Williams v. Tompkins
Decision Date | 20 June 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 10842.,10842. |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. TOMPKINS. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Towne Young, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. Lizzie Williams against R. V. Tompkins, as Auditor of the City of Dallas. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
J. H. Synnott, of Dallas, for appellant.
J. J. Collins, City Atty., and A. A. Long, W. Hughes Knight, and H. P. Kucera, Asst. City Attys., all of Dallas, for appellee.
This is an appeal prosecuted from a judgment denying to appellant a writ of mandamus against appellee as auditor of the city of Dallas and sought to compel appellee as such auditor to issue and countersign a proper warrant to pay the amount of an award made to her in compensation for personal injuries. As to the allegations upon which appellant predicated her right to the relief sought, it is only necessary to reproduce the following, viz. that the injuries received by her were in consequence of having been run over by a motorcycle officer of the city of Dallas on September 6, 1926; that a claim for compensation for loss from such injuries was presented and filed with the city December 30, 1926, and was by its board of commissioners duly and properly audited and allowed on December 21, 1928, as evidenced by a formal order of that date entered allowing said claim in the sum of $1,716.52 and ordering same paid; that it was the duty of appellee, in his official capacity, to issue and countersign all vouchers and checks, to pay all accounts and claims ordered paid by the board of commissioners of the city of Dallas (including appellant's claim); and that no such account or claim can be collected except upon a check or voucher issued and countersigned by him as such auditor.
In the discussion of the several material questions presented by this appeal, the case, as developed on both theory and fact by appellant and appellee, respectively, will be reflected; therefore, a further statement of the case as made by the pleadings will not be necessary. Following are all of the material facts established by the evidence to have existed from the time appellant was injured to the date the order allowing her claim was entered.
On September 6, 1926, appellant "was struck by a motorcycle ridden by a traffic policeman and sustained bruises and contusions of her right leg and thigh, a deep laceration of her left thigh and back, which were severely bruised, sprained and injured internally, her left foot and ankle severely injured and a compound-comminuted fracture of both bones of the left leg just above the ankle."
On December 30, 1926, Dr. Lane B. Cooke, city health officer, made the following report to the board of commissioners of the city of Dallas as to the condition of appellant:
On December 21, 1928, an order was entered by the board of commissioners on petition of appellant for redress on account of the injuries sustained by her, which in effect directed the city auditor to pay appellant the sum of $1,716.52 in settlement of her claim for damages, sustained by her on September 6, 1926; the said order further recites that appellant was struck by a motorcycle ridden by H. D. Miller of the police department, and directs said sum to be paid out of suits and accounts fund, and instructed the city attorney to draw the necessary release, and provides that out of said sum of $1,716.52 appellant should pay $641.52 to the city of Dallas, said sum representing accumulated taxes on appellant's homestead, and directed that the doctor's bill should also be paid out of said sum.
Following are all of the material facts established by the evidence to have existed in support of appellee's defense:
On July 12, 1929, the new city government — composed of J. Waddy Tate, mayor, and Wylie, Fouts, Harris, and Graves, commissioners — passed an order revoking the order of December 21, 1928, allowing appellant the sum of $1,716.52 in settlement of her claim for injuries received by her September 6, 1926, and as grounds for said rescission the following statement is contained in said order of July 12, 1929:
That appellant, as owner of lot 6 and 15 feet of lot 6, block 2/1008, Maple avenue, was due the city of Dallas taxes, penalties, and interest aggregating $641.52 up to December 15, 1928. By letter of date July 12, 1929, written by A. A. Long, assistant city attorney, addressed to the mayor and board of commissioners, they were advised that, in the opinion of said assistant city attorney, appellant's claim for personal injuries, by virtue of having been struck and injured by one Miller, motorcycle policeman of the city of Dallas, was not a valid claim against said city, and that there had been no legal liability resting upon said city by virtue of said accident. The following excerpt from the appellant's first amended original petition was offered in evidence by appellee:
H. B. Miller, witness for appellee, testified as follows:
Appellee testified in reference to the refusal to pay the claim as follows:
That since the...
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City of Houston v. Chapman
...that said claim be submitted to "an audit by the governing body of the city" of said claim. And it was held in Williams v. Tompkins, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 106, 110 (reversed on other grounds, Tex.Com.App., 62 S.W.2d 70): "* * * to audit is to hear, determine, and in its proper sense inclu......