Williams v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. DC 72-13.,DC 72-13.
• Citation: 344 F. Supp. 163
• Parties: Mr. James WILLIAMS et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

344 F. Supp. 163

Mr. James WILLIAMS et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. DC 72-13.

United States District Court, N. D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

June 27, 1972.

Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Washington, D. C., Nausead Stewart, Jackson, Miss., Richard B. Sobol, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.

Stephen N. Shulman, Robert T. Lasky, Washington, D. C., James L. Robertson of Campbell, DeLong, Keady, Robertson & Hagwood, Greenville, Miss., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ORMA R. SMITH, District Judge.

The parties have submitted to the Court, on briefs without oral argument, plaintiffs' motion to strike the demand for trial by jury filed herein by defendants.

The action is one which involves a charge by plaintiffs, members of the Negro or black race, that defendants have discriminated and are discriminating against plaintiffs and members of their class on the grounds of race in the operation of the plant of the defendants located in the City of Cleveland, Bolivar County, Mississippi.

The complaint alleges that defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. In addition, plaintiffs allege impermissible conduct which contravenes Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, now codified, in part, as 42 U. S.C.A. § 1981. Plaintiffs seek to prosecute a class action, which they allege is composed of "all past and incumbent black employees, all black applicants for employment, all potential black employees, and all future black applicants for employment at the facility operated by the defendants in Cleveland, Mississippi".

Section 1981 is now regarded as an effective prohibition against certain purely private discriminatory practices; including employment and labor discrimination. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. April 4, 1972). Currently, allegations of discriminatory employment practices under both Title VII and Section 1981 appear with frequency in a single suit. See e. g., Lazard v. Boeing Company, 322 F.Supp. 343 (E.D.La., 1971).

The specific relief sought in the complaint is a temporary and permanent injunction against the allegedly unlawful practices, as well as damages in the form of back pay, promotions and "compensatory seniority". Under a Title VII statutory grant, this Court, in its discretion, is empowered to accord the injunctive relief sought and order "such further affirmative action as may be appropriate" and to include damages in the form of back pay. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). Moreover, injunctive relief and damages are also available remedies under Section 1981. Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District, 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970). From the pleadings in this case, it cannot be immediately ascertained if the plaintiffs contemplate a form of relief under Section 1981 which is not a part of the express Title VII remedy.

Plaintiffs did not request trial by jury. However, after receiving an extension of time within which to plead, the defendants filed, with their answer, a timely demand for jury trial on all issues. Rule 38(b), F.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs responded by filing a Motion to Strike the demand.

The defendants initially make a pro-forma contention that, because of the demand for back wages, the Seventh Amendment guarantee entitles them to a jury trial on all aspects of the Title VII claim; to include, presumably, equitable relief contemplated in the form of an injunction. The Court is not free to accept this proposition. The demand for back pay under Title VII is not "in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court's discretion, and not by a jury." (Emphasis supplied). Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F.Supp. 914 (S.D.Tex., 1972). The express wording of the "statutory equitable remedy" supports this conclusion. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g).

Of more substance, however, is the defendants' demand for jury trial under the Section 1981 aspects of the suit. Defendants urge that Section 1981 protects, in part, the right "to make and enforce contracts", an action essentially in assumpsit and historically viewed as a purely legal form which is accompanied by an inherent right to trial by jury. 5 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 38.11 5. Therefore, defendants contend, they are entitled to a jury trial on all issues, legal and equitable, or, alternatively, are entitled to trial by jury on the Section 1981 aspects of the claim alone.

Initially, it should be noted that, by filing this suit as a class action, an essentially equitable device, the plaintiffs have not automatically placed the case beyond the scope of the Seventh Amendment. 5 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 38.38 2. Moreover, the fundamental right of a jury trial cannot be impaired by a blending of legal and equitable claims, even where the legal issues may be merely incidental to equitable ones. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L. Ed.2d 988 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L. Ed.2d 44 (1962); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961). See also, Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970).

Section 1981 itself is silent as to the right of trial by jury. Furthermore, the Court has been unable to locate a case in point. Resolution of the issue, therefore, must rest upon a determination of the character of Section 1981 as a form of action, the relief sought in this case and the right to trial by jury in analogous situations.

The Seventh Amendment provides that "in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy...