Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1950
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1043.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORPORATION.

89 F. Supp. 485

WILLIAMS et al. v. TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORPORATION.

Civ. A. No. 1043.

United States District Court W. D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division.

March 23, 1950.

L. K. Leonard, Spartanburg, S. C., for plaintiffs.

Carlisle, Brown & Carlisle, Spartanburg, S. C., Robinson, Robinson & Dreher, Columbia, S. C., for defendant.

TIMMERMAN, District Judge.

This bill in equity was brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County, South Carolina, for a permanent injunction against the defendant's proceeding in a condemnation action, then pending in the State court, to acquire a right-of-way for its natural gas pipe line across the petitioners' property in Spartanburg County. Served upon the defendant with the summons and petition was an order of the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County directing the defendant to show cause why a temporary injunction should not be issued during the pendency of the action and temporarily restraining the defendant from pursuing the condemnation proceeding. A motion by the defendant to vacate the temporary restraining order was refused by the State court without prejudice to the right of the defendant to oppose the granting of a temporary injunction when that question was reached under the rule to show cause.

Prior to the return date on the rule the defendant, a Delaware corporation, then removed the cause to this Court because the suit was one of a civil nature arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce and one between citizens of different states involving more than Three Thousand ($3000.00) Dollars. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, 1441.

The defendant filed its return to the Rule issued by the State Court, its answer and motion for judgment on the pleadings in that the petition does not state a claim against it on which relief can be granted. Therefore, the matter came before me on the petitioners' motion for a temporary injunction and the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. After hearing arguments, I filed an order refusing the temporary injunction, granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dissolving the temporary restraining order. In that order I reserved the right to file an opinion discussing the grounds of my ruling. Because of the importance of the questions at issue here, the present opinion is therefore being filed.

The petitioners allege that they will suffer irreparable injury if the condemnation is allowed to proceed, but neither their pleadings nor affidavits show any element of injury for which they cannot be compensated in the condemnation suit. On the other hand, the defendant shows by its return and affidavits that it would be greatly prejudiced in the construction of its pipeline if it were compelled by a temporary injunction to by-pass the petitioners' property with its heavy and expensive machinery and return at a later time.

Under such decisions as Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 49 S.Ct. 256, 73 L.Ed. 972, and Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 49 S.Ct. 220, 73 L.Ed. 480, the Court in determining whether to grant a temporary injunction must weigh the equities and conveniences of the parties and decide whose interests would be the more seriously prejudiced by the granting or withholding of the injunction.

A temporary injunction should be refused if there is grave doubt as to the petitioners' right to succeed on the merits after a full hearing. Guerlain Perfumery Corp. v. Klein, D.C., 56 F.2d 439; Knapp v. Callaway, D.C., 52 F.2d 476; Cywan v. Blair, D.C., 16 F.2d 279; Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 3 Cir., 90 F.2d 924; Cambridge Electric Light Co. v. Atwill, D.C., 25 F.2d 485; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Vol. 4, 1685. The merits of the present cause would therefore have to be considered by me upon petitioners' application for a temporary injunction even if the defendant had not moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Certainly no temporary injunctive relief may be granted unless a cause of action is stated, so I should first determine whether the petition here states a cause of action upon which injunctive relief may be granted.

The petition asserts three claims of illegality in the condemnation proceeding: (1) That the defendant has no right to condemn in the State court under the procedure sought to be used; (2) that under South Carolina law only political subdivisions of the State can condemn for pipe line purposes; (3) that it is not necessary for the defendant in constructing its pipe line to cross the petitioners' property at the location proposed. The second ground was withdrawn by counsel during argument because it was covered in the first ground.

The defendant's right to condemn is bestowed under the terms of the Natural Gas Act, Act of June 21, 1938, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq. It holds a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Federal Power Commission authorizing it to construct and operate a natural gas transmission pipe line from a point in Texas through eleven intervening States, including South Carolina, to a point on the Hudson River in New York City. Paragraph (h) of Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f (h), provides that when the holder of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity cannot acquire by negotiation a necessary right-of-way to construct and maintain its pipe line "it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated: Provided, That the United States district courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3000."

The Natural Gas Act is constitutional as a proper exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315 U.S. 575, 62 S.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037. Although that decision did not involve the constitutionality of the grant of eminent domain to private natural gas transmission companies, that question was passed upon in Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Thatcher, D.C.La., 84 F.Supp. 344. It was held there that Congress could constitutionally bestow the right of condemnation upon such private licensees as have been charged with the development of the national policy as to the interstate movement of natural gas. Since my order in the present case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed this decision in an opinion filed February 27, 1950, Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 5 Cir., 180 F.2d 644.

Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court uphold the authority of Congress to grant eminent domain powers to private corporations in furtherance of interstate commerce. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 14 S.Ct. 891, 38 L.Ed. 808; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 10 S.Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed. 295.

Closely analogous is the grant of the power of eminent domain to Federal Power Commission licensees under Section 21 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 814. The validity of this grant has been frequently recognized in Federal decisions. Oakland Club v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 84; State of Missouri v. Union Elect. Lt. & Power Co., D.C., 42 F.2d 692; Grand River Dam Authority v. Going, D.C., 29 F.Supp. 316; Harris v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation Dist., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 425.

Petitioners take the position that even though the defendant has been granted the right to condemn for its pipe line right-of-way by the Natural Gas Act, it cannot enforce this right in a South Carolina court because there is no specific South Carolina statute providing a procedure for condemnation of property for pipe line purposes. The procedure used by the defendant is that provided by Section 8437 et seq. of the Code of Laws of South Carolina for 1942. Originally, this procedure was established for railway, canal and turnpike condemnations, but subsequent enactments by the South Carolina Legislature bestowing the right of eminent domain upon other private utilities have prescribed that the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the right should be the procedure set up in Section 8437. Code 1942, §§ 8532, 8540. It appears, therefore, that all private utilities having the power of eminent domain under South Carolina law exercise it through a common procedure, that provided by Section 8437 et seq. It is my opinion that the defendant properly adopted that procedure when it sought to condemn for its right-of-way in a South Carolina Court.

The right to condemn having been given by Congress in the field of interstate commerce where it is supreme, all that is needed to make the grant effective is a State court procedure which meets the requirements of due process and which can be reasonably utilized for the defendant's...