 96-20287

• Decision Date: 25 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-20287,96-20287
• Citation: 98 F.3d 179
• Parties: 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,375 Alfred WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME WARNER OPERATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 179

98 F.3d 179

69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,375

Alfred WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME WARNER OPERATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-20287.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1996.

Larry V. Green, Charlotte Marie Williams, Lewis, Sewell & Green, Houston, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert Michael Moore, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DUHE, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Alfred Williams appeals a summary judgment regarding his racial discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in favor of Time Warner Operation, Inc. ("Time Warner"). Concluding that Williams has put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Time Warner's proffered justification for its failure to promote Williams was pretextual, we reverse and remand.

I.

Williams, a black male, was employed by Time Warner as an Installation/Repair Technician when he sought promotion to the position of Preventive Maintenance Technician ("PM Tech"). After the candidates had been reviewed initially by Chuck Stubblefield, the Time Warner employee responsible for making the promotion decisions, Williams and two white males were selected as finalists. Of the seven criteria employed by Stubblefield in making his decision--interview, longevity, experience and education, supervisor's recommendation, performance evaluation, corrective actions, and attendance--Williams scored lower than both of the other two in attendance and supervisory recommendation only.

It is the supervisory recommendation that forms the crux of Williams's case. Randy Waller, Williams's immediate supervisor in his then-current Installation/Repair Technician job, allegedly gave Williams a poor oral recommendation for the promotion, and Stubblefield avers that this recommendation was pivotal in his decision not to award the promotion to Williams. ¹ Although he does not allege that Waller is a racist, Williams contends that Stubblefield is a racist and that Waller, because of his loyalty to the company, lied about Williams's qualifications in order to cover up Stubblefield's racially-motivated decision not to promote Williams.

Williams appealed his adverse decision through Time Warner's "Open Door" procedure, in which the decision was explained to him by Stubblefield and Stubblefield's superior. Williams then had a hearing before a committee comprised of managers and employees of Time Warner, one of whom was selected by Williams and two of whom were black. The committee recommended no change in the decision.

Williams filed suit, alleging that he had been rejected because of his race and seeking damages under title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1994) (now codified as TEX.LAB.CODE ANN. §§ 21.001 et seq.). He also alleged that the failure to promote constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Time Warner's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Williams appeals the decision as to all claims but the art. 5221k action.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.1992). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 n. 14 (5th Cir.1993).

III.

The parties do not contest the proper allocation of burdens of production in employment discrimination cases: First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; second, if he is so successful, the defendant must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action; and third, if the defendant is so successful, the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff then must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that the defendant's articulated reason is false and that the defendant intentionally discriminated. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748-49, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant has rebutted successfully the presumption created by the prima facie case--that plaintiff's rejection was racially motivated--the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Id. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094.

IV.

As Time Warner stipulated that Williams had established a prima facie case, we examine Time Warner's reason for Williams's rejection--Randy Waller's unfavorable oral recommendation of Williams for the promotion. This explanation, if believed, would support a finding that the decision not to promote Williams was legitimate and non-discriminatory; Time Warner thus has satisfied its burden of production. Time Warner need not persuade us that it actually was motivated by this reason; it is sufficient that it has raised a genuine issue of fact regarding whether it unlawfully rejected Williams. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094.

We now turn to the third prong of the Burdine test--whether Time Warner intentionally discriminated against Williams on the basis of race. Williams may satisfy his summary judgment burden on the third prong by coming forward either with direct evidence of discriminatory intent or with circumstantial evidence demonstrating that Time Warner's articulated rationale was pretextual. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir.1996). We recently have articulated the test as follows:

[A] jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment ... if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains. The employer, of course, will be entitled to summary judgment if the evidence taken as a whole would not allow a jury to infer that the actual reason for the discharge was discriminatory.

Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).

The gravamen of William's pretext argument is that Waller, in order to protect his job, agreed to state that he gave a negative recommendation to conceal Stubblefield's discriminatory animus. In effect, Williams argues that Stubblefield made a race-based decision and then used Waller to cover it up. In support of this argument, Williams notes that...